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

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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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CONTENTS

Deterrence and the Cold War
RICHARD NED LEBOW
JANICE GROSS STEIN 157

The 1995 Congress: The First Hundred Days and Beyond
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN
AMY. L. SCHENKENBERG 183

The Making of the New Democrats
JON F. HALE 207

Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold War Military
PAUL STOCKTON 233

Democracy and Islamic Revivalism
S. V. R. NASR 261

Contra Aid Fundamentals: Exploring the Intricacies and the Issues
RICHARD SOBEL 287

Book Reviews 307

Reference Books and Other Books of Interest Received 348

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BOOK REVIEWS

Garry, **Scrambling for Protection: The New Media and the First Amendment** — Doris A. Graber — 307

Jentleson, **With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982–1990** — Robert A. Divine — 308

Lindsay, **Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy** — H. Bradford Westerfield — 309

Nacos, **Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing** — Vincent M. Cannistaro — 310

Nixon, **Beyond Peace** — Robert G. Kaufman — 311

Harris, **In Defense of Congress** — John B. Gilmour — 314

Greene, **The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford** — Richard M. Strean — 315

Sartori, **Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes** — Peter C. Ordeshook — 316

Nichols, **The Myth of the Modern Presidency** — Michael Nelson — 317

Avant, **Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars** — Barry R. Posen — 319

Hopf, **Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965–1990** — Richard Ned Lebow — 320

Napolitano, **Dove va la Repubblica, 1992–1994: Una transizione incompiuta**; Mershon and Pasquino, eds., **Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic**; Weinberg, **The Transformation of Italian Communism** — Joseph LaPalombara — 321

Johnson, **Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After** — Kenneth E. Gilmore — 323

Light, **Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability** — Robert Maranto — 324

Green and Shapiro, **Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science** — Margaret Levi — 326

Keating, **The Suburban Racial Dilemma: Housing and Neighborhoods** — Michael N. Danielson — 327

Drake, **Reforming the Health Care Market: An Interpretive Economic History** — Anne Lenhard Reisinger — 328

Weiner, Illston, and Hanley, **Sharing the Burden: Strategies for Public and Private Long-Term Care Insurance** — Richard P. Nathan — 329

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bessette, **The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government** EILEEN L. MCDONAGH 331

Diamond and Plattner, eds., **Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy** HYUN SOOK KIM 333

Jewell and Whicker, **Legislative Leadership in the American States** GERALD BENJAMIN 334

Paterson, **Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution** SUSAN ECKSTEIN 335

Downs, ed., **Collective Security beyond the Cold War** DAN LINDLEY 336

Levy, **Seasoned Judgments: The American Constitution, Rights, and History** JOHN R. VILE 338

Abramson, **We the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy** G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN 339

Maranto, **Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency: Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration** PATRICK J. WOLF 340

Jennings, **Understanding the Nature of Poverty in Urban America** JOEL BLAU 341

Susskind, **Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements** MATTHEW ALAN CAHN 342

Ryan, **War and Peace in Ireland: Britain and the IRA in the New World Order** JOHN KURT JACOBSEN 343

Schraeder, **United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change** JEFFREY HERBST 344

Blasius, **Gay and Lesbian Politics: Sexuality and the Emergence of a New Ethics** ROBERT W. BAILEY 345

Rodman, **More Precious the Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World** ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER 346

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RICHARD NED LEBOW and JANICE GROSS STEIN explore the impact of nuclear threats during the cold war. They show that these threats were much less effective than is generally assumed and that they often exacerbated rather than prevented conflict. The authors draw a number of cautionary lessons for the future.

NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN and AMY L. SCHENKENBERG analyze the 1994 midterm elections and provide an early assessment of the work of the 104th Congress. They find the first three months of this Congress to be dramatically different from the beginnings of any other in at least four decades. But the overall impact that will be made by this Congress over the remainder of 1995 and 1996 is still to be determined by the skill of party leaders, the behavior of rank-and-file members, and the role of the president.

JON F. HALE examines the formation, institutionalization, and 1992 electoral success of the New Democrats. His findings contribute to a more complete view of the role played by the Democratic Leadership Council.

PAUL STOCKTON shows how the end of the cold war has changed the process of defense budgeting in Congress. He argues that in response to the breakup of the Soviet Union, legislators are using new mechanisms to build coalitions and shape military spending, with broader implications for congressional behavior and the future of the U.S. defense posture.

S. V. R. NASR draws on the case of Pakistan's principal Islamic revivalists, Jama'at-i Islami, to argue that participation in the political process acts to constrict Islamic revivalism. The detailed examination of the party's role in Pakistan shows that inclusion in the political process has forced compromises and greater pragmatism on the party.

RICHARD SOBEL explores the provision of aid to the contra rebels in Nicaragua from the Reagan administration, third countries, private donors, and arms sales. This and a discussion of when contra funding may have violated the Boland amendment aid restrictions provide a basis for evaluating the Reagan policy.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

Note forthcoming Academy Conference
on
Washington Abandons the Cities?
12 October 1995
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Deterrence and the Cold War

RICHARD NED LEBOW
JANICE GROSS STEIN

The role of nuclear weapons in Soviet–American relations has been hotly debated. Politicians, generals, and most academic strategists believe that America's nuclear arsenal restrained the Soviet Union throughout the cold war. Critics maintain that nuclear weapons were a root cause of superpower conflict and a threat to peace. Controversy also surrounds the number and kinds of weapons necessary to deter, the political implications of the strategic balance, and the role of nuclear deterrence in hastening the collapse of the Soviet imperium.

These debates have had a distinctly theological quality. Partisans frequently defended their positions without recourse to relevant evidence. Some advocated strategic doctrines that were consistent with military postures that they supported. "War-fighting" doctrines were invoked by the air force to justify silo-busting weapons like the MX missile.[1] Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was espoused by arms controllers to oppose the deployment of particular weapons systems.

More careful analysts have been alert to the difficulty of making definitive judgments about deterrence in the absence of valid and reliable information about Soviet and Chinese objectives and calculations. McGeorge Bundy, in his masterful *Danger and Survival*, tells a cautionary tale of the impatience of leaders to acquire nuclear weapons, their largely futile attempts to exploit these weapons for political purposes and, finally, their efforts through arms control, to limit the dangers

[1] In keeping with the theological quality of the debate, followers of the "war-fighting" sect of deterrence had a sacred text: *Voyenaya mysl'*, the Soviet *Journal of Military Thought*. Many of the professional Soviet military discussions of the contingent uses of military power were misused to infer and attribute offensive military intentions to the Soviet Union.

RICHARD NED LEBOW is professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis; Nuclear Crisis Management*, and with Janice Gross Stein *We All Lost the Cold War*. JANICE GROSS STEIN is the Harrowston Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation at the University of Toronto. She is the author of *Getting to the Table: Processes of International Prenegotiation*.

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nuclear weapons pose to their owners as well as their targets. Bundy emphasizes the uncertainty of leaders about the dynamics of deterrence and their concerns about the risks of escalation in crisis.[2]

Richard K. Betts, in another exemplary study, illustrates how difficult it is to assess the efficacy of nuclear threats.[3] He found great disparity between the memories of American leaders and the historical record. Some of the nuclear threats American presidents claim were successful were never made.[4] Other threats were so oblique that it is difficult to classify them as threats. Betts was understandably reluctant to credit any nuclear threat with success in the absence of information about the internal deliberations of the target states. When these states behaved in ways that were consistent with their adversary's demands, it was often unclear if the threat was successful or irrelevant. Leaders could have complied because they had been deterred or compelled, they could have been influenced by considerations unrelated to the threat, or they could have intended originally to behave as they did.

Newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American officials permitted us to reconstruct the deliberations of leaders of both superpowers before, during, and after the two most serious nuclear crises of the last thirty years. This evidence sheds new light on some of the controversies at the center of the nuclear debate. Needless to say, definitive judgments must await the opening of archives and more complete information about the calculations of Soviet and American leaders in other crises, as well as those of other nuclear powers.

The Four Questions

Our analysis is organized around four questions. Each question addresses a major controversy about nuclear deterrence and its consequences. The first and most critical question is the contribution nuclear deterrence made to the prevention of World War III. The conventional wisdom regards deterrence as the principal pillar of the postwar peace between the superpowers. Critics charge that deterrence was beside the point or a threat to the peace. John Mueller, who makes the strongest argument for the irrelevance of nuclear weapons, maintains that

[2] McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988).

[3] Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

[4] Harry Truman claimed to have compelled the Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran in 1946, but no documentary record of a nuclear threat can be found. See Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, 7–8; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Review of the Data Collections on Extended Deterrence by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett" in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Specifying and Testing Theories of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, in press); and Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).

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the superpowers were restrained by their memories of World War II and their knowledge that even a conventional war would be many times more destructive.[5]

More outspoken critics of deterrence charge that it greatly exacerbated superpower tensions. The deployment of ever more sophisticated weapons of destruction convinced each superpower of the other's hostile intentions and sometimes provoked the kind of aggressive behavior deterrence was intended to prevent. The postwar peace endured despite deterrence.[6]

The second question, of interest to those who believe that deterrence worked, is why and how it works. Some advocates insist that it forestalled Soviet aggression; in its absence Moscow would have attacked Western Europe and possibly have sent forces to the Middle East.[7] More reserved supporters credit the reality of nuclear deterrence with moderating the foreign policies of both superpowers. They maintain that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons encouraged caution and restraint and provided a strong incentive for Moscow and Washington to make the concessions necessary to resolve their periodic crises.[8]

The third question concerns the military requirements of deterrence. In the 1960s, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara adopted MAD as the official American strategic doctrine. McNamara contended that the Soviet Union could be deterred by the American capability to destroy 50 percent of its population and industry in a retaliatory strike. He welcomed the effort by the Soviet Union to develop a similar capability in the expectation that secure retaliatory capabilities on both sides would foster stability.[9]

[5] John E. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Modern War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), also disparaged the role of nuclear weapons and argued that bipolarity was responsible for the long peace. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" (paper prepared for the August 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) subsequently acknowledged nuclear weapons as one of "the twin pillars" of the peace. See Richard Ned Lebow, "Explaining Stability and Change: A Critique of Realism" in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), chap. 2, for a critical examination of the realist position on the long peace.

[6] Richard Ned Lebow, "Conventional vs. Nuclear Deterrence: Are the Lessons Transferable?" *Journal of Social Issues* 43, 4 (1987): 171–91.

[7] McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs* 48 (October 1969): 1–20; Harvard Nuclear Study Group, *Living With Nuclear Weapons* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Klaus Knorr, "Controlling Nuclear War," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 79–98; Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–76* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Robert W. Tucker, *The Nuclear Debate: Deterrence and the Lapse of Faith* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).

[8] For example, Raymond Aron, *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy*, trans. Ernst Pawel (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965); Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 236; Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail*; Bundy, *Danger and Survival*; Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[9] For the evolution of McNamara's strategic thinking, see Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), esp. 171–93; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 331–71.

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Many military officers and civilian strategists rejected MAD on the grounds that it was not credible to Moscow. To deter the Soviet Union, the United States needed to be able to prevail at any level of conflict. This required a much larger nuclear arsenal and highly accurate missiles necessary to dig out and destroy Soviet missiles in their silos and the underground bunkers where the political and military elite would take refuge in any conflict. "War-fighting" supplanted MAD as the official strategic doctrine during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. The Reagan administration spent vast sums of money to augment conventional forces and to buy the strategic weapons and command and control networks that Pentagon planners considered essential to war-fighting.[10]

An alternative approach to nuclear weapons, "finite deterrence," maintained that Soviet leaders were as cautious as their Western counterparts and just as frightened by the prospects of nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence was far more robust than proponents of either MAD or war-fighting acknowledged and required only limited capabilities—several-hundred nuclear weapons would probably suffice. The doctrine of finite deterrence never had visible support within the American government.[11]

Differences about the requirements of deterrence reflected deeper disagreements about the intentions of Soviet leaders. For war-fighters, the Soviet Union was an implacable foe. Its ruthless leaders would willingly sacrifice their people and industry in pursuit of world domination. They could only be restrained by superior capabilities and demonstrable resolve to use force in defense of vital interests. Partisans of MAD thought the Soviet Union aggressive but cautious. Soviet leaders sought to make gains but were even more anxious to preserve what they already had. The capability to destroy the Soviet Union as a modern industrial power was therefore sufficient to deter attack, but not necessarily to make its leaders behave in a restrained manner. Proponents of war-fighting and MAD stressed the overriding importance of resolve; Soviet leaders had to be convinced that the United States would retaliate if it or its allies were attacked and come to their assistance if they were challenged in other ways.

Finite deterrence was based on the premise that both superpowers had an overriding fear of nuclear war. Small and relatively unsophisticated nuclear arsenals were sufficient to reinforce this fear and the caution it engendered. Larger forces, especially those targeted against the other side's retaliatory capability, were counterproductive; they exacerbated the insecurity of its leaders, confirmed

[10] For war-fighting critics of MAD, see Daniel Graham, *Shall America Be Defended? SALT II and Beyond* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1979); Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986); Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, "Victory is Possible," *Foreign Policy* 39 (Summer 1980): 14–27; Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Summer 1985): 962–94; Fred Hoffman, "The SDI in U.S. Nuclear Strategy," *International Security 10* (Summer 1985): 13–24.

[11] Morton H. Halperin, *Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987); Adm. Noel Gayler, "The Way Out: A General Nuclear Settlement" in Gwyn Prins, ed., *The Nuclear Crisis Reader* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 234–43.

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their belief in their adversary's hostility, and encouraged them to deploy similar weapons. Supporters of finite deterrence put much less emphasis on the need to demonstrate resolve. The possibility of retaliation, they believed, was enough to deter attack.

The fourth question concerns the broader political value of nuclear weapons. War fighters maintained that strategic superiority was politically useful and conferred bargaining leverage on a wide range of issues.[12] Most supporters of MAD contended that strategic advantages could only be translated into political influence in confrontations like the missile crisis, in which vital interests were at stake.[13] Other supporters of MAD, and all advocates of finite deterrence, denied that nuclear weapons could serve any purpose beyond deterrence.

Restraining, Provocative, or Irrelevant?

Students of deterrence distinguish between general and immediate deterrence. General deterrence relies on the existing power balance to prevent an adversary from seriously considering a military challenge because of its expected adverse consequences.[14] It is often a country's first line of defense against attack. Leaders resort to the strategy of immediate deterrence only after general deterrence has failed, or when they believe that a more explicit expression of their intent to defend their interests is necessary to buttress general deterrence. If immediate deterrence fails, leaders will find themselves in a crisis, as John F. Kennedy did when American intelligence discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba, or at war, as Israel's leaders did in 1973. General and immediate deterrence represents a progression from a diffuse if real concern about an adversary's intentions to the expectation that a specific interest or commitment is about to be challenged.

Both forms of deterrence assume that adversaries are most likely to resort to force or threatening military deployments when they judge the military balance favorable and question the defender's resolve. General deterrence pays particular importance to the military dimension; it tries to discourage challenges by developing the capability to defend national commitments or inflict unacceptable punishment on an adversary. General deterrence is a long-term strategy. Five-year lead times and longer are common between a decision to develop a weapon and its deployment.

Immediate deterrence is a short-term strategy. Its purpose is to discourage an imminent attack or challenge of a specific commitment. The military compo-

[12] Graham, *Shall America Be Defended?* Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style;* Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None."

[13] Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Fall 1983): 59–80, 68; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, 34–38; Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail.*

[14] This distinction was introduced by Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977).

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nent of immediate deterrence must rely on forces in being. To buttress their defensive capability and display resolve, leaders may deploy forces when they anticipate an attack or challenge, as Kennedy did in the aftermath of the summit in June 1961. In response to Nikita Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin, he sent additional ground and air forces to Germany and strengthened the American garrison in Berlin. These reinforcements were designed to communicate the administration's will to resist any encroachment against West Berlin or Western access routes to the city.

General Deterrence

The origins of the missile crisis indicate that general deterrence, as practiced by both superpowers, was provocative rather than preventive. Soviet officials testified that the American strategic buildup, deployment of missiles in Turkey, and assertions of nuclear superiority made them increasingly insecure. The president viewed all of these measures as prudent, defensive precautions. American actions had the unanticipated consequence of convincing Khrushchev of the need to protect the Soviet Union and Cuba from American military and political challenges.

Khrushchev was hardly the innocent victim of American paranoia. His nuclear threats and unfounded claims of nuclear superiority were the catalyst for Kennedy's decision to increase the scope and pace of the American strategic buildup. The new American programs and the Strategic Air Command's higher state of strategic readiness exacerbated Soviet perceptions of threat and contributed to Khrushchev's decision to send missiles to Cuba. In attempting to intimidate their adversaries, both leaders helped to bring about the kind of confrontation they were trying to avoid.

Kennedy later speculated, and Soviet officials have since confirmed, that his efforts to reinforce deterrence also encouraged Khrushchev to stiffen his position on Berlin.[15] The action and reaction that linked Berlin and Cuba were part of a larger cycle of insecurity and escalation that reached well back into the 1950s, if not to the beginning of the cold war. The Soviet challenge to the Western position in Berlin in 1959–1961 was motivated by Soviet concern about the viability of East Germany and secondarily by Soviet vulnerability to American nuclear-tipped missiles stationed in Western Europe. The American missiles had been deployed to assuage NATO fears about the conventional military balance on the central front, made more acute by the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The Warsaw Pact, many Western authorities now believe, represented an

[15] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1965), 347–48. This point is also made by Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 429, 579.

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attempt by Moscow to consolidate its control over an increasingly restive Eastern Europe.[16]

Once the crisis erupted, general deterrence played an important moderating role. Kennedy and Khrushchev moved away from confrontation and toward compromise because they both feared war. Kennedy worried that escalation would set in motion a chain of events that could lead to nuclear war. Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the missiles indicated that he too was prepared to make sacrifices to avoid war. His capitulation in the face of American military pressure was a humiliating defeat for the Soviet Union and its leader. Soviet officials confirm that it was one factor in his removal from power a year later.[17] For many years, Americans portrayed the crisis as an unalloyed American triumph. Kennedy's concession on the Jupiters and his willingness on Saturday night to consider making that concession public indicate that, when the superpower leaders were "eyeball to eyeball," both sides blinked. One reason they did so was their fear of nuclear war and its consequences.

General deterrence also failed to prevent an Egyptian decision to use force in 1973. President Anwar Sadat and his military staff openly acknowledged Egyptian military inferiority. They had no doubt about Israel's resolve to defend itself if attacked. Sadat still chose to fight a limited war. He decided to attack Israel because of intense domestic political pressures to regain the Sinai. He had lost all hope in diplomacy after the failure of the Rogers missions, and although he recognized that the military balance was unfavorable, he expected it to get even worse in the future.

Israel's practice of general deterrence – it acquired a new generation of fighters and bombers – convinced Sadat to initiate military action sooner rather than later. Egyptian military planners devised a strategy intended to compensate for their military inferiority. Egyptian officers sought to capitalize on surprise, occupy the east bank of the Suez Canal, defend against Israeli counterattacks with a mobile missile screen, and press for an internationally imposed cease-fire before their limited gains could be reversed by a fully mobilized Israel. The parallels between 1962 and 1973 are striking. In both cases, attempts to reinforce general deterrence against vulnerable and hard-pressed opponents provoked rather than prevented unwanted challenges.

General deterrence had contradictory implications in the crisis that erupted between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the October War.

[16] On the Warsaw Pact, see Robin Allison Remington, *The Changing Soviet Perception of the Warsaw Pact* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 1967); Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981); David Holloway, "The Warsaw Pact in Transition" in David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp, eds., *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 19–38.

[17] Interview, Leonid Zamyatin, Moscow, 16 December 1991; Sergei Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His Era*, trans. William Taubman (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 156–57; Oleg Troyanovsky, "The Caribbean Crisis: A View from the Kremlin," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 4–5 (April/May 1992): 147–57.

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Leaders of both superpowers were confident that the other feared war; general deterrence was robust. This confidence allowed the United States to alert its forces worldwide without fear of escalation. Leonid Brezhnev and some of his colleagues, on the other hand, worried about escalation if Soviet forces were deployed in positions in Egypt where they were likely to encounter advancing Israelis. The Politburo agreed that they did not want to be drawn into a military conflict that could escalate. Fear of war restrained the Soviet Union and contributed to the resolution of the crisis.

Immediate deterrence is intended to forestall a specific military deployment or use of force. For immediate deterrence to succeed, the defender's threats must convince adversaries that the likely costs of a challenge will more than offset any possible gains.[18] Immediate deterrence did not prevent the missile crisis. After Khrushchev had decided to send missiles to Cuba, Kennedy warned that he would not tolerate the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The president issued his threat in the belief that Khrushchev had no intention of establishing missile bases in Cuba. In the face of the president's warnings, Khrushchev proceeded with the secret deployment.

Students of the crisis disagree about why deterrence failed. Some contend that the strategy could not have worked, whereas others insist that Kennedy attempted deterrence too late.[19] Whatever the cause, the failure of deterrence exacerbated the most acute crisis of the cold war. By making a public commitment to keep Soviet missiles out of Cuba, Kennedy dramatically increased the domestic political and foreign-policy costs of allowing the missiles to remain after they were discovered. A threat originally intended to deflect pressures on the administration to invade Cuba would have made that invasion very difficult to avoid if Soviet leaders had not agreed to withdraw their missiles.

Israel chose not to practice immediate deterrence in 1973. Its leaders were convinced that Egypt would only attack when it could neutralize Israel's air force. Confidence in general deterrence blinded Israel's leaders to the growing desperation of Sadat and his imperative to find a limited military strategy that would achieve his political objective. Israel's leaders worried instead that limited deterrent or defensive measures on their part might provoke Egypt to launch a miscalculated attack.

Even if Israel had practiced immediate deterrence, the evidence suggests that it would have made no difference. It is unlikely that public warnings and mobilization of the Israel Defense Forces would have deterred Egypt; Sadat had expected Israel to mobilize its reserves and reinforce the Bar-Lev Line in response

[18] See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 82–97, for a discussion of the four traditional prerequisites of deterrence. For discussion of the conditions essential to deterrence success, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990), 59–69.

[19] See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3.

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to Egyptian military preparations. He was surprised and pleased that Israel did not take defensive measures and that Egyptian forces did not sustain the high casualties that he had anticipated and was prepared to accept.[20]

When the cease-fire negotiated jointly by Moscow and Washington failed to stop the fighting, Leonid Brezhnev threatened to consider unilateral intervention. The United States resorted to immediate deterrence to prevent a Soviet deployment. This was not the first time since the war began that Henry Kissinger had attempted to deter Soviet military intervention. As early as 12 October, he told Anatoly Dobrynin that any attempt by the Soviet Union to intervene with force would "wreck the entire fabric of U.S.–Soviet relations."[21] Later that day, he warned the Soviet ambassador that any Soviet intervention, regardless of pretext, would be met by American force.[22] On the evening of 24 October, when Brezhnev asked for joint intervention and threatened that he might act alone if necessary, the United States went to a DEFCON III alert.

Immediate deterrence was irrelevant since Brezhnev had no intention of sending Soviet forces to Egypt. Soviet leaders had difficulty understanding why President Richard Nixon alerted American forces. Brezhnev and some of his colleagues were angered, dismayed, and humiliated. Immediate deterrence was at best irrelevant in resolving the crisis and, at worst, it damaged the long-term relationship between the superpowers.

Deterrence had diverse and contradictory consequences for superpower behavior. General and immediate deterrence were principal causes of the missile crisis, but general deterrence also facilitated its resolution. In 1973, general deterrence contributed to the outbreak of war between Egypt and Israel and provided an umbrella for competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Immediate deterrence failed to prevent the superpower crisis that followed, but general deterrence constrained the Soviet leadership and helped to resolve the crisis. These differences can best be understood by distinguishing between the strategy and reality of nuclear deterrence.

The strategy of deterrence attempts to manipulate the risk of war for political ends. For much of the cold war, Soviet and American policy makers doubted that their opposites were deterred by the prospect of nuclear war. They expended valuable resources trying to perfect the mix of strategic forces, nuclear doctrine, and targeting policy that would succeed in restraining their adversary. They also used military buildups, force deployments, and threats of war to try to coerce one another into making political concessions. In Berlin and Cuba, these attempts were unsuccessful but succeeded in greatly aggravating tensions.

The reality of deterrence derived from the inescapable fact that a superpower nuclear conflict would have been an unprecedented catastrophe for both sides.

[20] Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence 1: The View from Cairo" in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 31–59.

[21] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 508.

[22] Ibid., 510.

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Superpower leaders understood this; by the late 1960s, if not earlier, they had come to believe that their countries could not survive a nuclear war. Fear of war, independent of the disparity in the strategic capabilities of the two sides, helped to keep both American and Soviet leaders from going over the brink and provided an important incentive for the mutual concessions that resolved the Cuban missile crisis. The moderation induced by the reality of deterrence helped to curtail the recklessness encouraged by the strategy of deterrence.

The contradictory consequences of deterrence are not fully captured by any of the competing interpretations. Proponents of deterrence have emphasized the positive contribution of the reality of deterrence but ignored the baneful consequences of the strategy. The critics of deterrence have identified some of the political and psychological mechanisms that made the strategy of deterrence provocative and dangerous. But many ignored the ways in which the reality of deterrence was an important source of restraint.

When and Why Does Deterrence Work?

Proponents of deterrence have advanced two contrasting reasons for its putative success. The conventional wisdom holds that deterrence restrained the Soviet Union by convincing its leaders that any military action against the United States or its allies would meet certain and effective opposition. Those who credit deterrence with preserving the peace assume that, in its absence, the Soviet Union would have been tempted to use force against its Western adversaries or their allies in the Middle East.

Throughout the years of Soviet–American rivalry, American leaders regarded their adversary as fundamentally aggressive and intent on expanding its influence by subversion, intimidation, or the use of force. Soviet leaders were frequently described as cold, rational calculators who were constantly probing for opportunities. They carefully weighed the costs and benefits and abstained from aggressive action only if its costs were expected to outweigh the gains. In this context, the peace always looked precarious to American leaders and the remarkable success in avoiding war needed an extraordinary explanation. The strategy of nuclear deterrence provided the explanation.

The strategy of deterrence seemed ideal for coping with a fundamentally aggressive and opportunity-driven adversary. It sought to prevent Soviet aggression by denying its leaders opportunities to exploit. The United States consequently developed impressive military capabilities—general deterrence—and publicly committed itself to the defense of special interests—immediate deterrence—when it appeared that these interests might be challenged. The conventional wisdom, eloquently expressed in many of the scholarly writings on deterrence, assumed that Soviet aggression would wax and wane as a function of Soviet perceptions of American military capability and resolve. Soviet leaders

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would be most restrained when they regarded the military balance as unfavorable and American resolve as unquestionable.[23]

Our analyses of the crises in 1962 and 1973 do not support this assessment of deterrence. In 1962, the strategy of deterrence provoked a war-threatening crisis, and in 1973 nuclear deterrence provided the umbrella under which each sought to make or protect gains at the expense of the other until they found themselves in a tense confrontation.

The alternative interpretation holds that fear of nuclear war made both superpowers more cautious than they otherwise would have been in their competition for global influence and thereby kept the peace. Although far more convincing than the argument that credits the strategy of nuclear deterrence with preserving the peace, this explanation also is not fully persuasive. The reality of nuclear deterrence had a restraining effect on both Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962 and on Brezhnev in 1973. When superpower leaders believed that they were approaching the brink of war, fear of war pulled them back.[24]

It is difficult to judge how much of the fear of war can be attributed to nuclear weapons. At the time of the Korean War, the United States had only a limited nuclear arsenal, but Stalin may have exaggerated American ability to launch extensive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union.[25] Robert McNamara subsequently testified that President Kennedy worried primarily that the missile crisis would lead to a conventional war with the Soviet Union.[26] Other members of the Ex Comm disagree; they say it was the threat of nuclear war that was in the back of their minds and, probably, the president's.[27] McNamara also admits that he had little expectation that a conventional conflict could be contained. "I didn't know how we would stop the chain of military escalation once it began."[28]

[23] "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," (NSC 68), 14 April 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 264; Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism* 20 (May–June 1980): 1–18; John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1981); Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan What?" *Commentary* 69 (April 1980): 1–18; Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 21–34; Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," *Commentary* 69 (April 1980): 40–49.

[24] There is also some evidence that the fear of war influenced Soviet behavior in Korea. Joseph Stalin authorized Kim Il Sung to attack South Korea in June 1950 in the expectation that the United States would not intervene. When Washington did intervene, Stalin, afraid that the North Korean attack would provoke a Soviet–American war, quickly signaled interest in a cease-fire. N. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav L. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 144–47.

[25] Oleg Grinevsky contends that Stalin feared that even a few atomic bombs dropped on Moscow would have destroyed the communist experiment. Interview, Oleg Grinevsky, Stockholm, 24 October 1992.

[26] David A. Welch, ed., *Proceedings of the Hawk's Cay Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 5–8 March 1987* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for Science and International Affairs, Working Paper 89-1, 1989), mimeograph, 81-83, hereafter cited as *Hawk's Cay Conference*.

[27] Ibid., 83ff.

[28] Hawk's Cay Conference, author's record.

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Soviet leaders also worried about war in the missile crisis, but neither the written record nor the testimony of Soviet officials offers any evidence of the kind of war Khrushchev thought most likely. There is no evidence that Khrushchev or Kennedy speculated about war scenarios; they were desperately trying to resolve the crisis. They had no political or psychological incentive to investigate the consequences of failure—quite the reverse. Their fear of war remained strong but diffuse.

In 1973, the United States did not see war as a likely possibility, but Soviet leaders worried actively about war. They feared the consequences of a conventional Soviet–Israeli engagement somewhere between the canal and Cairo, or an accidental encounter at sea. However, there is no evidence that Soviet speculation progressed to more detailed consideration of how either could escalate to nuclear war. Again, the fear of war was strong but diffuse. Soviet leaders feared not only nuclear war but any kind of Soviet–American war. Their fear translated into self-deterrence; Brezhnev ruled out the commitment of Soviet forces on Egypt's behalf before the United States practiced deterrence.

The absence of superpower war is puzzling only if at least one of the superpowers was expansionist and aggressive. On the basis of the evidence now available, the image that each superpower held of the other as opportunity-driven aggressors can be discredited as crude stereotypes. Khrushchev and Brezhnev felt threatened by what they considered the predatory policies of their adversary, as did American leaders by Soviet expansionist policies. For much of the cold war, Soviet leaders were primarily concerned with preserving what they had, although like their American counterparts, they were not averse to making gains that appeared to entail little risk or cost. Serious confrontations between the superpowers arose only when one of them believed that its vital interests were threatened by the other.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that although both superpowers hoped to remake the world in their image, neither Moscow nor Washington was ever so dissatisfied with the status quo that it was tempted to go to war to force a change. It was not only the absence of opportunity that kept the peace, but also the absence of a strong motive for war. Without a compelling motive, leaders were unwilling to assume the burden and responsibility for war, even if they thought its outcome would be favorable. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the United States might have destroyed the Soviet Union in a first strike with relatively little damage to itself, American leaders never considered a preventive war. The Soviet Union never possessed such a strategic advantage, but there is no reason to suspect that Khrushchev or Brezhnev had any greater interest than Eisenhower and Kennedy in going to war. The reality of deterrence helped to restrain leaders on both sides, but their relative satisfaction with the status quo was an important cause of the long peace.

How Much is Enough?

There was never a consensus in Washington about what was necessary to deter the Soviet Union. Proponents of MAD maintained that Soviet leaders would be

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deterred by the prospect of their country's destruction. Robert McNamara's "whiz kids" at Defense calculated that MAD required the capability to destroy 50 percent of the Soviet Union's population and industry in a retaliatory strike.[29] McNamara recommended to Premier Aleksei Kosygin in 1967 that the Soviet Union acquire roughly the same kind of second-strike capability so that deterrence would become more stable. Many military officers and conservative civilian strategists rejected MAD on the grounds that it was not a credible strategy. No American president, they argued, could ever convince his Soviet counterpart that he would accept certain destruction of the United States to punish the Soviet Union for invading Western Europe. To deter Soviet aggression, the United States needed clear-cut, across-the-board strategic superiority to decapitate the Soviet political and military leadership, destroy their command, control, and communications network, penetrate hardened targets, and outfight Soviet forces at every level.[30] Proponents of finite deterrence, the smallest of the three communities, argued that nuclear deterrence was robust and required only limited capabilities. Strategic thinkers in France and Israel have, of necessity, voiced this kind of argument.

The outcome of the missile crisis supports the argument of finite deterrence. The American advantage was overwhelming. The CIA estimated that the Soviet Union, which had only a hundred missiles and a small fleet of obsolescent bombers, could attack the United States with at most three-hundred-fifty nuclear weapons. The United States had a strategic nuclear strike force of thirty-five hundred weapons and far more accurate and reliable delivery systems. Because Soviet missiles were unreliable and Soviet bombers vulnerable to air defenses, it was possible that very few Soviet weapons would have reached their American targets. Had the missiles in Cuba been fully operational and armed with nuclear weapons, they would have augmented the Soviet arsenal by fewer than sixty warheads.[31]

Military superiority offered little comfort to the administration. It was not "usable superiority," McGeorge Bundy explained, because "if even one Soviet weapon landed on an American target, we would all be losers."[32] Robert McNamara insists that "The assumption that the strategic nuclear balance (or 'imbalance') mattered was absolutely wrong."[33] He recalled a CIA estimate that the Soviets

[29] Ball, *Politics and Force Levels*, 171–93; Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 331–71.

[30] See Graham, *Shall America Be Defended?*; Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*; Gray and Payne, "Victory is Possible"; Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None."

[31] Interview, General Dimitri A. Volkogonov by Raymond L. Garthoff, Moscow, 1 February 1989; Anatoliy Gribkov, "Transcript of the Proceedings of the Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 9–12 1992" in James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, eds., *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 53–317, hereafter cited as *Havana Conference*.

[32] "Retrospective on the Cuban Missile Crisis," 22 January 1983, Atlanta, GA. Participants: Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Edwin Martin, Donald Wilson, and Richard E. Neustadt (hereafter referred to as Retrospective), 6.

[33] *Hawk's Cay Conference*, 9–10.

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might be able to deliver thirty warheads against the United States in a retaliatory attack. "Does anyone believe that a president or a secretary of defense would be willing to permit thirty warheads to fall on the United States? No way! And for that reason, neither we nor the Soviets would have acted any differently before or after the Cuban deployment."[34] In McNamara's judgment, no president would be willing "to consciously sacrifice an important part of our population or our land and place it in great jeopardy to a strike by Soviet strategic forces, whether it be one city, or two cities, or three cities." The Soviet Union had the capability to do this even before deploying any missiles in Cuba. "And therefore, we felt deterred from using our nuclear superiority and that was not changed by the introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba."[35]

Proponents of war-fighting, MAD, and finite deterrence would all expect Khrushchev to be deterred by the one-sided American strategic advantage. Only proponents of finite deterrence would anticipate that Kennedy would be deterred by the small Soviet arsenal.

Ironically, Kennedy was not fully confident before or during the crisis that even overwhelming American strategic superiority would restrain the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, by contrast, was confident—before the crisis—that the small and inferior Soviet arsenal would deter Kennedy. He worried rather that the United States would exploit its strategic superiority for political purposes. His confidence in finite deterrence permitted him to deploy missiles in Cuba with the expectation that Kennedy would not go to war.

During the crisis, Khrushchev's confidence in deterrence wavered. He worried both that Kennedy would be unable to control the militants in the military and the CIA who did not share his sober recognition of the futility of war and that the crisis might spin out of control. These fears were partly responsible for the concessions that he made. Kennedy, too, worried that Khrushchev would be ousted by militants determined to go to war. Even when the United States had the overwhelming superiority that proponents of war-fighting recommend, Kennedy's confidence in deterrence was limited. He, too, then made the concessions necessary to resolve the crisis.

In making critical judgments about the robustness of deterrence during the crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev paid little attention to the military balance. They concentrated instead on the political pressures that might push either side into using force. This success in resolving the crisis increased their confidence that the other shared their horror of war.

Although deterrence was robust in 1962, not everybody drew the same positive lessons from the missile crisis as did Khrushchev and Kennedy. Influential members of the Soviet elite believed that the Kennedy administration had acted aggressively in Cuba because of its strategic advantage. Many Americans concluded that Khrushchev had retreated because of Soviet inferiority. The lesson

[34] Interview, Robert McNamara, Hawk's Cay, FL, 6 March 1987.
[35] Retrospective, 40.

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of the missile crisis was clear: the United States needed to maintain its strategic advantage, or failing that, strategic parity. In Moscow, too, there was a renewed commitment to ending the strategic imbalance. The missile crisis did not trigger the Soviet strategic buildup of the 1960s—it had been authorized by Khrushchev before the missile crisis—but it mobilized additional support for that program and made it easier for Brezhnev to justify when resources grew scarce in the 1970s.[36]

The crisis in 1973, the most serious superpower confrontation since the missile crisis, occurred when the strategic balance was roughly equal and both sides had a secure second-strike capability. Proponents of finite deterrence would expect the reality of nuclear deterrence to be robust and the strategy of nuclear deterrence to fail unless the security of the homeland was threatened. Given the reality of nuclear deterrence when both sides had an assured capacity to retaliate, advocates of MAD would also expect the strategy of deterrence to fail unless vital interests were at stake. War-fighters would reason differently. Since neither side possessed "escalation dominance," the side that estimated a lower risk of war would have the advantage.

The predictions of the three schools with respect to the American alert cannot be tested directly, since deterrence was irrelevant. The Soviet Union had no intention of sending forces to Egypt before the United States alerted its forces. We can nevertheless assess the Soviet interpretation of the American attempt at deterrence and examine its fit with the expectations of the three schools. Soviet leaders dismissed the American nuclear alert as incredible. They could do so in a context in which nuclear weapons were regarded as so unusable that nuclear threats to defend anything but the homeland or vital interests were incredible. There is no evidence, moreover, that political leaders in Moscow made any attempt to assess the relative strategic balance. The Soviet interpretation is consistent with the expectations of finite deterrence and MAD and inconsistent with those of war-fighters.

Analysis of these two crises reveals that it was not the balance or even perceptions of the balance but rather the judgments leaders made about its meaning that were critical. The understanding leaders had of their adversary's intentions was much more important than their estimates of its relative capabilities. Deterrence was as robust in 1962 as proponents of finite deterrence expected, and at least as robust in 1973 as proponents of MAD anticipated. Yet, worst-case analyses remained the conventional wisdom for many years among militants in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Many on both sides continued to assume that the strategic balance was and would continue to be the critical determinant of superpower behavior.

[36] Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. rev. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 158–86, on Soviet lessons from the crisis; Interviews, Leonid Zamyatin and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Moscow, 16–17 December 1991.

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War fighters drew a direct relationship between the strategic balance and Soviet behavior. The Soviet Union would be most restrained when the United States had a strategic advantage and would behave more aggressively when the military balance tilted in their favor.[37] Proponents of finite deterrence denied that any relationship existed between the strategic balance and aggression, whereas adherents of MAD could be found on both sides of the debate. The proposition that the aggressiveness of Soviet leaders intensified or diminished in accordance with their perception of the strategic balance became the fundamental assumption of strategic analysis and force planning in the United States. Deterrence was considered primarily a military problem, and many American officials and strategists worked on the assumption that Washington could never have too powerful a military or too great a strategic advantage.[38]

The link between Soviet foreign policy and the military balance is an empirical question. To test this relationship, we examined Soviet–American relations from the beginning of the cold war in 1947 to 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Drawing on formerly classified estimates of the strategic balance and public studies of the balance prepared by prominent strategic institutes, we developed a composite measure of the relative strategic potency of the two superpowers. Our analysis suggests that the nuclear balance went through three distinct phases. The first, 1948 to 1960, was a period of mounting American advantage. The second, 1961 to 1968, was characterized by a pronounced but declining American advantage. The third, 1968 to 1985, was an era of strategic parity.[39]

[37] The assertion that the Soviet Union could only be constrained by superior military power became something close to dogma in the United States government. It received its most forceful expression in National Security Council Memorandum (NSC) 68, written on the eve of the Korean War in 1950. NSC 68 is generally recognized as the most influential American policy document of the cold war. See John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chap. 4; Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament" in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 267–338; "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 234–92.

[38] Soviet leaders, with a mirror image of their adversary, made the same assumption about American foreign policy. Khrushchev put missiles in Cuba in part to achieve psychological equality and constrain American foreign policy.

[39] The accepted strategic wisdom, reflected in our analysis, holds that the United States had a decisive strategic advantage throughout the 1950s. It possessed an expanding capability to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons without the prospect of direct retaliation. The Strategic Air Command had a large and growing fleet of strategic bombers based in the United States, Western Europe, and North Africa. This strike force was supplemented by carrier and land-based aircraft deployed along the Soviet periphery. The Soviet Union's bomber force was small, shorter range, and technologically primitive. The relative military balance changed in the 1960s when both superpowers began to deploy ICBMs. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had some 3,500 warheads against approximately 300 for the Soviets. Only 20 of the Soviet warheads were on ICBMs. See Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy," *International Security* 12 (Summer 1987): 22–51; David A. Welch, ed., *Proceedings of the Cambridge Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 11–12 October 1987* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for Science and International Affairs, April 1988), final version, mimeograph, 52, 79, hereafter cited as *Cambridge Conference*.

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There is no positive correlation between shifts in Soviet assertiveness and shifts in the strategic balance. Soviet challenges are most pronounced in the late 1940s and early 1950s in central Europe and Korea and again in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Berlin and Cuba. A third, lesser period of assertiveness occurred from 1979 to 1982 in Africa and Afghanistan.[40] The first and second peaks occurred at a time when the United States had unquestioned nuclear superiority. The third peak coincides with the period of strategic parity, before the years of the putative American "window of vulnerability." During this period of alleged Soviet advantage, roughly 1982 to 1985, Soviet behavior was restrained. The relationship between the military balance and Soviet assertiveness is largely the reverse of that predicted by proponents of war-fighting. The United States had unquestioned supremacy from 1948 to 1952 and again from 1959 to 1962, the principal years of Soviet assertiveness. Soviet challenges were most pronounced when the Soviet Union was weak and the United States was strong.

This pattern challenges the proposition that aggression is motivated primarily by adversaries who seek continuously to exploit opportunities. When leaders became desperate, they behaved aggressively even though the military balance was unfavorable and they had no grounds to doubt their adversary's resolve. In the absence of compelling need, leaders often did not challenge even when opportunities for an assertive foreign policy were present.[41] A definitive answer to the question, "How much is enough?" must await detailed analyses of other nuclear crises with other leaders. Drawing on the analysis of leaders' thinking in these two cases and the broad pattern in their relationship during the cold war,

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By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces had deployed enough ICBMs to destroy about half of the population and industry of the United States. It had achieved the capability that McNamara considered essential for MAD. Some time in the 1970s the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity. This balance prevailed until 1991, although some analysts have argued that one or the other possessed some margin of advantage. American missiles were more accurate throughout the 1970s. The United States was also the first to deploy multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). It put three warheads on Minuteman missiles, and fourteen on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Soviet Union began to deploy MIRVs in the late 1970s and, in the opinion of some analysts, gained a temporary strategic advantage because of the greater throw weight of their ICBMs. The SS-18 could carry thirty to forty MIRVs, but in practice was deployed with a maximum of ten.

[40] Soviet aggressiveness is a subjective phenomenon. To measure it, we polled a sample of international relations scholars and former government officials. They were carefully chosen to ensure representation of diverse political points of view. These experts were given a list of events that could be interpreted as Soviet challenges to the United States, its allies, or nonaligned states. They were asked to rank them in order of ascending gravity. The survey revealed a surprising concurrence among experts. A description of the survey and its results appears in Richard Ned Lebow and John Garofano, "Soviet Aggressiveness: Need or Opportunity?" mimeograph.

[41] This kind of need-based explanation of aggression provides a convincing explanation of both Soviet and American foreign policy in the cold war since the Khrushchev and Kennedy years. See Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984): 147–86.

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we can suggest a tentative answer: finite nuclear capabilities in the context of a shared fear of war. In this circumstance, a little deterrence goes a long way.

The Political Value of Nuclear Weapons

Just as there was no consensus during the cold war on how much deterrence was enough, so there was no agreement on the political value of nuclear weapons. War-fighters contended that nuclear power was fungible; they insisted that strategic advantage could be successfully exploited for political purposes. Most proponents of MAD argued that nuclear threats were likely to be effective only in defense of a state's most vital interests. Proponents of finite deterrence took the most restrictive view of the political value of nuclear weapons. They argued that nuclear weapons could only deter attacks against one's own state and perhaps against one's closest allies.

War-fighters, who were dubious about the efficacy of deterrence and set the most demanding conditions, nevertheless expressed the greatest confidence in compellence. Advocates of finite deterrence, who maintained that nuclear deterrence was relatively easy to achieve, doubted that nuclear threats would succeed in compelling nuclear adversaries. Proponents of MAD thought deterrence was somewhat easier to achieve than compellence.

These seeming contradictions between the schools of war-fighting and finite deterrence can be reconciled by examining why each argued that deterrence and compellence would succeed or fail. For war-fighters, the critical factor was the military balance. When a state possessed a decisive strategic advantage, it could more convincingly demonstrate resolve and more readily deter and compel an adversary. Parity made deterrence possible but compellence extraordinarily difficult.

Advocates of finite deterrence reasoned that leaders had a pronounced fear of the consequences of nuclear war. This fear had a low threshold and was independent of the level of destruction leaders could inflict on their adversaries. The strategic balance was therefore irrelevant to deterrence, and strategic advantage did not make compellence any easier. So long as the target state had some nuclear retaliatory capability, nuclear threats for any purpose other than retaliation lacked credibility.

Proponents of MAD also denied the utility of strategic superiority. They placed the threshold of deterrence higher than did advocates of finite deterrence and argued that a state needed an unquestioned capability, after sustaining a first strike, to retaliate in sufficient force to destroy approximately 50 percent of its adversary's population and industry. Additional nuclear capabilities did not make deterrence any more secure. Some advocates of MAD believed that strategic advantages were critical for compellence but only in limited, well-specified circumstances. Like the advocates of finite deterrence, they argued that the unprecedented destructiveness of nuclear weapons made it very difficult to make credible

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nuclear threats against nuclear adversaries. Such threats would carry weight only when a state's most vital interests were unambiguously threatened.[42]

Proponents of war-fighting and MAD argued that the Cuban missile crisis was consistent with their expectations. They both maintained that Khrushchev sent missiles to Cuba because he doubted American resolve and withdrew them because he respected American military capability.[43] The crisis illustrated a general truth to war-fighters: strategic superiority confers important bargaining advantages in crisis. Advocates of MAD maintained that the missile crisis was a special case. Compellence succeeded not only because of the American military advantage, but because of the asymmetry of interests. The United States was defending a vital interest; the Soviet Union was not.[44]

Both arguments took as their starting point the apparently one-sided outcome of the crisis in favor of the United States. Khrushchev withdrew the Soviet missiles in return for a face-saving pledge from Kennedy not to invade Cuba. Proponents of war-fighting and MAD treated this pledge as largely symbolic because the administration had no intention of invading the island other than to remove the missiles. Both believed that the missiles would have significantly affected the military or political balance and therefore treated their withdrawal as a major concession.

These interpretations that congealed in the 1960s are contradicted by newly available evidence. Although the administration had ruled out an invasion of Cuba, Khrushchev considered Kennedy's pledge not to invade an extremely important concession. With other Soviet leaders, he was convinced that the United States was preparing to overthrow the Castro government and was only prevented from doing so by the missile deployment. In the eyes of the president and his secretary of defense, the missiles in Cuba had much less military value than many students of the crisis have alleged. Their withdrawal was important for domestic and foreign political reasons.

We now know that Kennedy made a second important concession to Khrushchev: he agreed to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey at a decent interval after the crisis. The decision to withdraw the missiles was not made before the crisis, as some administration officials contended, but was offered to Khrushchev as a concession. However, Kennedy insisted that the Kremlin keep it secret. The removal of the Jupiters had little military value but was of enormous symbolic importance to Khrushchev.

[42] McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons"; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail.*

[43] Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," *Adelphi Paper* no. 17 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), 16. See also, Herman Kahn, *On Escalation* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 74–82; Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 80–83.

[44] McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons"; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, 34-38.

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The outcome of the missile crisis is best explained by finite deterrence. The terms of the settlement did not reflect the strategic balance, but mutual fears of war. Despite pronounced Soviet strategic inferiority, the crisis ended in a compromise, not in a one-sided American victory. American leaders judged it too risky to rely on their strategic advantage to compel withdrawal of the Soviet missiles without making the compensating concessions.

The advocates of finite deterrence, MAD, and war-fighting would all expect compellence to be very difficult in the strategic context of 1973. War-fighters would predict that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could compel the other side to achieve political benefit since neither had a decisive strategic advantage. Under conditions of parity and a secure capability to retaliate, proponents of MAD and finite deterrence would predict that compellence would be very difficult unless vital interests were demonstrably at stake.

The failure of Soviet compellence in 1973 is consistent with the shared expectation of all three schools. Brezhnev did not succeed in compelling the United States to restrain Israel, even though it was very much in Washington's interest to stop the fighting. On the contrary, Brezhnev's attempt to compel backfired and escalated the crisis. Although Henry Kissinger recognized Soviet interests, particularly the heavy cost of its humiliating failure to stop the fighting, he nevertheless interpreted Brezhnev's threat that he might consider unilateral action as a direct challenge to the reputation and resolve of the United States.

All three approaches expect, although for quite different reasons, strategic parity to confer no political advantage. To distinguish among the three schools, we need detailed evidence of the calculations of American leaders about the strategic balance. Yet, when Kissinger and his colleagues chose to respond to Brezhnev's threat that he might consider unilateral military action, they made no reference at all to the strategic balance.[45] When they chose not to comply with Brezhnev's threat, the strategic balance was not salient in their minds.

Our analysis of these two cases is most consistent with the arguments of finite deterrence. The overwhelming strategic advantage of the United States in the missile crisis was negated by the fear of war. When the strategic balance was roughly equal, the Soviet Union could not compel even when the United States recognized the strong Soviet interest in protecting an endangered ally and their own interest in saving the Egyptian Third Army. Our evidence suggests

[45] Years later, in an offhand comment, Kissinger claimed that he would not have felt secure enough to choose an alert if the Soviet Union had had a marked strategic advantage. Cited by Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail*, 125. This kind of indirect and fragmentary evidence fits best with the arguments of the war-fighters, largely because Kissinger thought very much as they did. It is of course debatable whether Kissinger would have acted differently had the United States been in a position of relative inferiority; the proposition has never been put to the test. Given Kissinger's heavy emphasis on reputation and resolve, it seems unlikely that he would have complied even if the Soviet Union had had a relative strategic advantage. Proponents of finite deterrence and MAD would argue that Soviet compellence was unlikely to succeed even if the Soviet Union had had a marked advantage because the interests at stake were not sufficiently important.

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that nuclear weapons are unusable for any political purpose but the defense of vital interests.

Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons

The role of nuclear threats and nuclear weapons in Soviet–American relations during the cold war runs counter to much of the conventional wisdom. Throughout the cold war, superpower leaders expected their adversary to exploit any strategic advantage for political or military gain. Consequently, they devoted scarce resources to military spending to keep from being disadvantaged. For four decades Soviet and American leaders worried about the political and military consequences of strategic inferiority. These fears, coupled with the worst-case analysis each side used to estimate the other's strategic capabilities, fueled an increasingly expensive arms race. In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union made an intensive effort to develop its own nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the early 1950s, both sides developed thermonuclear weapons. Following the success of Sputnik in 1957, the United States accelerated its commitment to develop and deploy ICBMs. President Kennedy's decision to expand the scope of the American strategic buildup in the spring of 1961 triggered a reciprocal Soviet decision. The Reagan buildup of the 1980s was a response to Brezhnev's intensive spending of the previous decade and widespread concern that it had bought the Soviet Union a strategic advantage.

This pervasive fear of strategic inferiority was greatly exaggerated. We offer a set of general observations about the impact of nuclear threats and nuclear weapons that summarize our arguments based on the new evidence. These observations must remain tentative until additional evidence becomes available about other critical confrontations during the cold war and about the role of nuclear weapons in Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations.

- *Leaders who try to exploit real or imagined nuclear advantages for political gain are not likely to succeed.* Khrushchev and Kennedy tried and failed to intimidate one another with claims of strategic superiority in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Khrushchev's threats and boasts strengthened Western resolve not to yield in Berlin and provoked Kennedy to order a major strategic buildup. Kennedy's threats against Cuba, his administration's assertion of strategic superiority, and the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey—all intended to dissuade Khrushchev from challenging the West in Berlin—led directly to the Soviet decision to send missiles to Cuba. Both leaders were willing to assume the risks of a serious confrontation to avoid creating the impression of weakness or irresolution.
- *Credible nuclear threats are very difficult to make.* The destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes nuclear threats more frightening but less credible. It is especially difficult to make nuclear threats credible when they are directed against nuclear adversaries who have the capability to retaliate in kind. Many Soviets worried about nuclear war during the missile crisis, but Khrushchev judged correctly that Kennedy would not initiate a nuclear war in response to the deploy-

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ment of Soviet missiles. Khrushchev's principal concern was that the president would be pushed into attacking Cuba and that armed clashes between the invading Americans and the Soviet forces on the island committed to Cuba's defense would escalate into a wider and perhaps uncontrollable war.

In 1973, the American alert had even less influence on the Soviet leadership. It was inconceivable to Brezhnev and his colleagues that the United States would attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. They did not believe that the interests at stake for either the United States or the Soviet Union justified war. The American nuclear threat was therefore incomprehensible and incredible.

• *Nuclear threats are fraught with risk.* In both 1962 and 1973, American leaders were uninformed about the consequences and implications of strategic alerts. In 1973, they did not fully understand the technical meaning or the operational consequences of the DEFCON III alert and chose the alert in full confidence that it entailed no risks. During the missile crisis, when conventional and nuclear forces were moved to an even higher level of alert, it was very difficult to control alerted forces. Military routines and insubordination posed a serious threat to the resolution of the crisis.

Evidence from these two cases suggests that there are stark trade-offs between the political leverage that military preparations are expected to confer and the risks of inadvertent escalation they entail. American leaders had a poor understanding of these trade-offs: they significantly overvalued the political value of nuclear alerts and were relatively insensitive to their risks.[46]

• *Strategic buildups are more likely to provoke than to restrain adversaries because of their impact on the domestic balance of political power in the target state.* Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev all believed that strategic advantage would restrain adversaries. Khrushchev believed that the West behaved cautiously in the 1950s because of a growing respect for the economic as well as the military power of the socialist camp. He was convinced that the visible demonstration of Soviet power, through nuclear threats and the deployment of missiles in Cuba, would strengthen the hands of the "sober realists" in Washington who favored accommodation with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's actions had the reverse impact: they strengthened anti-Soviet militants by intensifying American fears of Soviet intentions and capabilities. Kennedy's warning to Khrushchev not to deploy missiles in Cuba and his subsequent blockade were in large part a response to the growing domestic political pressures to act decisively against the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally.

Brezhnev's strategic buildup was a continuation of Khrushchev's program. American officials believed that the Soviet buildup continued after parity had been achieved. Soviet strategic spending appeared to confirm the predictions of militants in Washington that Moscow's goal was strategic superiority, even a first-strike capability. Brezhnev, on the other hand, expected Soviet nuclear capa-

[46] This theme is developed at length in Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

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bilities to prevent the United States from engaging in "nuclear blackmail." Instead, it gave Republicans the ammunition to defeat President Carter and the SALT II agreement. The Soviet arms buildup and invasion of Afghanistan contributed to Ronald Reagan's landslide victory in 1980 and provided the justification for his administration's massive arms spending. American attempts to put pressure on the Soviet Union through arms buildups were equally counterproductive.

• *Nuclear deterrence is robust when leaders on both sides fear war and are aware of each other's fears.* War-fighting, MAD, and finite deterrence all mistakenly equate stability with specific arms configurations. More important than the distribution of nuclear capabilities, or leaders' estimates of relative nuclear advantage, is their judgment of an adversary's intentions. The Cuban missile crisis was a critical turning point in Soviet–American relations because it convinced Kennedy and Khrushchev, and some of their most important advisers as well, that their adversary was as committed as they were to avoiding nuclear war. This mutually acknowledged fear of war made the other side's nuclear capabilities less threatening and paved the way for the first arms-control agreements.

By no means did all American and Soviet leaders share this interpretation. Large segments of the national security elites of both superpowers continued to regard their adversary as implacably hostile and willing to use nuclear weapons. Even when Brezhnev and Nixon acknowledged the other's fear of war, they used the umbrella of nuclear deterrence to compete vigorously for unilateral gain. Western militants did not begin to change their estimate of Soviet intentions until Mikhail Gorbachev made clear his commitment to ending the arms race and the cold war.

Deterrence in Hindsight

The cold war began as a result of Soviet–American competition in Central Europe in the aftermath of Germany's defeat. Once recognized spheres of influence were established, confrontations between the superpowers in the heart of Europe diminished. Only Berlin continued to be a flashpoint until the superpowers reached an understanding about the two Germanies. The conventional and nuclear arms buildup that followed in the wake of the crises of the early cold war was a reaction to the mutual insecurities they generated. By the 1970s, the growing arsenal and increasingly accurate weapons of mass destruction that each superpower aimed at the other had become the primary source of mutual insecurity and tension. Moscow and Washington no longer argued about the status quo in Europe but about the new weapons systems each deployed to threaten the other. Each thought that deterrence was far less robust than it was. Their search for deterrence reversed cause and effect and prolonged the cold war.

The history of the cold war provides compelling evidence of the pernicious effects of the open-ended quest for nuclear deterrence. But nuclear weapons also moderated superpower behavior, once leaders in Moscow and Washington

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recognized and acknowledged to the other that a nuclear war between them would almost certainly lead to their mutual destruction.

Since the late 1960s, when the Soviet Union developed an effective retaliatory capability, both superpowers had to live with nuclear vulnerability. There were always advocates of preemption, ballistic missile defense, or other illusory visions of security in a nuclear world. But nuclear vulnerability could not be eliminated. MAD was a reality from which there was no escape short of the most far-reaching arms control. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the proposed deep cuts in nuclear weapons, Russia and the United States will still possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over.[47]

Nuclear vulnerability distinguished the Soviet–American conflict from conventional conflicts of the past or present. In conventional conflicts, leaders could believe that war might benefit their country. Leaders have often gone to war with this expectation, although more often than not they have been proven wrong. The consequences of war turned out very differently than expected by leaders in Iraq in 1980, Argentina in 1982, and Israel in 1982.

Fear of the consequences of nuclear war not only made it exceedingly improbable that either superpower would deliberately seek a military confrontation with the other; it made their leaders extremely reluctant to take any action that they considered would seriously raise the risk of war. Over the years they developed a much better appreciation of each other's interests. In the last years of the Soviet–American conflict, leaders on both sides acknowledged and refrained from any challenge of the other's vital interests.

The ultimate irony of nuclear deterrence may be the way in which the strategy of deterrence undercut much of the political stability the reality of deterrence should have created. The arms buildups, threatening military deployments, and the confrontational rhetoric that characterized the strategy of deterrence effectively obscured deep-seated, mutual fears of war. Fear of nuclear war made leaders inwardly cautious, but their public posturing convinced their adversaries that they were aggressive, risk-prone, and even irrational.

This kind of behavior was consistent with the strategy of deterrence. Leaders on both sides recognized that only a madman would use nuclear weapons against a nuclear adversary. To reinforce deterrence, they therefore tried, and to a disturbing degree succeeded in convincing the other that they might be irrational enough or sufficiently out of control to implement their threats. Each consequently became less secure, more threatened, and less confident of the robust reality of deterrence. The strategy of deterrence was self-defeating; it provoked the kind of behavior it was designed to prevent.

The history of the cold war suggests that nuclear deterrence should be viewed as a powerful but very dangerous medicine. Arsenic, formerly used to treat

[47] By 2003, if the cuts proposed in the START II treaty are implemented, Russia will cut its missiles to 504 and its warheads to 3,000, and the United States will reduce its missiles to 500 and its warheads to 3,500.

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syphilis and schistosomiasis, and chemotherapy, routinely used to treat cancer, can kill or cure a patient. The outcome depends on the virulence of the disease, how early the disease is detected, the amount of drugs administered, and the resistance of the patient to both the disease and the cure. So it is with nuclear deterrence. Finite deterrence is stabilizing because it prompts mutual caution. Too much deterrence, or deterrence applied inappropriately to a frightened and vulnerable adversary, can fuel an arms race that makes both sides less rather than more secure and provoke the aggression that it is designed to prevent. As with any medicine, the key to successful deterrence is to administer correctly the proper dosage.

The superpowers "overdosed" on deterrence. It poisoned their relationship, but their leaders remained blind to its consequences. Instead, they interpreted the tension and crises that followed as evidence of the need for even more deterrence. Despite the changed political climate that makes it almost inconceivable that either Russia or the United States would initiate nuclear war, there are still influential people in Washington, and possibly in Moscow, who believe that new weapons are necessary to reinforce deterrence. Deeply embedded beliefs are extraordinarily resistant to change.*

* This article is based on a chapter from Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein *We All Lost the Cold War*.

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

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The 1995 Congress: The First Hundred Days and Beyond

NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN
AMY L. SCHENKENBERG

4 January 1995 was one of the most striking days in modern American political history. The House of Representatives convened to organize, elected Newt Gingrich of Georgia as the first Republican Speaker since Joe Martin of Massachusetts in 1954, debated and then passed a sweeping series of rules changes and reforms, and then took up and passed its first piece of legislation, the Congressional Accountability Act, finishing up at nearly 2:30 in the morning on 5 January.

That first day was followed by more than ninety that were nearly equally striking. The 104th House hit the ground sprinting, overcoming the natural inertia of the institution to draft, consider, debate, and pass a series of other bills and resolutions that dominated the nation's policy agenda in an almost unprecedented version of congressional government.

In mid-April 1995, television networks, newspapers, and magazines were filled with stories of the Congress's first hundred days. That hundred-day period was capped with another unprecedented event. On 7 April, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich addressed the nation live in prime time on several television networks, including CBS, CNN, C-SPAN, and PBS. Except to respond to a president, never before had a Speaker requested an opportunity to appear on national television to address the nation; never before would any television network have granted a Speaker time if he had in fact asked. The Speaker's request and the networks' response both demonstrated the unusual, even unique character of the 104th Congress, brought about by the election of November 1994.

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Those first hundred days, at least, suggested profound changes in political structures and political dynamics; but they left unanswered questions about how unique the changes were in modern American history, how purposeful American voters were when they voted for change, and, most important, how enduring the changes would be.

The 1994 Election

Using broad electoral history as the predictor, no one would have expected the massive Republican takeover of both houses of Congress in the 1994 election. Indeed, politicians, pundits, and strategists on both sides of the political spectrum were caught off guard. In the *Washington Post*'s final election predictions, only three of the fourteen analysts surveyed picked the Republicans to win both Houses, and not one picked them to muster the full 230 seats in the House that they achieved.[1]

In this case, history misled students of elections. There are, of course, examples of huge congressional losses for the president's party in the midterm elections. But normally, such sweeps occur either during the second midterm of a two-term president or after a sweeping across-the-board presidential party victory, neither of which was the case in 1994. In fact, the Democrats lost seats in their 1992 Presidential victory.[2] Combine that fact with the relatively good economic conditions as the elections approached, and it is not surprising that many models of congressional election seat change predicted 1994 Democratic losses in the single digits.

The results, of course, were rather different. In 1994 Republicans captured fifty-two seats in the House and eight in the Senate, including a majority of southern seats in both houses for the first time since Reconstruction.[3] In the House, Republicans retained control of seventeen out of twenty-one open GOP seats and captured twenty-two of the thirty-one Democratically-held open seats. They gained seventeen seats in the Midwest, sixteen in the South and ten on the Pacific Coast. New England was the only region in which the Democrats held onto a solid majority.[4] The only gains the Democrats made in the House at all were four open GOP seats. Not a single GOP incumbent lost! In the Senate, Republicans swept all nine open seat races, ousted two Democrat incumbents, equalled the House in not losing a single one of their own incumbents, and have since had two Democratic defections to their party. On the day after the election, Alabama Senator Richard Shelby switched his party allegiance, followed by

[1] "Naked Punditry," *Washington Post*, 4 November 1994.

[2] Dave Kaplan and Charles Mahtesian, "Elections Wave of Diversity Spares Many Incumbents," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 November 1992, 3570-71.

[3] Norman Ornstein, Thomas Mann, and Michael Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress: 1993-94* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), 10-15; for regional breakdowns, see 7-8.

[4] "Elections at A Glance," *National Journal*, 12 November 1994, 2628-29.

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Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (CO) on 3 March. The Republicans biggest senatorial gains were in the South, four seats, and the Midwest, two seats. The Senate freshman class consists of eleven GOPs and zero Democrats—the first such shutout since 1914.[5]

In the months after the tumultuous results poured in, analysts scrambled to make sense of them and the surrounding circumstances. Voters had been discontented with Congress throughout 1994 and approached the election with a disapproval rating of Congress of 73 percent, one of the highest ever.[6] Cynical toward Washington and unhappy with their own lives, they rejected not only the status quo, but specifically the Democrats. As we note above, not a single Republican incumbent lost his or her seat in the House or Senate; the same was true in gubernatorial races.

The electorate voted for change just as they had in 1992 when they elected 110 freshmen to the House. But in 1994 they ousted first-termers as quickly as they did other incumbents—sixteen of the thirty-four Democrat incumbents defeated in the House were freshmen. In the eyes of their constituents, they had been given a fair chance to bring change and failed to deliver. What was behind this dramatic vote? As analyst Fred Steeper argues in his well read election analysis, a cultural realignment has brought the New Deal party system to an end, replacing it with a new system and a new set of issues in addition to the older, economic ones.[7] But, it was not the conventional realignment such as occurred in 1896 and 1932, he tells us. These centered on a reversal in party loyalties, while 1994 was based on ideological polarization.

Most major swing elections such as 1974, 1980, and 1982, Steeper writes, are dominated by short-term issues—Watergate, Jimmy Carter's presidency, severe depression—which move virtually all groups of voters in the same direction on election day. Groups may have different starting points and will move in varying degrees, but they move in the same direction. Further, votes are in response to the current situation in the country, judging policy results, and not prospectively aiming for a new policy agenda.

But 1994 proved different. Steeper found that groups did not all move in the same direction. The Republican vote among self-professed conservatives skyrocketed to 80 percent, up from 61 percent in 1990 and 72 percent in 1992; the Republican vote among liberals dropped to 18 percent, its lowest level since at least 1980.[8] The vote among moderates hardly changed at all—down one percentage point since 1992. Conservatives and liberals polarized along ideological lines.

If, Steeper argues, the election was a reflection of Bill Clinton's unpopularity or anger with politics as usual, as other analysts have argued, it would have been

[5] Phil Duncan, "Republicans' Gains Matched Their Rosy Prediction," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 November 1994, 3240.

[6] CBS/*New York Times* Poll, 29 October-1 November 1994.

[7] Fred Steeper, "1994—This Swing is Different," *Market Strategies, Inc.*, 1995.

[8] Ibid., 4.

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supported by a parallel movement among voters. Instead, 1994 was a policy vote for the new conservative ideology—an ideology based not only on the traditional conservative economics but also on cultural conservatism. This new conservatism, focused on preventing the decay of traditional values, and how it is incorporated into each party's platform will largely determine the party's future, according to Steeper. So far, Democrats have failed to recognize this aspect of the Republican victory, and even some Republicans have been slow to fit them into traditional party politics.[9]

Other analysts put more direct blame for the Democratic loss on President Clinton. According to exit poll data, his performance and presidency clearly were issues that drove voters in 1994. Eighty-two percent of those who approved of the president's job voted Democratic; 83 percent of those who disapproved voted Republican; and 46 percent disapproved.[10] In "What Happened in the 1994 Midterm Elections," authors David Brady, John Cogan, and Douglas Rivers make a convincing argument that Clinton was a key reason behind the Democratic losses.[11] Focusing on the fifty-seven districts where Republicans gained seats, the authors conducted a statistical analysis of the common explanations for electoral victories and concluded that the largest Democratic party losses in the House were due to voters' rejection of President Clinton's legislative agenda in relation to the district's conservatism. They found this to be true in both Democratically-held open seats and incumbent seats.

Most losses were in marginal districts (districts in which the Democrat received less than 56 percent of the vote in 1992) where 45.9 percent of incumbents were defeated—versus 10.1 percent in nonmarginal districts.[12] Further, incumbents with a marginal 1992 Clinton vote of 40–50 percent, who had supported Clinton's policies were reelected at a rate of only about 30 percent.[13] Breaking this down further, in conservative districts with a 1992 Clinton vote of less than 40 percent, only 17 percent of incumbents with a presidential support score of under 60 percent were defeated, while 75 percent of those with a score of greater than 75 percent lost.

Brady, Cogan, and Rivers found that not only incumbents, but also Democratically-held open seats were largely determined by the 1992 Clinton vote. In the twenty-two states where Clinton received less than 47 percent of the vote, Republicans made Clinton and his policies the issue and won every seat.[14] But Democrats held onto each of the nine seats in the more liberal districts that gave Clinton over 50 percent of the 1992 vote.[15]

[9] Ibid., 10.

[10] Official Election Exit Polls, cited in *National Journal*, 12 November 1994, 2631.

[11] David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, and Douglas Rivers, *How the Republicans Captured the House: An Assessment of the 1994 Midterm Elections* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution), 1995.

[12] Ibid., 9.

[13] Brady et al., "What Happened," 12.

[14] Ibid., 9-10.

[15] Ibid., 9-10.

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While this article does contradict Steeper's rejection of a retrospective vote in 1994, it also supports his final explanation of the 1994 realignment. Steeper claims that it was a realignment that had begun in the 1980s but was delayed because of split party government. Conservatives who wanted to vote for change were not sure which way to vote, because they saw a Republican president in control of the federal policies they disliked. The Clinton victory in 1992 and the resulting same-party rule in Congress and the presidency provided a clear anti-Democratic vote for conservatives who wanted change and allowed the realignment to reach fruition. Most of the criticism was aimed toward Clinton, because as Steeper writes, "Voters tend to believe that the party that controls the White House controls the federal government."[16]

THE 104TH CONGRESS

The first Republican majority in the House in forty years convened with not one member among its 230 with experience in this role. It underscores the drama of the party turnover that only one Republican among the 230 was around the House the last time the GOP had a majority there—Bill Emerson of Missouri was a fifteen-year-old page at the time! At the same time, change is not simply new in 1994; it has characterized the membership of Congress for several years. A full 52 percent of all House members in the 104th Congress arrived for the first time in the 1990s; over 60 percent of Republican House members are new in the 1990s.

The changes were not just in numbers but in composition. The number of lawyers decreased slightly in the House in 1995, but the number of members with previous occupations in business or banking shot up 24 percent, largely because of Republican victories. The number of House Republicans in business or banking grew by 54 percent.[17] This Congress also had the unusual trait of its majority having been elected to govern under an antigovernment banner. Nothing underscored this reality more than the fact that the new majority's choice as House GOP transition leader, Jim Nussle of Iowa, had been best known in the House for his appearance on the floor in 1991 wearing a paper bag on his head because he was so ashamed to be part of the institution.

The Freshmen

If the 104th Congress's freshman class was nowhere near the largest in history, it still entered as a major force in the institution. The class came to Washington with substantial ballyhoo, making up nearly 32 percent of their party and repre-

[16] Steeper, "1994," 13.

[17] Ornstein et al., *Vital Statistics*, 22-27; Donna Cassata, "Freshman Class Boasts Resumes To Back up 'Outsider' Image," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Special Report, 12 November 1994, 9.

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senting the emerging wave in American politics. As a group, they proved strikingly homogeneous in the campaign, nearly all running on an agenda of term limits, balancing the budget, the line-item veto, reforming welfare, cutting government, and cutting taxes. They tended to be both young and inexperienced. Almost 55 percent of House freshmen were under 45 years of age, and only about 53 percent declared to have previously held an elected office, versus 70 percent of returning incumbents.[18] But inexperience provided no deterrent either to rhetoric or action. The near uniform attitude among the 104th freshmen was that they came to Congress with an agenda to change the way the system works—and a tight time frame to accomplish it. "We ran because we were upset about how things were going here. You don't look at this as a profession, but as a calling," asserted one of its members.[19]

Unlike the freshman class of 1992, which fragmented in its priorities early in the 103rd Congress and left unfulfilled promises of major institutional reform, this class stuck together with its agenda and message throughout the early part of the 104th, at times going farther than the rest of their party was prepared to go. In the House, for example, a core group calling itself "The New Federalists" issued a series of salvos calling for major additional reform of Congress and the executive, in the process demanding to be considered in the budget and government re-invention debates; at a news conference on 14 February, they announced that they would produce detailed plans in the next few months for eliminating four cabinet departments: Commerce, Education, Energy, and Housing and Urban Development (HUD).[20] Though it broke little new ground, the plan got considerable attention, and underscored their seriousness and cohesiveness.

The freshmen early took on a stature comparable to the Democratic freshman class elected in 1974—the famous Watergate Babies, whose votes were instrumental in ousting three prominent committee chairmen and in implementing more sweeping reforms in the 94th Congress. They were cultivated and encouraged by their party leaders, who celebrated their elections, met with them regularly, solicited their views, and worked to provide them with strong committee assignments—including appointing the first freshman on the House Rules Committee in decades, assigning other freshmen to the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees, including them in leadership meetings, and letting them lead debates over contract provisions. In December of 1994, the Republicans even entrusted their few minutes of response time to Clinton's "Middle Class Bill of Rights" speech to newly elected Senator Fred Thompson (TN),[21] and gave in January time

[18] Cassata, "Freshman Class," 9.

[19] Nancy E. Roman, "Republican Freshmen a Potent Force," *Washington Times*, 13 February 1995.

[20] Guy Gugliotta, "GOP House Freshmen Put Cabinet Posts on Block," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1995.

[21] For text, see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 17 December 1994, 3580.

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to freshman House member James Longley (R-ME) to respond to the president's weekly radio address.[22]

The freshmen were in turn complimentary toward their leaders, expressing gratitude to and near awe of the new Speaker Newt Gingrich, who had actively solicited many of them to run for the House, had offered campaign advice and sometimes money, and was universally seen as the driving force behind the new Republican revolution.

But the populist, antigovernment, and antileadership character of the campaign, especially of the bulk of the freshmen, also promised a far more complicated relationship between freshmen and party leaders. None of the freshmen ran by pledging to march in lockstep with leaders in Washington; all ran by distinguishing themselves from run-of-the-mill politicians and the dreaded incumbents. And a large number saw their role in even larger terms.

The signs of a less-than-perfect relationship between newcomers and leaders emerged early in two separate incidents. In late January, the freshmen directly threatened what House Republicans had billed as the crown jewel of the Republican "Contract with America," the constitutional amendment to balance the budget, suggesting that they would vote against the bill unless it included a provision requiring a three-fifths vote by both houses of Congress for any income tax increases. The freshmen backed down only when Speaker Gingrich offered assurances of a separate, up-or-down vote on the provision on 15 April 1996.[23]

Trouble surfaced again when the bulk of the GOP freshman class indicated their clear unhappiness with the proposed U.S. Government loan guarantee to Mexico to ease its financial crisis—widely called a bailout—which had been endorsed by both Speaker Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, and made clear their determination to vote against it if it came to the House floor. It did not, sparing the Speaker an embarrassing setback. Even so, the Speaker had to force the class group to back off from their determination to force a vote on the issue in the Republican Conference by ruling their petition out of order.[24]

Other rhetorical outbursts made clear that the relationship between the Speaker and his progeny would have more rocky moments. Consider, for example, the extraordinary comment made in April to *The New Republic* by freshman Linda Smith of Washington state: "We are here on a mission, and I will remain loyal to Gingrich only as long as he doesn't lose sight of what the people of Washington want us to accomplish. . . . My base is more populist than Republican."[25]

If the early national spotlight focused on the House and its freshmen, the smaller Senate freshman class was equally populist and activist, and proved

[22] Associated Press, "Clinton Returns to Tax Cuts in Radio Talk," *Washington Times*, 18 January 1995.

[23] Graeme Browning, "The GOPs Young Turks," *National Journal*, 25 February 1995, 479.

[24] Richard Cohen, "The Transformers," *National Journal*, 4 March 1995, 530.

[25] Hanna Rosin, "Invasion of the Church Ladies," *The New Republic*, 24 April 1995, 21.

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anything but shy. Freshman Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) took the lead in challenging publicly a senior member from his own party, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, for his opposition to the balanced budget amendment, a major contract provision. Santorum and other Republicans moved to strip him of his chairmanship for being the only Republican to vote no on a contract provision that passed the House but lost in the Senate by one vote. The attempt eventually fizzled, but Santorum still received strong support from most of his freshman colleagues. Freshman Senator Fred Thompson remarked emphatically, "Santorum's as much a senator as the most senior member and he has a right to do and say anything he wants."[26]

The Leaders

As the forty-year Democratic rule over the House moved toward its end, internal party divisions and bickering over the weakness of the party's leadership were endemic. To be sure, a major part of the majority party's problem was one of followership, not leadership.[27] But Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-WA) was both unable and unwilling to exert the kind of tough, strong-arming, and aggressive leadership over control of the agenda, his party's committee heads, and rank-and-file members that had been characteristic, for example, of the reign of his predecessor, Jim Wright.[28]

The contrast between Newt Gingrich's style and approach to leadership and Tom Foley's was as stark as that between their personalities. Wielding an assertive, strategic vision of leadership, driven in part by the writings on management of Peter Drucker, Gingrich began to implement his leadership vision long before the Republicans won the 1994 election. He was the central creator and voice for the "Contract with America," making it easy for the party to follow his lead. To him, an effective Speaker is "somebody who could somehow combine grassroots organizations, mass media and legislative detail into one synergistic pattern."[29]

In the immediate aftermath of the election, Gingrich began to work through rules changes and other related mechanisms to assure him of more formal power in the Speakership than any holder of the office in eighty-five years. Gingrich's vision turns on transforming the speakership into a powerful pulpit, with an eye toward supplanting President Clinton as the primary source of ideas and vision about where the country should be heading. Eugene McCarthy, former presiden-

[26] Kevin Merida, "The Freshmen Who Raised the Fuss," *Washington Post*, 9 March 1995.

[27] See Norman Ornstein, "Too Many 'Lone Rangers'," *Washington Post*, 2 September 1994.

[28] For an in-depth reading of Jim Wright's speakership, see John M. Barry, *The Ambition and the Power* (New York: Viking, 1989); and Barbara Sinclair, *Majority Leadership in the House* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

[29] David S. Cloud, "Speaker Wants His Platform to Rival the Presidency," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 February 1995, 333.

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tial candidate, described him as, "a kind of Prime Minister, chosen by the House of Representatives . . . since in the U.S. he cannot bring down the government, he appears ready to act as a kind of 'counter government.'"[30]

Most Speakers have had their primary focus inward, toward the House and its members. Gingrich has had at least as much focus outward, using his bully pulpit to shape public opinion and control the policy agenda and debate. He has been more available to media and journalists than any other Speaker in his time, has made his daily news conference available nationwide on C-SPAN, has continued (to the criticism of many) to teach his college course and distribute it nationwide, and has had a weekly discussion show on cable television's National Empowerment Television network.

Gingrich's conception of the Speakership is different in another way. While previous Speakers have spent sizable amounts of time managing the day-to-day legislative agenda on the House floor and managing the administrative operations of the House and the Capitol, Gingrich has delegated most of those duties to his subordinates in the leadership and on the staff. He handed the bulk of his agenda, the "Contract" provisions, over to Majority Leader Dick Armey (TX) with the declaration that he would stand back as the details of the legislation were worked through. In delegating, Gingrich could concentrate on spreading the message and crafting the longer-term strategy and agenda.

Delegation, however, does not mean inattention; to the contrary, Gingrich coupled it with another vital ingredient in his strategy, a close eye on all that is going on, much of it coming through his own staff. The Speaker's aides schedule and monitor legislative plans on sophisticated computer software. They hold meetings with top committee aides twice a week to make sure that panels are complying with the leadership's master schedule. The majority leader has a computerized schedule system and carries a laminated copy of the House schedule with him. The fifty-five member whip organization led by Tom DeLay (TX) meets weekly. DeLay, Deputy Whip Dennis Hastert (IL), and thirteen deputy whips meet twice a week to maintain a strict record on vote scores.[31]

In assigning chairs of the 104th Congress, Speaker Gingrich bypassed three senior members in line for chairmanships to give the seat to younger but more invigorated members, demonstrating that his first criteria for committee chairs is not the traditional one of seniority but rather the assurance that they will be helpful agents in completing his agenda. The chairs will deliver on the leadership's agenda because, as Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) remarked, they know that if they fail they won't be chairs anymore.[32]

The power Speaker Gingrich exercised at the beginning of the 104th Congress over the selection of committee chairs may not be directly comparable to that exercised by Speakers Thomas Reed and Joseph Cannon in the 1890 to 1910

[30] Ibid., 331.
[31] Cohen, "The Transformers," 531.
[32] Ibid., 532.

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period, when Speakers made committee appointments at the beginning of a session but would wait months before seating the new members to ensure desired legislative outcomes.[33] But it is sharply greater than we have seen in modern times.

Nevertheless, amid the tight controls and continuous communication between the leadership and committee chairs, gaps remain—in part because of the frenetic pace of the first hundred days and in part because of the Speaker's tendency to think out loud and to speak at length. Numerous times Gingrich has been caught having made legislative declarations that did not jibe with his chairs' thinking. On the Republican budget, Gingrich pledged prematurely that his party would produce a balanced budget by the year 2002, which forced Budget Chairman John Kasich to turn around and contradict him, and then reverse course again to concur with the Speaker.

The Speaker also declared his intention to recommend that Congress hire a top accounting firm to audit the District's finances as a step toward fixing its horrid financial state—not knowing, as did Representative James T. Walsh (R-NY) chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, that it is already audited once a year. Speaking about the "Contract's" welfare reform bill on C-SPAN, Gingrich announced that Republicans would drop the plan to deny benefits to legal immigrants who have not become citizens. This was news to Representative Clay Shaw, chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Affairs, who disagreed.[34]

While part of the problem no doubt stems merely from the lack of experience in the majority, another part of it seems to be generated by Gingrich's volubility, loquaciousness, and sometimes careless use of examples. The Speaker criticized the Food and Drug Administration for not approving a heart pump when that company did not even have an application at the FDA and tests had shown the product ineffective.[35] Speaking before a Washington trade group in late February, Gingrich talked of a "federal shelter" in Denver with 120 beds that costs $8.8 million a year to operate versus a privately funded homeless shelter of about the same size which saved more lives and cost only $320,000 a year. As it turns out, the "federal shelter" was really a large drug and alcohol treatment program that used costly, medically trained personnel and expensive machinery while receiving only $4.3 million of federal funds.[36] The leap from renegade to Speaker, from outsider to the ultimate insider, caused obvious transitional problems for Gingrich. In his first three months as Speaker, he spoke frequently of the need to be more careful and to be more "Speaker like" in his demeanor and rhetoric, aware of the dangers of continued controversy and conflict over his words and

[33] Paul DeWitt Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 37.

[34] Kevin Merida, "GOP Leaders Might Prefer a Little Less Talk From the Speaker," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1995.

[35] Serge F. Kovaleski, "Speaker Cited 'Federal Shelter' as Tax Waste," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1995.

[36] Ibid.

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assertions. Gingrich also found himself responding almost daily to a string of charges of unethical behavior raised in the press or lodged against him by various Democrats, including his 1994 opponent Ben Jones and House Democratic Whip David Bonior, ranging from his book deal with HarperCollins to his college course and its funding to the employment arrangement of his wife Marianne.

Gingrich has called all of these accusations ridiculous, blaming them on largely embittered Democrats and the "liberal press." At one point he charged the Democrats with "misusing the ethics system in a deliberative, vicious, vindictive way," exclaiming, "I have just about had it."[37]

Representative Newt Gingrich skyrocketed to national prominence in 1989 when the reaction to his accusations against Speaker Jim Wright went from dismissive to serious, and ultimately resulted in the unprecedented resignation of the Speaker. While Speaker Gingrich vigorously dismissed the irony or any parallel between the charges he had lodged against Wright and the charges others are lodging against him, it was clear that his prominence, power, and confrontational style would leave Gingrich constantly open to attacks from his adversaries and the investigative focus of reporters, with unknown implications for his future.

It has been interesting to watch the dynamics of Gingrich, leader of the young, energized, and angry "revolutionaries" in the House and contrast them with those of Bob Dole (R-KS), the strong, rooted, father figure of the institution leading the Senate. Bob Dole, of course, was a prominent national figure for more than a decade before Newt Gingrich even entered the House of Representatives, serving before the 104th Congress as his party's vice presidential nominee, Senate Finance Committee chairman, and Senate minority and majority leader, and running unsuccessfully for the Republican presidential nomination twice, in 1980 and 1988.

Senator Dole was himself a figure of major controversy over the years, but found himself in the unusual position of spending the period from November 1994 through March 1995 as a secondary character, largely overshadowed by the new Speaker of the House. The lack of concentrated press coverage and attention, ironically, worked substantially to his personal advantage. Dole's approval in polls went from 39 percent in early November 1994, to 51 percent by late March 1995.[38] Further, as of March he was far and away the public's first choice for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination.[39]

Dole's record in the Senate from 1969 on was a combination of a consistent party-oriented conservative and legislative pragmatist and a strong and savvy leader willing to use his power and even upset fellow Republicans, but also willing to compromise when necessary. His artful exercise of power as Finance Committee chairman in 1982 resulted in passage of a sizable tax increase in an

[37] Jonathan D. Salant, "Democrats File New Complaint Against Gingrich," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 25 February 1995, 592.

[38] *Time*/CNN survey, 29-30 March 1995.

[39] Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press survey, 22-26 March 1995.

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election year; his position as Senate majority leader in 1985 resulted in passage by one vote of a dramatic budget package making across-the-board changes dismissed as impossible by much of official Washington.

But the individualized nature of the Senate, the small size of the Republican majority, and Dole's 1996 presidential ambitions all made it clear that he could not exercise leadership in a way that would be comparable to Newt Gingrich in the House. Initially at least, Dole showed himself very supportive of the Gingrich team but was neither willing nor able to completely overturn his own practices to accommodate the House agenda. His reaction as Gingrich outlined his blitzkrieg approach to governance the day after the election was to slow down and take time to consider the impact of all legislation thoroughly. In the first one hundred days, the fast paced House churned out victorious votes on contract provisions item by item only to find themselves waiting for the Senate to catch up. Meanwhile, the Senate slowly, sometimes seriously, deliberated over a small number of items, only belatedly to discover—to Gingrich's and Dole's frustration—that they did not have the votes needed for passage.

Legislative Action

Legislatively, House Republicans had an overwhelming first day. As they pressed on, considering "Contract" provisions at a record pace through the first one hundred days, they secured some major victories along with a few significant setbacks as the leaders attempted to reconcile interparty and interchamber differences, as well as draw enough support from minority Democrats to recreate the old conservative coalition.

The Gingrich team stampeded the House floor opening day and then maintained a frantic and mostly successful pace in order to fulfill the contract. The "Contract with America," more ambitious for the first one hundred days than any Congress since the 73rd under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,[40] was viewed with skepticism by many analysts during the 1994 campaign; but contrary to conventional wisdom, the "Contract" did not prove any kind of electoral drag on Republicans.

As it turned out, the "Contract" proved to have far more significance after the election than before it, serving as the key organizing force for the newly minted majority. Instead of a chaotic transition filled with all-new GOP committee and subcommittee chairs, each declaring a different set of priorities, as well as a huge freshman class with little or no previous government experience, the "Contract"-driven new Congress provided a sharply focused agenda and timetable, and a powerful force for party unity.

Day one was a fourteen-hour-plus blur of lopsided votes to reform House operations. Going well past the midnight hour, the Republicans eventually suc-

[40] Donna Cassata, "Swift Progress of 'Contract' Inspires Awe and Concern," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 1 April 1995, 910.

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ceeded in passing eight major rules changes.[41] Committee reforms included the long-overdue elimination of three committees—District of Columbia, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Post Office and Civil Service—as well as staff cuts of one-third of the 103rd level, assignment restrictions, a ban on proxy voting in committee and closed meetings, and a ban on the Speaker sending a bill for consideration to more than one committee simultaneously. Most of these changes were salutary and reflected a bipartisan reform consensus from the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. However, the complete elimination of proxy voting, coupled with only a weak cutback in the number of committees, subcommittees, and assignments ran the risk of spreading majority Republicans too thin and negating its desired effects, while the move for even more openness of committee meetings made any opportunity for candid discussion and give-and-take more problematic. And one controversial rules change, requiring a three-fifths vote for any increases in income tax rates, was the first requirement for a supermajority for legislation in the history of the House and was quickly challenged in the courts by a sizable group of lawmakers led by David Skaggs (D-CO).

Other rules changes enacted in the House on the first day were limits of no more than four consecutive two-year terms for the Speaker, the repeal of delegates' rights to vote in the Committee of the Whole that had been established in the previous Congress by the Democrats, and an end to all commemorative legislation on the basis that it is too time consuming. The Republicans made a gesture toward minority rights by passing a rule to guarantee the minority party the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions on any bill under consideration in the House, as well as more equal representation on committees.

However, House Republicans also took some steps that suggested a more partisan approach to running the House. After years of adamant pressure to make the administration of the House bipartisan, the GOP leaders reversed course when they achieved majority and moved to a structure firmly under the control of the Speaker. The House administrator, created in the aftermath of the House Bank scandal to be hired and overseen by the joint party leadership, was replaced and put under the sole control of the Speaker and his party. To be sure, having a tightly organized administrative structure in the House, with clear lines of responsibility and accountability, is an idea that has been endorsed over the years by a wide range of lawmakers in both parties. But the top officers put in place by the Republicans, while having strong credentials, tended to have highly partisan backgrounds, raising real questions about the future fairness of the House's operations.[42]

The Republicans also moved to eliminate funding for legislative service organizations (LSOs), commonly known as caucuses. While this step was called a

[41] David S. Cloud, "GOP, To Its Own Great Delight, Enacts House Rules Changes," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 January 1995, 13.

[42] Norman Ornstein, "A Progress Report on GOP Reforms: So Far, So Good," *Roll Call*, 5 December 1994, 5.

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budgetary measure, it actually saved little if any money.[43] LSOs, like the Black Caucus and the Hispanic Caucus, directly affected by the GOP directive, angrily charged the Republicans with targeting them for ideological reasons, although with no evidence to prove their point.

The more obvious target was the Democratic Study Group (DSG), a major source of information and strategy for House Democratic liberals, which tried to follow House Administration Committee directives to privatize, but found that Republican leaders refused to sign vouchers from congressional offices to pay for the new private DSG publications. DSG subsequently folded and sold its operations to *Congressional Quarterly*. The process left a bitter taste in the mouths of several House Democrats who were DSG leaders and provided another warning that the strong willed Republican leadership in the House might well use its majority status to undercut the minority party for partisan advantage.

The first House bill of the session, offered on day one, passed overwhelmingly, without a single opposition vote cast. Called the Congressional Accountability Act, it forced congressional compliance with workplace laws, including ten current labor laws as well as the right of employees to sue Congress in federal court. It had in fact been adopted by the House near the end of the 103rd Congress, but died on a last minute Republican-led delay in the Senate. The new Republican-led 104th Senate took a different view; it passed 98 to 1 its own version on 11 January, which added the inclusion of the Veterans Re-Employment Act, which the House approved without hearings or amendments on the 17th. It was the fastest a new Congress sent major legislation to the White House since the 1933 Emergency Banking Relief Act.[44]

The Senate, not tied to the House contract, found itself in the unusual circumstance of being upstaged by the House. Still, it stuck to its traditions and instead of opening with a blitzkrieg day of activities, spent it getting organized in its normal way. Most of the Senate's first day was spent debating an amendment proposed by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to reduce the number of votes needed for cloture to end a filibuster from the current 60 to 51. It failed 76-19.[45]

The intrinsic differences between the two bodies were underscored by their different treatment of the Congressional Accountability Act. The House took less than an hour on its first day to debate and pass the bill. The Senate got around to the bill on its third day; after eight days it passed the bill 98 to 1.

[43] Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY), chairman of the Hispanic Caucus, noted early on that if LSOs were eliminated, the money spent on them "would simply revert back to the individual lawmaker's offices." Indeed, *Roll Call* pointed out in March that Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX) had not returned to the Treasury any of the $40,000 from his office account that he had spent on LSOs, but had used the money to augment his office payroll. (*Roll Call*, "The LSO Sham," 23 March 1995, 4.)

[44] Kenneth J. Cooper, "House Sends Congressional Compliance Bill to Clinton," *Washington Post*, 18 January 1995.

[45] Jonathan D. Salant, "Ever Genteel, the Senate Quietly Seeks Attention," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 January 1995, 22.

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The First 100 Days' Victories

In the first 100 days, the House steadily worked its way through the "Contract" voting on all ten items and passing all but one. The Balanced-Budget Constitutional Amendment was approved in the House on 26 January; unfunded mandates on 1 February; the Line-ItemVeto on the 6th. A series of crime legislation items to rescind much of the 1994 bill passed in mid-February as did their national security bill. Civil litigation and product liability legislation, creating a "loser pays" rule and placing limitations on punitive damages, passed in the House in early March. Welfare reform—one of the more controversial items—passed on 24 March. And, finally, the tax cut plan was approved in the House on 5 April. The only item to fail was the Congressional Term Limits Constitutional Amendment. It was rejected 227-204 on 29 March.

Setbacks and Challenges

The remarkable string of legislative successes that House Republicans achieved in the first hundred days overshadowed the few significant setbacks and disguised the difficulties that lay ahead for the new majority. With only 230 seats—the smallest majority in forty years—the Republicans were left with a small cushion for a purely partisan success and no cushion for any proposed constitutional amendments like those to require a balanced budget or to implement term limits, which required sixty more votes than there were Republicans.

To achieve their successes, the House Republicans showed a remarkable cohesion during their first one hundred days, in part a carryover from their discipline as a minority party, in part a tribute to the adroit performance of party leaders like Speaker Gingrich, and in part an artifact of the "Contract." But even in the first hundred days, there were signs that unity might fragment over time, with potential problems on both the right and the left. On the right, the first hints of disagreement came on 26 January, when the provision of the balanced budget amendment requiring a three-fifths majority vote in the House and Senate for any tax increases failed a test vote, 253-173, far short of the 290 votes needed to pass a proposal for a constitutional amendment.[46] Leaders Gingrich and Armey understood that the amendment would fail if it included this requirement and were willing to part with it. But conservative members, including most freshmen, were not so willing to give it up and continued to demand a vote. The dispute was defused only when Gingrich promised a separate vote on a three-fifths provision on 15 April—Tax Day 1996.

Another incipient revolt occurred with the administration's proposal for loan guarantees for Mexico, supported by Speaker Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Dole. But a sizable collection of Republicans, led again by the freshmen, denounced a Mexican bailout and tried to introduce a resolution in the House

[46] "House Votes," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 January 1995, 314.

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Republican Conference condemning it. The Speaker used procedural grounds to rule the resolution out of order and then avoided a potentially embarrassing floor setback when President Clinton changed his plan to an executive order not requiring direct congressional approval.

Yet more dissension came from the moderate side of the party. Twenty-four centrist Republicans joined the Democrats to approve an amendment to the National Security Bill by Representative John Spratt (D-SC), which placed the importance of troop readiness above that of a new missile defense system.[47] Then, the GOP managers of the bill agreed to an amendment by Representative Douglas K. Bereuter (R-NE) to delete language that said the president must gain congressional approval before putting any Pentagon operation under UN control.[48]

In late March 1995, a larger collection of Republicans – 102 out of the 230 – signed a letter to the party leadership calling for cutbacks in the tax cut plans to be more responsive to the need to reduce deficits; specifically, they endorsed limiting the benefit of a $500-per-child tax credit to those making less than $95,000 per year, compared to the "Contract's" commitment to make the credit available to those with incomes up to $200,000. Despite the strong support for the change shown in the letter, House GOP leaders stuck with their original plan and won on the House floor when the bulk of the letter signers proved reluctant to create a party embarrassment on the eve of the hundredth day.[49]

For most House Republicans, the solemn commitment of the "Contract" was reason enough to swallow philosophical or constituency differences and vote together. But the remaining 630 days of the 104th Congress would lack the "Contract's" glue, making the job of the leadership more challenging.

On most of the key votes on "Contract" issues, sizable numbers of Democrats voted with the Republican majority: 130 for unfunded mandates; 186 for regulatory reform; 72 for the Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment; 71 for the line-item veto; and not one Democrat against the Congressional Compliance Act. Even so, the key to GOP success was the majority's unity. As the 104th Congress moved along, however, the coalitions required to build majorities would necessarily change. On the surface, finding broad coalitions appears to be a daunting task; Republicans in the House and the Senate, as a whole, have become more homogeneous ideologically and more sharply conservative. Democrats, at the same time, have moved to the left as a group in both houses.

Nevertheless, to succeed, Republicans would need to find a center in the House and the Senate, beginning by holding on to most of their centrist members – the thirty to forty House Republicans and ten to fifteen Senate Republicans who would broadly fit under the "moderate" rubric. In fact, a better way to classify this group of members is as "coalitionists," as opposed to "confrontationalists" –

[47] Cohen, "The Transformers," 530.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Alissa J. Rubin, "Finishing the 'Contract' in Style, House Passes Tax-Cut Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 8 April 1995, 1010.

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lawmakers whose first instinct is to form broad-based bipartisan coalitions rather than to push for sharp ideological and partisan confrontation.

Some coalitionists, including Henry Hyde (R-IL), Bill Emerson (R-MO), David Dreier (R-CA), Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), and Tom Petri (R- WI), are quite conservative in their voting records; others, like Nancy Johnson (R-CT), Chris Shays (R-CT), Fred Upton (R-MI), Amo Houghton (R-NY), Marge Roukema (R-NJ), and Connie Morella (R-MD), have more moderate voting stances. But on issues from trade to deficit reduction, these lawmakers and others prefer the middle to the margins.[50]

The comparable Republican group in the Senate includes Arlen Spector (PA), Bob Packwood (OR), Mark Hatfield (OR), Jim Jeffords (VT), William Cohen (ME), Olympia Snowe (ME), Ben Nighthorse Campbell (CO), John Chafee (RI), Pete Domenici (NM), Nancy Kassebaum (KS), and Ted Stevens (AK), among others. Add to them a comparable group of Democrats, including sixty or so more centrist and conservative Democrats in the Conservative Democratic Forum and the Mainstream Forum in the House, and senators like Joe Lieberman (D-CT), John Breaux (D-LA), Howell Heflin (D-AL), Bennett Johnston (D-LA), Bob Kerrey (D-NE), Bill Bradley (D-NJ), Chuck Robb (D-VA), and the result is a powerful force in the center of both houses, even though the parties in both houses in general have become considerably more polarized.

For leaders in both parties in both houses, the challenges were great and interesting: wooing members in the center of the overall political spectrum, but in the minority within their own respective parties, without losing the allegiance of their more purist ideologues and without engaging in too obvious or protracted a set of bidding wars with the key swing lawmakers—and all in a political setting with a Democratic president and a Republican majority in Congress, previously completely unknown to all the actors in the process.

Dueling Agendas. The focus of the first hundred days of the 104th Congress was of course the ten items of the "Contract with America." The "Contract" contained within it, however, two broader themes, which clearly would reverberate through the remainder of the Congress, but not necessarily in concert. On the surface, the two themes are mutually reinforcing. In reality, they are not. Indeed, there is enough tension between them that they may be close to mutually exclusive. That tension was bound to play out in ways that would both define the majority Republican Party and determine what policy path would be followed in the 104th Congress.

The two themes are government dismantling and budget balancing. Some prominent Republican leaders—Newt Gingrich and Phil Gramm among them—want the former more than anything else. Others, like Pete Domenici and Bob Packwood, set the latter as their priority. What's the difference? Ask each if he

[50] Ornstein, "The 'Boll Weevils' of the 104th Congress: GOP Moderates," *Roll Call*, 31 October 1994, 10.

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would embrace a plan to balance the budget by simply freezing all government programs in place, maintaining every program but restricting each in growth to one or two percent each year. Gingrich and Gramm would say no: that would merely cement the corrupt welfare state in place, with glacially slow erosion, instead of precipitating the kind of revolution that is required if we are to move to an opportunity society. Domenici and Packwood, on the other hand, would accept enthusiastically the idea of a freeze, if it could be made workable.

Consider another part of the political debate in the first hundred days—the highly charged and highly publicized controversy over eliminating the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and the National Endowments for the Arts (NEA) and Humanities (NEH). These areas got more public attention in the first hundred days than did Medicare and Medicaid. But CPB, NEA, and NEH combined make up less than one-twentieth of one percent of the federal budget. Eliminate them all, and you have done the equivalent of draining the ocean by filling a gallon jug. CPB, NEA, and NEH are not about balancing the budget. They are about altering the role the federal government plays in directing and shaping American culture; zeroing them out is about dismantling government.

To be sure, every little bit counts. A quiet campaign stressing the need for all sides to sacrifice and pointing out that priorities have to be set, and in this era of fiscal stress, to be changed, might reinforce that point. But the high profile Republican campaign, led by agent provocateurs and designed to generate national debate, was intended for another purpose at best unrelated to budget balancing.

Public broadcasting and arts are not the only areas where government dismantling gets in the way of budget balancing. Consider tax cuts. As the 102 GOP House members who signed the March letter mentioned above made clear, tax cuts and budget balancing are not highly compatible. Their views were echoed by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob Packwood. Senator Phil Gramm responded by suggesting that Republicans like Packwood were behaving more like Democrats. Gramm's fierce protectiveness of deep tax cuts reflects his own clear priorities: he wants to reduce the role and reach of government, and sees tax cuts as having a double-pronged advantage, both reducing government's food supply, and adding to the pressure for even more spending cuts that can target programs he wants eliminated.

The tensions developing here are basically nothing new. They go back at least to 1981. Then Budget Director David Stockman saw the threat of huge looming deficits as his only hope of dismantling government. Stockman earlier had written in *The Public Interest* with eloquent disdain of the "social pork barrel,"[51] which he believed was supported with equal enthusiasm by reelection-hungry, pseudo-conservative Republican members of Congress and by Democrats. Just calling for cutting programs, even with the backing of his newly elected President Ronald Reagan, wouldn't work. It would take a figurative gun to the heads of recalcitrant lawmakers of all political stripes.

[51] David A. Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel," *The Public Interest* 39 (Spring 1975): 3-30.

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Stockman's theory, of course, was faulty, as he himself subsequently admitted. The threat of huge deficits wasn't enough to cause members of Congress to erase the social pork barrel. That is not to say that all the decades-old patterns of spending persisted. The fact is that much did change in the 1980s and early 1990s. Considerable discipline and restraint were brought to both defense and domestic discretionary spending as a whole, up to and including the hard freeze that was the centerpiece of the 1990 budget agreement and was extended with the 1993 budget agreement. Discretionary spending, including most all of what would commonly be considered pork barrel, came down steadily as a portion of the federal budget from 75 percent in 1962 and still nearly half in 1980 to just about one-third in 1995.

The growth in federal spending, besides interest on the debt, has come in the entitlement programs, driven especially by Medicare and Medicaid, along with things like veterans' health. After feeble efforts to cut them along with social programs, Stockman and Reagan largely abandoned the effort. When Senate Republicans tried valiantly to cut them back, along with Social Security in 1985, President Reagan said no. The entitlement problem has grown dramatically since then and has become the core of any serious effort to balance the budget.

As the 104th Congress moved from its first hundred days through its second and toward its third hundred days, the budget became a more dominant issue, crowding out large portions of the "Contract" agenda. At the same time, Medicare and Medicaid moved to the center of the congressional agenda.

The more Medicare and Medicaid take over and dominate the debate, the less the ability of Republicans to focus on things like public broadcasting, arts, humanities, or legal services, much less dramatic regulatory reform or government reorganization. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing Republican congressional leaders in the second part of their first year in the majority was finding ways to handle Medicare so artfully that real restraint could be achieved without hitting the elderly directly; and handling Medicaid without nicking nursing home care or causing a revolution among the GOP's favorite politicians, the governors. Success in that kind of agenda control would ensure a broader and comprehensive approach to budget balancing, one that could include zeroing out a number of programs as well as applying shorter leashes to all the others. And the result would be some parts of government dismantled, even as we move toward budget balance.

But it was at least as likely that the budget balancing debate would prove debilitating and dangerous for advocates of government dismantling. It could move the agenda to grounds such as care for the elderly, especially, that they fear, from grounds such as government-funded art projects like André Sarano's "Piss Christ" and Mapplethorpe photos that they prefer. The danger for purposive Republican leaders was encountering enough dissonance in the two goals that both would end up suffering.

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The Minority. The November 1994 elections proved wholly stunning and demoralizing for House Democrats. They did not expect to be forced into minority status and were unprepared for it. Democrats were slow to organize for the 104th Congress, faced leadership contests in both houses, showed little internal discipline in the early months of the new Congress, and had little party strategy to reflect a meaningful minority role.

Ideological divisions within the party became more apparent in the early part of the new Congress, despite the fact that a large share of the more conservative Democrats – including twenty members of the Conservative Democratic Forum – departed the House. Nonetheless, in the House, a group of twenty-three members announced on 15 February that they were forming a conservative voting coalition, called "The Coalition," which took deliberate distance from the Democratic party and proclaimed an eagerness to work with Republicans.[52] One charter member of The Coalition, Nathan Deal of Georgia, subsequently switched to the Republican party, joining the two Democratic Senators Richard Shelby of Alabama and Ben Nighthorse Campbell (CO) who had switched earlier.

Though Speaker Gingrich was conciliatory toward Democrats when the session began and publicly pledged to police his members to prevent derogatory remarks aimed at Democrats if Democrats in return policed their own, most Democrats did not believe his sincerity. Many veteran House Democrats harbored continuing resentment toward Gingrich over his harsh criticism of them in the past and particularly over his role in the forced resignation of Speaker Jim Wright.[53]

Representative Dick Gephardt moved from his role as majority leader to become the new Democratic minority House leader, beating back a challenge from Representative Charlie Rose (NC). His early strategy involved independent policy actions designed to show House Democrats' independence from the White House. For example, on 10 January, he proposed before the Ways and Means Committee his "Modified Flat Tax Plan," which resembled Republican Dick Armey's plan more than President Clinton's.[54]

The minority voices most often heard in the first months of Republican rule were Democratic whip, Representative David Bonior (MI) and Representative Barney Frank (MA) in the House and Minority Leader Tom Daschle (SD) and Senator Robert Byrd (WV) in the Senate. Minority Whip Bonior, excited at "the struggle" of being the minority, emerged as the chief nemesis of the Speaker, hounding him in much the same way that Gingrich hounded Speaker Jim Wright in the 1980s. Even before the 104th Congress began, Bonior had held four press conferences to attack actions of the GOP and Gingrich in particular. On opening day he voiced the most opposition to the Republicans by proclaiming that their

[52] Gabriel Kahn, "In Major Break With Own Leadership, Conservative Democrats Launch Group," *Roll Call*, 13 February 1995, 1.

[53] Barry, *Ambition and the Power*.

[54] Eric Pianin and Dan Morgan, "Gephardt is Developing Modified Flat Tax Plan," *Washington Post*, 11 January 1995.

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proposed rules changes should include a ban on gifts from lobbyists and a cap on book royalties for members of Congress (a personal cut at Gingrich). Further, he said GOPAC, the Speaker's Political Action Committee (PAC), should be forced to release its list of donors and as of 8 March had filed four ethics complaints against the Speaker. The main strategy reflected in Bonior's actions, however, was to attack the motives, ethics, and fairness of the majority Republicans, not to articulate a coherent Democratic party alternative or to promote and defend the policies of the Democratic president.

Representative Barney Frank was unofficially anointed as a leading voice in opposition of the new Republican control. He was an important tactician in the Judiciary Committee's markup of the controversial term limits constitutional amendment, where he offered an amendment, which was narrowly rejected, to apply a six-term limit retroactively. Frank's most visible and significant role, however, was as a gadfly on the House floor, a time-honored role for the minority, prodding Republicans with rhetoric and amendments to keep them honest and on their toes. In addition to criticizing the Republican policy agenda, Frank has criticized their claims at success, saying that they "have redefined success as getting legislation through one house."[55]

In the Senate, a tough battle for the party leader's position ensued with the retirement of Majority Leader George Mitchell of Maine. South Dakota's Tom Daschle beat Connecticut's Chris Dodd by one vote and began quickly to build a broad-based leadership team and to develop a minority strategy—a task made somewhat easier by the fact that a majority of Senate Democrats had experienced minority status before in the 1981-1986 period.

Like the House minority, the Senate Democrats' strategy focused more on opposition to the Republican majority, but with more substance. Daschle's biggest early fight (and tentative victory) with the Republicans was over the balanced budget amendment. He had supported the amendment in the past but said he could only support it this Congress if he could modify it through a "Right to Know" amendment that would have forced Republicans to specify the spending that would be cut before the amendment was sent to the states. Daschle's approach focused on the largely symbolic nature of the constitutional amendment and put Republicans on the defensive over the painful budget cuts that would necessarily follow adoption of the amendment. In the end, his provision was not adopted; Daschle did not support the amendment; the amendment failed by one vote.

The individualized nature of the Senate gives much greater power to individual members with knowledge of the rules and self-discipline. This factor made former Democratic leader, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the senior Democrat in the Senate, a key player from the first day of the 104th Congress. Byrd's strong feelings about the institution, combined with his encyclopedic knowledge of Senate rules and his passionate opposition to the balanced budget amendment

[55] Tom Kenworthy, "House Passes Temporary Freeze on Regulations," *Washington Post*, 25 February 1995.

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and the line-item veto, combined to delay votes on these measures for weeks and to make Republican senators fume with frustration over his tactics and his success. But Byrd served as a vivid reminder of the inherent power of checks and balances and the very different style and role of the Senate vis à vis the House in the American political system. Bob Dole ruefully noted that Byrd, "knows more than all of us put together."[56]

Public Opinion

With the increased attention devoted to public opinion, there has been plenty of data tracking the change in public sentiment since the 1994 election. There have been four main types of questions that provide insight in this area: congressional approval, Clinton's approval, Newt Gingrich's favorability, and support for the "Contract With America." All four suggest a surge in Republican approval immediately following the election, which gradually reverted to cynicism toward those in office as the 104th Congress progressed.

As mentioned earlier in this article, voters went to the polls with an extremely high disapproval rating of Congress and an approval of only 23 percent.[57] Approval numbers gradually increased after the election, reaching 38 percent and only 53 percent disapproval in early February.[58] But as the Congress moved forward and the typical conflicts arose, the numbers again began to slide. While not reaching pre-election percentages, approval was back down to 32 percent and disapproval at 59 percent by mid-March.[59]

Newt Gingrich's favorability rating jumped 10 percentage points from early October to 28 November, 1994.[60] But, between mid-January and mid-March of 1995, his favorability rating decreased and his unfavorability rating increased 10 percentage points.[61] A series of NBC/*Wall Street Journal* polls that questioned respondents' feelings toward Gingrich revealed this same trend.[62] The number of respondents with very or somewhat positive feelings increased steadily from October of 1994 through January of 1995, when they began to decline. Those with very or somewhat negative feelings toward the Speaker increased from 31 percent in January 1995 to 41 percent by March 1995.[63] At the same time, the negative numbers for Clinton decreased slightly over this time.

A *Washington Post*-ABC News Poll asked respondents which alternative they felt was more dangerous: Democrats in Congress going "too far in keeping costly

[56] Steve Langdon and Richard Sammon, "The Master of Machinations," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 January 1995, 208.

[57] CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Public Opinion Poll, 22–25 October 1994.

[58] CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Public Opinion Poll, 3–5 February 1995.

[59] CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Public Opinion Poll, 17–19 March 1995.

[60] CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Public Opinion Poll, 7–9 October; 28–29 November 1994.

[61] CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Public Opinion Poll, 16–18 January; 17–19 March 1995.

[62] Survey by Hart/Teeter for NBC/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of 4–7 March 1995.

[63] Ibid.

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government services that are wasteful or out-of-date" or Republicans going "too far in helping the rich and cutting needed government services that benefit average Americans as well as the poor." On 4 January 1995, 43 percent picked the first statement as more dangerous and 45 percent picked the second. But when the question was asked on 19 March, the gap had widened at the expense of the majority Republicans. A full 59 percent reported that they felt Republicans "going too far" was a bigger danger while only 34 percent feared the danger of Democrats "going too far."[64]

When asked about "The Contract With America," voters have consistently revealed in several different polls that they support the "Contract" in general, but are skeptical or disapproving of specific items within it. In one such poll, a plurality of respondents felt that Republicans were trying to make too many cuts in almost all of the specific programs named; yet when asked whether they supported the "Contract with America," a majority, 56 percent, reported supporting "all or most of the items."[65]

Conclusion

The deep cynicism voters clearly felt toward Congress, Washington, and politicians in general before the 1994 election did not disappear after the election. Satisfaction with the change wrought in Congress by the election was tempered by a wait-and-see attitude about whether the change would be reflected in more enduring ways inside Congress and in policies, and by a continuing unease about the motives and commitment of both major political parties.[66]

Could Congress really change? Could Congress really deliver? Could what Congress delivered meet the expectations—often contradictory—of Americans, to streamline government, reduce its role, maintain essential services, reduce tax burdens, and move the country forward? The first three months of the 104th Congress were clearly dramatically different from the beginnings of any other Congress in at least four decades. New faces abounded, including familiar faces newly wielding gavels. Reforms that had been ignored or jettisoned for years were implemented swiftly in the House of Representatives. The normal inertia of the institution gave way to a frenetic pace, with major legislation actually passing the House and occasionally the Senate. The Congress acted more like a parliament than a traditional Congress.

But the second three months of the 104th Congress began by resembling a more typical Congress. That change was, of course, inevitable. But a reversion to full-scale partisan bickering, failure to enact major policies into law or to do so only at the very end of the Congress, and the domination of internal scandals

[64] *Washington Post*/ABC News Poll, 4 January 1995 and 16–19 March 1995, Question 16.
[65] Ibid., Questions 19 and 20.
[66] Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press survey, 6–9 April 1995.

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were not inevitable. Whether or not that destructive dynamic emerged would depend on the actions of many political figures.

The kind of Congress that would emerge through the remainder of the 104th is also unclear. The parliamentary tenor of the House in its first hundred days meant that deliberation in the classic sense—carefully thinking through alternatives, debating them, and then moving to a broader public judgment—was virtually absent in the House, either in committees or on the floor. The emphasis was on processing legislation, not on debate and discussion. The Senate, to be sure, did provide more genuine deliberation, but whether its procedures would become regularized or extend to the House remained uncertain. While several of the reforms passed in the House on the first day were consistent with a deliberative process,[67] their mere existence did not mean that deliberation would be enhanced. And the populist character of the new House, combined with its backbreaking schedule, worked against a focus on real deliberation.

The skill of leaders in both parties, the behavior of rank-and-file members, especially the newer ones, and the role of the president facing the first Republican majorities of his career and the first in the House in forty years would shape the end performance of the 104th Congress and shape the perceptions of American voters. They in turn would decide whether an enduring pattern of Republican majorities would emerge, whether the pattern of divided government—this time with a Democratic president—would endure at least for a time, and whether a pattern of some stability or one of continuing tumult would characterize Congress as it stumbled toward the twenty-first century.

[67] See Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, *Renewing Congress: A First Report* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution, 1992), 29–52.

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The Making of the New Democrats

JON F. HALE

In 1992, a "new" Democratic party was presented to Americans as Bill Clinton captured the party's nomination and won the presidency. Clinton's oft-made assertion that he was "a different kind of Democrat" was meant to suggest to voters a centrist candidate more attuned than his immediate predecessors to the concerns and values of the white, middle-class voters who had deserted the party in its losing presidential campaigns in the 1980s. The prominent use of the phrases "New Democrat" and "a different kind of Democrat" by the Clinton campaign gave clear indication of its perception that the preexisting identity of the national Democratic party was a handicap that needed to be overcome for Bill Clinton to be elected president. Clinton did not want to be regarded as a Democrat in the line of Michael Dukakis, Walter Mondale, Jimmy Carter, and George McGovern. The New Democrat rhetoric, however, was not simply campaign rhetoric concocted by Clinton's coterie of talented campaign strategists. It stood for a substantively new Democratic approach to active government that had been developing since the early years of the Reagan administration.

The story of the New Democrats is, in large part, the story of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), an unofficial party organization of elected Democrats put together by a political entrepreneur in 1985. The DLC's objective was to move the national Democratic party, in both perception and substance, toward the center of the political spectrum in order to break the Republican hold on the White House. Over time, the DLC gained the institutional capacity to draw prominent Democratic politicians into its sphere and to develop a centrist alternative for the party. Had it not been for the institutional success of the DLC, the New Democratic message would not have been articulated and Bill Clinton would have been a considerably less appealing and probably less successful candidate for president.[1]

[1] The information in this article is based on interviews with principal actors among the New Democrats, personal attendance at various meetings in 1991, 1992, and 1993, documents provided by the DLC, and various periodical accounts. Of the more than three dozen interviews conducted for this research, twenty were conducted with members of Congress and six with congressional aides, most on the condition that they would not be identified. Accordingly, none of the identities of the members or their aides are revealed. Interviewees outside of Congress who agreed to interviews on the record are identified.

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The purpose of this article is to explain the rise of the New Democrats in Democratic party politics from 1980–1992. In so doing, it promises to shed light on several topics of interest to scholars of American parties: out-party policy development, the role of unofficial party organizations, party factionalism, and in general the role of parties in candidate-centered politics.

The party that does not hold the White House faces the need to generate ideas and policy responses that can form the basis of a message and agenda in the next election. Unofficial party groups tend to emerge to fulfill functions, such as policy development, that official party organizations are neglecting.[2] Unofficial groups often represent factions vying for control of the party message, agenda, and, most important, presidential nomination. The influence of unofficial groups ultimately depends on having an affiliated candidate fare well in the party's presidential nominating process. Unofficial groups that focus on party policy serve the needs of the party's elected officials by providing them with much-needed policy ideas and analysis that individual politicians lack the means to generate for themselves. This holds true for presidential candidates too, as they are "both consumers and interpreters of the policy ideas generated within the party."[3] Presidential candidates and, ultimately, administrations need intellectual fuel on which to campaign and to govern.[4]

The first section examines the formation of the New Democrats, focusing on the 1980–1985 period. The second section addresses the reasons why the New Democrats were successful in 1992, focusing on the institutionalization of the DLC beginning in 1989 and the Clinton campaign in 1992. A brief, third section probes what happened after 1992 when New Democrats attempted to govern. The article concludes with a discussion of how the case of the New Democrats informs our understanding of contemporary American parties.

The Formation of the New Democrats, 1981–1988

1981–1984: The Committee on Party Effectiveness

A significant electoral defeat provides the occasion for rethinking a party's message. The 1980 election was the worst disaster for the Democrats since before the New Deal. Not only was an incumbent Democratic president ousted, but also the Republicans took control of the Senate for the first time since the 1952 election and matched their post-1952 high-water mark in the House. In their embrace of a new conservative agenda, the Republicans were perceived as the party of ideas, the party with a sense of mission, an agenda, and policy alternatives ready to implement under the Reagan administration.

[2] Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[3] David E. Price, *Bringing Back the Parties* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1984), 291.

[4] Erwin Hargrove and Michael Nelson, *Presidents, Politics, and Policy* (New York: Knopf, 1983).

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As the out-party, the Democrats needed to generate policy ideas, policy responses, an agenda, and a message to be seen as a credible alternative in time for the next election. Yet policy development is one task among many that needs to be addressed by the party that does not hold the White House. Others include rebuilding party unity, which is often strained in losing elections, and improving the party's fund-raising and campaign assistance capabilities, which are often perceived as inadequate after a losing campaign.

American parties, however, lack an institutionalized process by which out-party policy development takes place. This raises the related questions of *who* in the party is going to engage in policy development and *where* in the party is policy development going to occur? Out-party policy development could occur within the national committee, led by the national chair, as was the case with the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and its chair, Paul Butler, after 1956. Butler appointed the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC), which served to fashion a policy agenda for the party in time for the 1960 election. The DAC was controversial because it was in many ways a factional organization, representing party liberals (often referred to at the time as the presidential wing of the party) but not party conservatives (the congressional wing).[5]

Recent national chairs of both parties have been hesitant to get involved in policy development, seeing it as too controversial and seeing their task as primarily organizational, oriented toward improving the national committee's abilities to raise money and to assist state parties and party candidates with money and campaign technology.[6] On occasion, policy councils have been appointed, but always with an eye toward balance and always with the limited mandate to prepare a simple statement of party purpose.

For the Democrats after 1980, new party chair Charles Manatt initially intended to form a party policy council, but his idea did not sit well with a congressional leadership still adjusting to a radically different legislative context. In an effort to gain the support of the congressional leadership, Manatt eventually formed a group that would serve as a forum for debate among elected officials. The Democratic Strategy Council met on two or three occasions from 1981-1983 and sank from the party landscape without a trace.[7]

Out-party policy development might also occur within the official congressional party caucuses or within informal intraparty caucuses, depending on who is interested in pursuing it. For the Democrats after 1980, Representative Gillis

[5] James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[6] John F. Bibby, *Politics, Parties, and Elections in America*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1992), 87; David Menefee-Libey, "Embracing Candidate-Centered Politics at the Democratic Headquarters: Charles Manatt and Paul Kirk in the 1980s" in John C. Green, ed., *Politics, Professionalism and Power* (Lanham, MD: Ray Bliss Institute/University Press of America, 1994), 167–185.

[7] Price, *Bringing Back the Parties*, 264–270; Caroline Arden, *Getting the Donkey Out of the Ditch* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

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Long (D-LA), newly elected to chair the House Democratic Caucus, was interested in policy development and subsequently used the caucus as the location for the party's most significant policy development effort during Reagan's first term.

The House Democratic Caucus Committee on Party Effectiveness (CPE) became the first organizational embodiment of the New Democrats. A widely respected southern moderate with a reputation for seeking consensus among his co-partisans, Long sought to chair the caucus in order to bring about party unity, to revive the caucus as an active forum for intraparty debate and policy development, and to use it to reinject House Democrats into the more general debate over the identity of the national party.[8]

There were good reasons to do so. With Republicans in control of the White House and the Senate, the pressure was on the House Democratic majority to formulate a coherent response and credible alternative to Reagan initiatives. To achieve this, Long believed, party unity would be necessary. To forge party unity from among the diverse mix of House Democrats, the caucus could be used as a forum for the kind of private debate necessary to achieve consensus. Moreover, with the national party in disarray as the result of the 1980 election, the caucus could be used as a platform to reinject House Democrats into national party affairs.

Upon assuming the caucus chair, according to Alvin From, who was executive director of the caucus, Long met with a group of younger policy-oriented House Democrats "who thought the party needed to redefine itself," and against this backdrop Long held an issues conference in January 1981 especially well attended by junior Democratic members.[9] The issues conference led to Long's creation of the CPE, a group of thirty-six House Democrats representing "all the philosophies and regions" of the caucus. The committee's mission was "to reassess our Party's direction and redefine our message."[10]

The CPE and its seven task forces dealing with specific issues (economic, housing, small business, crime, environment, women's economic, and national security) met once or twice a week over the next twenty months to discuss new directions for the party. The result of their work was a publication entitled, *Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity*, put out prior to the 1982 midterm elections.[11] Dubbed "the yellow brick road" by its detractors, the yellow booklet was applauded politely as a first attempt by Democrats to find their voice in the 1980s. Its most well received element was a paper on long-term economic policy written

[8] Richard Cohen, "Gillis Long Presses House Democrats to Establish a New Party Identity," *National Journal*, 4 December 1982, 2075-2076; Diane Granat, "Democratic Caucus Renewed As Forum for Policy Questions," *CQ Weekly Report*, 15 October 1983, 2115-2119.

[9] Price, *Bringing Back the Parties*, 280.

[10] National-House Democratic Caucus, *Renewing America's Promise: A Democratic Blueprint for Our Nation's Future* (Washington, DC: National-House Democratic Caucus, 1984), v.

[11] Committee on Party Effectiveness, *Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity: A Democratic Direction for the 1980s* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982).

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by Representatives Long, Tim Wirth (D-CO), and Richard Gephardt (D-MO), which was seen by some as a reorientation of Democratic economic policy away from an emphasis on redistribution and toward an emphasis on the twin goals of restoring growth and opportunity. More specifically, the report argued for the need for economic policies designed to spur investment in general, but also for policies to encourage investment in new high-tech industries. In reality, there was little about the economic paper that many in the party would oppose, even those who had a supposed orientation to redistribution rather than growth.

Overall, the effort did more for party unity than it did for rebuilding a party message and agenda. As David Price notes, the committee was constrained by "ideological divergences among members, the interests of committee leaders and constituency spokesmen, and a disinclination on the part of legislators to probe too deeply or to depart very far from conventional approaches."[12] Stung by the criticism that there was little of substance in the yellow book, the CPE continued to meet in 1983 with the goal of presenting a more detailed statement that combined the task force reports into "a single, broadened, strategic vision."[13] Long, meanwhile, sought to broaden the CPE's influence on national party affairs by forming a group called the National-House Democratic Caucus, co-chaired by Robert Strauss, in July 1983. In addition to seventy House Democrats, the group included eighty-three prominent Democrats, former administration officials, contributors, and the like. The group financed the publication of *Renewing America's Promise: A Democratic Blueprint for Our Nation's Future*, published in January 1984 and later submitted to the 1984 Democratic Platform Committee.

A member of the Committee on Party Effectiveness, Representative Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY), was selected as chair of the 1984 Democratic Platform Committee and the *Blueprint* was submitted to the Platform Committee. In the end, however, the 1984 platform was used, as it often is, as a unifying device by the nominee, who allowed numerous planks to be added that lengthened the document to a record 45,000 words, overwhelming the caucus' contribution and adding fuel to the claim that the Democrats were a party of special interests.[14]

The CPE successfully hammered out a consensual policy statement, but the group lacked the means for participating as an on-going entity in national party affairs. Additionally, because Long had to give the CPE ideological balance, its output avoided issues that split party liberals and moderates. Finally, the CPE's work required significant time commitments from caucus staff, members' staffs, and members themselves. In the end, the caucus seemed a less than optimal location for developing party message and policy, especially for those who wanted the party to take a substantively more moderate approach.

[12] Price, *Bringing Back the Parties*, 284.

[13] National-House Democratic Caucus, *Renewing America's Promise*, vi.

[14] Gerald M. Pomper, "The Nominations" in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1984: Reports and Interpretations* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985), 24; Timothy B. Clark, "Promises, Promises: Will the Democrats Play to Every Interest in the Platform?" *National Journal*, 26 May 1984, 1324–1328.

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1985-1988: The Democratic Leadership Council

The 1984 elections convinced centrist Democrats that a broader effort was needed to redefine the party. The election seemed to confirm the Republican victory of 1980. Recovering from a poor midterm election in 1982, Republicans retained control of the Senate, gained fourteen seats in the House, and Reagan won a second term with a smashing landslide over Democratic nominee Walter Mondale.

Mondale's campaign seemed to symbolize everything the centrists felt was wrong with the Democratic party. The post-1968 reforms of the nominating process had created a group-based politics in the Democratic party. Delegates were selected by demographic category, the abolition of the unit rule prevented individual state delegations from voting as a bloc, and the open nomination campaign process encouraged candidates to tap the energies of already organized groups to use as a framework for their campaign efforts.[15] In a move that epitomized the influence of groups in the party, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 1982 officially sanctioned seven intraparty groups as official caucuses: women, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, gays, liberals, and business/professionals.[16] In this party culture, each group had an agenda to which it expected the party and the party's nominee to respond.[17] The primary reference group for activists became the group with which they were associated rather than the party. As convention delegates, they pushed for the inclusion of their specific interests in the party platform, but lacked both the desire and the political skills to forge a broad-based liberal message for the party.[18]

Against this backdrop, Mondale's nomination campaign had been one in which the candidate assiduously built support among the parties' groups, bloc by bloc. As a result, he was a nominee widely preferred within the party, but one without an overarching vision for the party. As Gerald Pomper noted in his assessment of the 1984 nomination campaigns, "Mondale personified the problem of the Democratic party generally, the need to define a more general vision from the clash of competing factions."[19] In the general election, Republicans were able to frame Mondale's call for a tax increase to bring the burgeoning annual federal deficits under control as a call for the white middle class to pay more taxes for governmental programs benefiting the array of "special interests" in the Democratic Party.[20]

[15] Byron E. Shafer, *Bifurcated Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

[16] Ronald Elving, "Debating Length, Language, Democrats Ponder Platform," *CQ Weekly Report*, 11 June 1988, 1583; Menefee-Libey, "Embracing Candidate-Centered Politics."

[17] Jo Freeman, "The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, (Fall 1986): 327–356.

[18] Jon F. Hale, "New Politics Liberals and DLC Centrists: Factionalism in the Democratic Party, 1968–1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 1992).

[19] Pomper, "The Nominations," 16.

[20] Thomas Edsall, with Mary Edsall, *Chain Reaction* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 205.

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For many moderate Democratic elected officials, especially those from the South, the 1984 election marked a change in their efforts to distance themselves from the national party, which had been going on since the early 1970s. The creation of superdelegate slots prompted many to get involved in party politics, but the election itself convinced others that they might not be able to count on the distancing strategy indefinitely to save them from the national party. Reagan won 60 percent or more of the vote in every southern and border state, except for Tennessee. In the House, Republicans gained nine seats in southern and border states, including three seats in North Carolina and four in Texas. In the Senate, four out of five incumbent Democrats facing opposition fared worse than they had in their previous election (1978) and one of those, Senator Walter "Dee" Huddleston (D-KY), was defeated in an upset.[21] Republican incumbents won handily in Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia and the seat in Texas left open by the retirement of Senator John Tower (R-TX) was retained, also handily. Democrats in these races averaged only 35 percent of the vote. In North Carolina, Governor James Hunt, a popular moderate Democrat, failed to unseat Senator Jesse Helms in a close race that was the most expensive in Senate history. In both Kentucky and North Carolina, Reagan ran ten points ahead of the successful Republican candidates, suggestive of a coattail effect.[22]

Republicans were meeting with more success at the gubernatorial and state-house levels in the South as well, this despite the countervailing effects of incumbency, and GOP party organization was becoming much more extensive in areas where the party had been historically weak.[23] After the 1984 election, Republicans controlled 21 percent of state legislative seats in the Deep South, up from 16.7 after 1982.[24] Finally, white southerners appeared to have realigned from the Democratic to the Republican party. In early 1985, certain public opinion surveys reported, for the first time, a Republican advantage in party identification among white southerners.[25]

On the campaign trail, Republicans tagged their opponents as "Mondale liberals" and tied themselves closely to the popular Republican ticket. In his state-by-state survey of campaigns in the eleven states of the old Confederacy, Alexander Lamis found the prominent use of this tactic in virtually every Senate and competitive House race. Particularly disturbing to Democrats were the losses of two moderates, Huddleston and Hunt, to conservative Republicans who had tied them to the "liberal" Democratic ticket. These defeats served as "a sober warning to

[21] Based on author's comparison of 1978 and 1984 Senate election results.

[22] Charles E. Jacob, "The Congressional Elections" in Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1984.*

[23] Earl Black and Merl Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Cornelius P. Cotter, James Gibson, John Bibby, and Robert Huckshorn, *Party Organizations in American Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

[24] Alexander P. Lamis, *The Two-Party South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 249.

[25] Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1988 Elections: Continuation of the Post-New Deal System," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989): 1–18.

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southern Democrats of the national party's negative impact."[26] Noted then-Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL): "Most of us had been running away from the Democratic Party for years. But we were beginning to see you couldn't enjoy the luxury of that anymore. Maybe some of us would survive, but there wasn't going to be a Democratic Party behind us in our state."[27]

In his own case, Chiles was concerned about the dwindling number of Democrats in Florida, a result of party switching among both elected officials and the rank and file. As Republicans, the voters would be less reliable supporters of Chiles; and as the number of Democratic politicians declined, Chiles would be left distancing himself from a national party and tying himself to a withering state party. Insofar as the state party lost its moderates and conservatives, it would become a minority liberal party itself, more congruent with the national party. Under such conditions, the distancing strategy would lapse into irrelevance.

In light of the 1984 election, the efforts of the CPE seemed trivial, as did the superdelegate counter-reform designed to return elected officials to the party convention.[28] Superdelegate status did not give centrist elected officials any real control over the 1984 Democratic National Convention, but it did give them a first-hand look at a party dominated by liberal activists and a chance to hold discussions about a broader effort to influence the direction of the national party. In San Francisco, Long brought together then-Governor Chuck Robb (D-VA), who was head of the Democratic Governors Association; Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who was interested in starting a think tank; Chiles; and several other House members active in the Committee on Party Effectiveness. According to participants, discussion ranged from trying to influence the selection of the next DNC chair to developing some kind of unofficial party organization. The consensus of the meeting was that, while a DNC chair might make some difference in the party's ideological direction, the institutional party was not the best place to develop a more moderate message.

The 1984 election results confirmed the concerns of the group that met in San Francisco and gave many elected Democrats pause to reconsider the distancing strategy. Plans to launch the DLC were finalized after Robb and then Governor Bruce Babbitt (D-AZ) failed in their efforts to find a moderate Sunbelt candidate to run for DNC chair and after the January 1985 death of Representative Long.[29] Former Long aide and executive director of the House Caucus, Al From, spearheaded the effort. According to one DLC co-founder: "After Gillis died, Al was out of a job; the national party was an albatross on a lot of people as we saw with Jim Hunt in 1984, and so Al met with Senator Nunn and Senator Chiles, Governor Robb, and some others and they decided, 'Let's put this thing together.'"

[26] Richard Cohen, "Democratic Leadership Council Sees Party Void and Is Ready to Fill It," *National Journal*, 1 February 1986, 270.

[27] Quoted from Fred Barnes, "Flying Nunn," *The New Republic*, 28 April 1986.

[28] Price, *Bringing Back the Parties*, 166–171.

[29] Ronald Elving, "Ronald Brown Coasting to DNC Chairmanship," *CQ Weekly Report*, 28 January 1989, 180; Will Marshall, Interview with author, June 1991.

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With From as executive director, Gephardt as chairman, and Nunn, Robb, Chiles, Babbitt, and Representative James R. Jones (OK) as founding spokesmen, the formation of the DLC was announced on 28 February 1985 at a Capitol Hill press conference. As an organization, the DLC bore a strong resemblance to an intraparty congressional caucus, but was organized as an unofficial party group not formally connected to the congressional party or any of the national party committees. Its goal was to influence the direction of the national party, something its members did not think they could do as effectively under the constraints of the official party organization. "It is important to have an autonomous group constantly pushing for change," noted From.[30] Specifically, the DLC aimed to reconstruct the identity of the national party to make it more appealing to mainstream voters who had been deserting the party in recent elections, primarily at the presidential level but with increased seepage to lower levels as well. What the party needed, according to the DLC, was to be perceived as more moderate by the public; and to achieve this change, the party needed to reenlist Democratic elected officials into national party affairs, a function to be provided by the DLC. "For too many years," noted Robb at the founding news conference, "Democratic officials have been running away from the party. We want to change that."[31] Representative Richard Gephardt added that he saw the DLC as "a way station or bridge back into the party for elected Democrats" and later underscored his point by adding that luring Democratic officials back into the process of shaping the party's positions would be the DLC's "most important function."[32] The DLC's official membership was limited to elected Democrats, with its activities financed by contributors sympathetic to its aims.

Although Nunn said at the founding press conference that, "we are going to try to move the party – both in substance and perception – back into the mainstream of American political life,"[33] neither he nor any other DLC founders defined any specific substantive differences with the national party.[34] And most of the DLC's activities for the next four years were oriented towards changing perceptions. Changing the image of the party, according to From, was the primary DLC "mission" in the first four years.[35]

The initial DLC activity was a series of public appearances and media events featuring prominent DLC members that took place in late spring 1985. Dubbed the "DLC Cavalry," a group of DLC spokespersons would descend on major media markets in Sunbelt states to advertise the DLC, to create the "perception"

[30] Quoted from Cohen, "Democratic Leadership Council Sees Party Void," 1986.

[31] Quoted from Greg McDonald, "Nunn Is One of Leaders of New Democratic Political Group," *Atlanta Constitution*, 1 March 1985.

[32] Janet Hook, "Officials Seek Moderation in Party's Image," *CQ Weekly Report*, 9 March 1985; Phil Gailey, "Dissidents Defy Top Democrats; Council Formed," *New York Times*, 1 March 1985.

[33] Hook, "Officials Seek Moderation."

[34] Gailey, "Dissidents Defy Top Democrats."

[35] Al From, Interview with author, June 1991.

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that there was "life at the party's center," and to urge wavering Democrats to "fight, don't switch."[36] The public appearances touted not only the DLC, but certain politicians willing to associate themselves publicly with the DLC—Gephardt, Nunn, Robb, Al Gore and others. "A lot of people liked the DLC and became members because of particular people—Nunn and Gephardt, for example," noted one DLC official.[37] All eight House members interviewed for this research who were DLC members prior to 1988 cited either Gephardt or Nunn as influences in their decisions to associate themselves with the group.

The DLC sponsored policy forums primarily for its congressional membership and put out occasional policy papers. The forums demonstrated the DLC's interest in substance, without committing it to any particular set of alternatives. The policy papers were written by DLC members expert in the areas of economics and defense. They laid out moderate positions on these threshold issues, but their substance was not as important as the image they projected of a group within the Democratic party interested in substance and ready to chart a more moderate course for the party.

The DLC developed a dualistic nature during its first four years. It was part forum for elected officials interested in discussing party positions on policy and in creating an impression in the public mind of a temperamentally moderate party, and it was part movement for those elected officials specifically interested in moving the party message to a more centrist position. Many DLC members in the first group were themselves liberals. In 1987, forty-eight of one hundred DLC House members had Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ratings of more than 75.[38] As liberals, most did not want to see the party's substantive positions change; but as elected officials, most saw the wisdom in discussing ways to make party positions more palatable to mainstream voters and in making themselves look more moderate in the eyes of their constituents. Several of the more liberal DLC members interviewed indicated that the group was primarily useful to them as a forum, but were wary of the DLC becoming a divisive force in the party. The second group consisted of elected officials with centrist records more interested in seeing the DLC become a substantive movement—a force within the party to change its national identity. For these members, the DLC provided a platform upon which they could establish national credentials as "leaders" in the centrist movement within the Democratic party. One junior member commented that the DLC is "wide open to those of us who want to get out front on

[36] Frederick Allen, "Not All Democrats Want to Look Like Tip O'Neill," *Atlanta Journal*, 12 November 1985; Marshall, Interview, 1991.

[37] Bruce Reed, Interview with author, June 1991.

[38] This was up from only 14 percent in 1985. Part of the increase is due to the abnormally high ADA ratings of all Democrats in 1987, an artifact of the issues selected to be included in the rankings. In 1989 and 1990, the percentage of DLC members with ADA ratings above 75 was 38.5 percent, well over one-third. DLC membership lists were provided by the DLC. ADA ratings found in *CQ Weekly Report*, 22 November 1986, 5 March 1988, 3 March 1990, 30 March 1991.

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issues." Another noted that the DLC "provides an identity, a presence in Washington and in the media, for moderate Democrats." One southern member said flatly, "I think the DLC is the key for the revival of the Democratic Party, and the only way we will win back the White House is through the work of the DLC."

This dual purpose did not hurt the DLC's development as an organization: the DLC gained membership across the ideological spectrum of Democratic elected officials because of it. As with any voluntary association, the DLC had to attract and maintain a membership to survive, but with membership limited to elected officials, the pool of potential members was small. By not being overly specific about its aims, the DLC maximized its membership. At its founding, the DLC announced its membership at forty-one, consisting of ten governors, fourteen Senators, and seventeen House members, all male, two black, and predominately from the Sunbelt. Membership grew to sixty-nine in the first two months, and to 110 in the first year, including nine women, four blacks, and seventy-nine House members. By 1988, membership neared 200, half from the House.[39]

At its founding in 1985, few saw the DLC's time horizons extending beyond 1988, when it was assumed the Democrats would have a good chance to retake the White House. If the DLC was to be successful in changing the image of the party, the proof would come during the 1988 nomination process. If it was not to be successful, most assumed the DLC would fade away. Several potential candidates associated themselves extensively with the DLC in the years leading up to 1988, most prominent among them Robb and Nunn, who were thought to be the strongest moderate candidates. Indeed, the DLC was seen by many as little more than a stalking horse for a Nunn or Robb candidacy, but in the end, neither ran. Gephardt, Babbitt, Gore, and Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) all participated in DLC affairs prior to their runs for the 1988 nomination.[40] Their association with the DLC "helped with prestige and money, and helped make the organization seem vital and attractive," but their performance disappointed the DLC and seemed to confirm perceptions that a moderate could not win the nomination.[41] Of the DLC-associated candidates, only the inexperienced Gore ran openly as a moderate. Biden and Gephardt ran campaigns to the left of where the DLC would have preferred them to be.[42] Babbitt ran on "new ideas," but they were not ideas developed within the DLC. From assessed the first four years as follows:

[39] DLC membership lists were obtained from the DLC by the author.

[40] Biden was not as active as the other three. A plausible left-to-right ordering of the 1988 candidates (Jesse Jackson, Paul Simon, Gary Hart, Michael Dukakis, Joseph Biden, Richard Gephardt, Bruce Babbitt, and Al Gore) shows that the more moderate 1988 candidates were those involved with the DLC.

[41] Reed, Interview.

[42] Gephardt's subsequent association with the DLC was at arms length, and many of the moderate to conservative DLC House members interviewed were critical of Gephardt's leadership in the House.

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"We were fine until the presidential nominating process got going in earnest, but then that process defines the party."[43]

The DLC became the organizational vehicle for the New Democrats after the initial efforts within the House Democratic Caucus met with little impact and after the 1984 election demonstrated to moderate Democrats that the national party posed a threat to their own electoral security. The CPE produced two documents on party policy, but lacked the institutional wherewithal to push them politically in the broader party network. Moreover, as part of the House Caucus, an official party group, the CPE was not a reliable location for the pursuit of centrist viewpoints, especially after Long's death in 1985. The 1984 election sparked broader interest among centrist Democrats in a group that could work on their behalf to reorient the party. The DLC responded to the needs of its membership by organizing itself as a staff-driven entity providing policy forums and publicity for its members. In return, the DLC required no time commitment from its general membership, but provided ample opportunity for the input and participation of those members who wanted to be active DLC members. By 1988, however, the DLC had not developed a distinctive centrist message for the party.

The Triumph of the New Democrats, 1989–1992

1989-1991: Institutionalization of the DLC

The Democrats lost their third presidential election in a row in 1988 as George Bush came from behind to win easily over Michael Dukakis, whom Bush skewered mercilessly during the general election campaign as an out-of-the-mainstream liberal. Democrats had tried to project a more centrist image in 1988. DNC Chair Paul Kirk had taken steps to weaken the institutional strength of liberal activists in party affairs by canceling the midterm party conference, withdrawing official DNC support of the special interest caucuses, increasing the number of superdelegates, recommending that the 1988 ticket include a candidate from the Sunbelt and that the platform be broad-based, thematic, and brief. Prior to the convention, Jesse Jackson was complaining that Kirk was "getting too cozy with the DLC."[44] Yet 1988 was painful demonstration to Democrats that they had no coherent message to replace activist liberalism. For his part, Dukakis gamely attempted to deemphasize his own basically liberal viewpoints by trying to emphasize "competence" over "ideology," a strategy that failed miserably in the general election.[45]

Unlike his immediate predecessors at the DNC, new party Chair Ron Brown did not go through the motions of appointing another policy council. It was not seen as necessary. Party liberals, pointing to Democratic inroads in the upper

[43] From, Interview, 1991.

[44] Elving, "Ronald Brown Coasting to DNC Chairmanship."

[45] Peter Goldwin and Tom Mathews, *Quest for the Presidency: The 1988 Campaign* (New York: Touchstone, 1989).

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Midwest and on the West coast, and to continuing Democratic majorities in Congress, blamed the 1988 defeat on the candidate and his campaign.[46] Party centrists had the DLC. Brown subsequently filled what seems to have become the standard role of the party chair, focusing on party organizational matters and smoothing potential rifts between party factions.[47]

The Democrats' 1988 defeat clarified the DLC's purpose. The Dukakis candidacy, according to the DLC, was symptomatic of a party with no alternative to the liberalism caricatured so effectively by the Bush campaign. Noted From: "Dukakis erased the [liberal] graffiti on the wall but put nothing on it, and Bush painted it for him. Dukakis never articulated an alterative vision for the country, allowing Bush to use wedge issues against him. At that point we decided to increase the intellectual effort within the DLC."[48] Henceforth, the DLC would become less of a benign forum for Democrats of all ideological stripes to discuss issues and less of a political image-maker for moderates wanting to use it for personal publicity and would be more of an ideas-based movement focused on shaping a specific mainstream alternative identity for the party.

This course of action alienated some of the more liberal DLC members, who preferred the DLC-as-forum concept. "I worry about the DLC becoming a divisive force in the party," noted one interviewee, a moderate-liberal, in 1991. Likewise, the new course would relegate some of the more conservative DLC members to the sidelines in favor of the movement moderates, who were anxious to spearhead the new direction. Ignoring the liberal DLC members, DLC Policy Director Bruce Reed explained:

> There have been two strains within the DLC. The moderate-conservative strain that has said, "Let's cut our losses by not making the mistakes that have hurt us so badly in the last 25 years." These are typically thoughtful, cautious southern Democrats like Robb and Nunn. That's where the DLC started.
>
> Another strain—Clinton, Gore, Dave McCurdy—thinks that the Democratic Party is at a point where it has to reinvent itself or risk going out of existence. These are the "New Democrats" who think you don't have to be conservative to avoid the mistakes the Democrats have made, who are frustrated with the course the party has taken but want to find a new course that everyone could support.[49]

To fulfill its mission as the centrist "ideas movement" within the Democratic party, the DLC became a more complex and more permanent establishment after 1988. "The DLC settled in for the long haul after 1988. It was good for the

[46] Jon F. Hale, "Shaping the Conventional Wisdom," *Political Communication* 10 (July-September 1993): 285-302.

[47] Brown was also a "speaking chairman," acting as spokesperson for the party, especially during the immediate post-Gulf War period, when Democrats seemed reluctant to criticize the Bush administration. On the roles of party chairs, see John F. Bibby, *Politics, Parties, and Elections in America*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1992), 86–89.

[48] From, Interview, 1991.

[49] Reed, Interview.

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organization," noted Reed.[50] Membership increased after the election to more than 200, and DLC centrists held a high profile in postelection interpretations of why Dukakis lost.[51] In June 1989 a think tank, Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), was created, nominally separate from the DLC, while the DLC itself undertook more movement-oriented activities. As a quasi-separate entity from the DLC, the PPI was free to explore new ideas with some degree of independence from the politicians associated with the DLC. As PPI developed new ideas, the DLC came to serve as the political vehicle for publicizing the new centrist alternative. The DLC did this through its annual meetings, a new magazine called *The New Democrat*, and regular media contacts. With its own entity generating ideas and a developing communication network, the DLC added a grass-roots membership and, perhaps most important, a New Democrats leadership cadre willing to commit itself to the developing message.

Financing such an extensive operation required substantial amounts of money. The annual budget in the DLC's first two years was $400,000, much of it raised in large contributions from executives, lawyers, lobbyists, and other Democratic contributors supportive of the DLC's goals, or its early stalwarts like Nunn, Robb, and Gephardt. In 1986, former DNC Chair John White began coordinating fundraising.[52] Major contributors made up the DLC Board of Advisers, which met on occasion with DLC members. The annual budget of the post-1988 institutionalized DLC reached and surpassed the $2 million mark, with corporate sponsorships bringing in substantial portions. Of one hundred DLC Sustaining Members in 1991-1992, fifty-seven were corporations and another twelve were professional or trade associations. The energy, health care, insurance, pharmaceutical, retail, and tobacco industries were all represented. The DLC Network, a group of contributors under the age of 40 brings in still more money.[53]

As a movement, the DLC could ill afford to keep its membership tied to Capitol Hill Democrats. Up and coming Democrats in the states provided an untapped potential for increased membership and future leadership in the DLC-centrist wing of the party. DLC leaders felt that their developing message and agenda would be well-received in the "laboratories of democracy," where "reinventing government" was being put into practice.[54]

> The truth is that Congress, the source of our initial strength, is the last institution that will conform to some of the changes in the DLC agenda. Outside Washington, the leadership has a different outlook, driven by fiscal restraint and a degree of accountability that is often shirked in D.C.[55]

[50] Ibid.

[51] Hale, "Shaping the Conventional Wisdom."

[52] Cohen, "Democratic Leadership Council Sees Party Void."

[53] Linda Moore, Interview with author, March 1991; Democratic Leadership Council, membership/donor list, 1991.

[54] See David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1992).

[55] From, Interview, 1991.

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One liberal DLC House member agreed that the more assertive direction taken by the DLC (along with the withdrawal of Gephardt from DLC affairs) "had caused Al to lose soldiers up here, so he has to go down to the next level."

Thus, in 1990, the DLC expanded its efforts to the states in an attempt to establish a grass-roots base of support, both among state and local Democratic officeholders and moderate Democrats active in state politics as financial contributors and campaign workers. Governor Bill Clinton became the first outside Washington DLC chair in May 1990, and for the next year, Clinton was point man for the founding of nearly two dozen state DLC chapters, travelling to the states for the initial media blitz and networking with DLC supporters. As of spring 1992, the DLC had twenty-six state chapters. Membership in the state chapters is open to any Democratic elected official. Extending its grass-roots outreach, the DLC is now organized like an interest group for members of the general public. Citizens can join either the national organization or their state chapter by paying membership dues and receive in return *The New Democrat*, other DLC announcements, policy papers, and PPI publications. DLC membership expanded accordingly, first from 219 in late 1989 to 400 by spring 1991, then to 700 in spring 1992.[56]

The first concern after the 1988 election was that the party would try to smooth over its differences to avoid factional warfare and to present a picture of unity. Indeed, by early 1990 the *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* decision and the collapse of communism had brought Democrats closer together on the issues of abortion and national defense. Nonetheless, the DLC tried to draw a line in the sand in 1989 and 1990 in order to distinguish its approach from that of party liberals. "Pretending that divisions don't exist is hardly a constructive foundation for rebuilding our party," argued From in response to Jesse Jackson's pronouncement that he was "delighted to be united" with the DLC.[57]

It proved difficult, however, for the DLC to pick a fight with party liberals, because so few would engage in the debate. Only Jesse Jackson stood as a reliable spokesman for the liberal wing of the party, and despite his Rainbow Coalition organization there was no intraparty group comparable to the DLC on the left working on message, agenda, and policy alternatives. These factors no doubt kept other liberals from responding to the DLC. In the end, however, the DLC made its case anyway, and the lack of refutation on the left only enhanced the credibility of its message.[58]

[56] DLC membership lists obtained by author. These figures represent current and former elected officials at national, state, and local levels. They do not include grass-roots members.

[57] *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Al From, "The Myth of Unity," *The Mainstream Democrat*, May 1990.

[58] Some party liberals finally realized their own lack of attention to ideas development and launched a group called the Coalition for Democratic Values (CDV) in late 1990 to counter the DLC's efforts. By 1992, the CDV had merged with a group calling itself the Campaign for New Priorities. At the 1992 Democratic National Convention, they held a meeting in which they called for a massive reinvestment of defense money to domestic needs. See Campaign for New Priorities

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The first task was to make the political argument that the party needed a new identity. This effort began as early as the immediate post-election period in 1988 when DLC spokespersons argued that Dukakis lost because of the party's national identity,[59] and continued at the 1989 and 1990 DLC annual conferences. This effort was considered by the DLC to be "critical, because it began to change the framework for why we lost" and paved the way for the DLC's policy ideas to get a hearing inside the party.[60] The DLC's political argument was propounded most thoroughly in a PPI publication entitled, "The Politics of Evasion."[61]

In it, political scientists Elaine Kamarck and William Galston contend that the Democratic party had come to be identified with a rigid "liberal fundamentalism" that had "lost touch with the American people."[62]

> Since the late 1960s, the public has come to associate liberalism with tax and spend policies that contradict the interests of average families; with welfare policies that foster dependence rather than self-reliance; with softness toward the perpetrators of crime and indifference toward its victims; with ambivalence toward the assertion of American values and interests abroad; and with an adversarial stance toward mainstream moral and cultural values.[63]

That this coalition of minorities and white liberal elites actually dominated the Democratic party in the 1970s and 1980s was, of course, debatable.[64] But the widespread perception that the party was caught in the throes of this so-called liberal fundamentalism indeed appeared to have driven away enough white middle-class voters to give the Republicans dominance in presidential politics between 1968 and 1988, near parity in the Senate, and in partisan identification. Unless the Democrats could moderate their liberal identity, argued Kamarck and Galston, a Republican realignment, averted since Watergate, would be completed.[65]

Having established its political rationale for a new party identity, the DLC set about the task of fleshing out its message and policies, which was done largely through policy monographs and papers put out by PPI, then publicized and commented upon at DLC conferences and in its magazine, which was sent to Democratic officeholders throughout the nation. At its 1990 and 1991 annual

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(pamphlet, July 1992). Needless to say, these efforts on the liberal side of the party pale in comparison to the DLC.

[59] Hale, "Shaping the Conventional Wisdom."

[60] From, Interview, 1991.

[61] William Galston and Elaine C. Kamarck, "The Politics of Evasion: Democrats and the Presidency" (Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute, 1989).

[62] Ibid. The genesis of this line of argument can be found in Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward McCann, 1970).

[63] Galston and Kamark, "The Politics of Evasion," 3-4.

[64] For a counterargument, see Jeff Faux, "The Myth of the New Democrat," *The American Prospect* (Fall 1993): 20–29.

[65] For arguments that the Democrats' success in the Watergate midterms averted a GOP realignment, see Thomas Edsall, *The New Politics of Inequality* (New York: Norton, 1984); and Kevin Phillips, *Post-Conservative America* (New York: Random House, 1982).

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conferences, the DLC unveiled its New Orleans Declaration and New Choice Resolutions, declaring the guiding themes of "opportunity, responsibility, community, and national security" and setting forth a "New Democratic" policy agenda. The agenda set forth at the DLC's 1992 annual conference became the basis for the 1992 Democratic party platform.[66]

In developing its program, the DLC faced the difficult task of differentiating itself from both the left and right sides of the political spectrum without appearing to be simply posturing in the middle, as was too much the tendency of the early DLC. The New Democrats extricate themselves from this dilemma with mixed success by denying the relevance of the conventional liberal-conservative spectrum under changed political conditions and proclaiming their ideas to be a progressive, third way to address the problems of the 1990s. They argue that the standard liberal and conservative policy options represent false choices of a now irrelevant old politics.

Once the DLC policy message and agenda were fleshed out, the results seemed well within the ideological tradition of the Democratic party. Avoiding the term "liberal," the DLC nonetheless described its message as "progressive," and a "new formula for activist government." Indeed the DLC message is nothing if not an attempt to rescue liberalism from its negative reputation and update it for the 1990s. The New Democratic message is fundamentally in the tradition of modern liberalism in its belief that government is a positive good that should intervene actively in economic and social matters to ensure economic growth and equal opportunity.

Thus, there is much less than one would expect in the New Democratic agenda that the so-called liberal fundamentalists would oppose, given the DLC's own rhetoric about their intraparty adversaries. Arguing that it is the responsibility of those who favor activist government to address public hostility toward government, the New Democrats call for more flexible government organizations and procedures and in general for reinventing government to make it more responsive and less bureaucratic. In their advocacy of "ending welfare as we know it," the New Democrats propose an overhaul that combines increased obligations on the part of welfare recipients with extensive investment in education and job training, something few liberals would oppose. In pursuing the idea of national service, the New Democrats propose a gigantic domestic program patterned after the Peace Corps. On economic matters, the New Democrats' support increased public investment targeted to making the economy more productive, the restoration of progressivity to the tax code, and a guaranteed working wage. Other issues on which New Democrats and liberals would agree include environmental protection, abortion, family leave, and handgun control. Both favor national health care, although the liberals are more supportive of a single-payer system and

[66] The DLC message and agenda is contained in "The New Orleans Declaration" (DLC 1990); "The New Choice Resolutions" (DLC 1991); and "The New Choice: Draft for a Democratic Platform" (DLC 1992).

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employer mandates than the New Democrats. The major points of contention are largely confined to trade and affirmative action issues. The New Democrats are more closely tied to business than to organized labor and take pains to distance themselves from Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition.

In the end, the New Democrats' message is one thing, its agenda another. In attacking the liberal fundamentalists, the DLC is signaling to swing voters in the white, middle class that Democrats are not exclusively black, feminist, gay, and liberal. While this message is offensive to the groups just mentioned, it holds the potential to wedge the Democrats' foot in the door of voters who make the difference in presidential elections and many subpresidential elections. In its policy positions, the DLC has fleshed out a liberal-leaning platform couched in soothing centrist rhetoric for a party that has been unable to do so and one that has considerable potential appeal to much of the party's liberal base. On the other hand, the DLC program seems vulnerable to an attack from the right claiming that it is just a cleverly concealed version of liberalism.

After 1989 the DLC essentially institutionalized itself as an unofficial party organization. It moved from a group built largely around the personal influence of Nunn, Robb and a few others to a much more formal entity, which has taken on a life of its own, guided by professional staff and funded by an extensive network of contributors. As long as the DLC is perceived by its membership as serving their needs effectively, it will remain a major player in Democratic party politics.

1992: The Clinton Campaign

The DLC recognized from its inception that the only way for its message, once developed, to become the party message and for it to mold the party identity would be for a presidential candidate to pick up the message and, literally, run with it (and on it). The greater the DLC's success at changing and dominating the ideas environment of the party between election years, the more likely a presidential candidate would emerge to pick up the DLC message. For their part, presidential candidates need policy ideas when they seek office. Rather than create a message and agenda out of whole cloth, candidates rely on ideas generated within the party network.[67] Just as Reagan was able to draw on well developed ideas that had been percolating in the growing conservative establishment of think tanks, journals, and leadership groups throughout the 1970s, the DLC, in setting up an infrastructure for a new "progressive" establishment, hoped to provide the same for the next Democratic nominee and administration.[68] In 1988

[67] Price, *Bringing Back the Parties*, 291; Hargrove and Nelson, *Presidents, Politics, and Policy*. On party networks, see Mildred Schwartz, *The Party Network* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

[68] On the conservative establishment, see Sidney Blumenthal, *The Rise of the Counter-Establishment* (New York: Times Books, 1986).

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the early efforts of the DLC had contributed, along with the actions of DNC Chair Paul Kirk, to some change in the image of the party, but not much to the development of an alternative message available for a moderate candidate to use. Because of its more extensive message and policy development efforts after 1988, the DLC message and agenda had much more appeal to potential candidates in 1992.

In addition to providing substantive ideas for candidates, the DLC provides a leadership platform for elected officials who want to enhance their visibility and establish their leadership credentials.[69] The most prominent position in the DLC to do this is the chairmanship. The DLC chairmanship changes hands roughly every two years, which spreads around the opportunity to members, while keeping the DLC itself from being tied too closely to any particular politician.

Bill Clinton took advantage of both the ideas created within the DLC and the informal party leadership position provided by the DLC in his 1992 presidential campaign. Clinton had been associated with, though not active in, the early DLC and did not become more engaged with the DLC until its post-1988 ideas movement phase was well under way. In 1990, the DLC was looking for a chair from outside of Washington, and Clinton was seeking to enhance his visibility within the national party. It was a perfect fit, given Clinton's interest in policy and his national aspirations. As DLC chair, Clinton worked the DLC network assiduously, with his extensive travel paid for by the DLC. In return, he received key early money, campaign workers, and endorsements from among those associated with the DLC.[70] Perhaps most important, the DLC's policy development efforts provided Clinton with the ready-made message and agenda of the New Democrats to use in his campaign.

The DLC's 1991 annual conference in Cleveland was its largest up to that time, drawing around 1,000 participants, organized by state delegations, with delegates voting on resolutions to ratify the DLC's New Choice agenda. Many prospective 1992 Democratic candidates took the stage in Cleveland (Gephardt, Gore, Jay Rockefeller, Paul Tsongas, McCurdy, Douglas Wilder), but Clinton's performance was considered the best.[71] According to one report, "The unquestioned star of Cleveland was Mr. Clinton." To his "boyish charm he has now added the ability to deliver a rousing speech."[72] Not considered in the top echelon of potential Democratic candidates prior to the Cleveland convention, Clinton stock rose considerably thereafter.[73]

After Mario Cuomo announced he would not run in December 1991, Clinton, who had announced in October, was generally considered the best financed and

[69] On informal leadership structures in Congress, see John J. Kornacki, ed., *Leading Congress* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1991).

[70] Paul Starobin, "An Affair to Remember?" *National Journal*, 16 January 1993, 120–124.

[71] Robin Toner, "Democrat Session Previews '92 Race," *New York Times*, 8 May 1991.

[72] "The White Men in Suits Move In" *The Economist*, 11 May 1991.

[73] Dan Balz, "Democrats' Perennial Rising Star Wants to Put New Face on Party," *Washington Post*, 25 June 1991.

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best organized candidate in the field.[74] His DLC contacts paid off in the early phases of the nomination campaign. In Georgia, where Clinton desperately needed to win to stop former Senator Tsongas's post-New Hampshire momentum in the week prior to Super Tuesday, Clinton was helped by the endorsements and support of Nunn, Governor Zell Miller, and Representative John Lewis, the former civil rights activist.[75] All three were DLC members.[76] The same week in Maryland, Clinton picked up the endorsement of another prominent African American, Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke, also a DLC member. In fact, most of the high profile African Americans who endorsed Clinton before Super Tuesday were DLC members.[77] Clinton also received an early boost from DLC members in Congress selected as superdelegates to the convention. As of 28 February 1992, one week after Clinton's defeat in the New Hampshire primary, thirty-seven of Clinton's first fifty-two congressional endorsements came from DLC members, more than 70 percent. At that time, Tom Harkin, Bob Kerrey, and Tsongas had twelve endorsements each, one-third of which consisted of DLC members.[78]

Throughout his campaign, Clinton utilized the message and agenda put together by the DLC. In announcing his entry into the campaign in October 1991, Clinton spoke of the need to "reinvent government" to address problems in ways that would broaden opportunity, called for greater responsibility on the part of citizens and for a restoration of a sense of community. Eschewing ideological labels, Clinton took a page straight out of the DLC's 1991 New Choice Resolutions: "The change I seek and the change that we must all seek, isn't liberal or conservative. It's different and it's both."[79] In his standard stump speech, Clinton emphasized the opportunity, responsibility, and community themes while decrying the economic decline hastened by the trickle down economics of the Reagan-Bush years and promised a "new kind of government" based on the government-managed capitalism envisioned by the New Democrats. Every major issue position mentioned in the version of the speech that appeared in *The New York Times* was in agreement with items on the New Democrat agenda.[80]

[74] Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Delivers a Mainstream Message With a Southern Accent," *New York Times*, 27 December 1991.

[75] Dan Balz and Helen Dewar, "Contrasting Shows of Support for Clinton," *Washington Post*, 28 February 1992.

[76] Governor Miller's spirited defense of Clinton won him one of the keynote addresses at the 1992 Democratic National Convention. In contrast, Nunn quietly reiterated his support for Clinton in the face of questions over Clinton's draft record. Since that time, Nunn's support for Clinton has seemed rather perfunctory, especially compared to his early enthusiasm. Nunn steered some of his own would-be financial contributors to Clinton in 1991. See Paul Starobin, "An Affair to Remember?" *National Journal*, 16 January 1993.

[77] These included Representatives Lewis, Mike Espy (MI), William Jefferson (LA), and Floyd Flake (NY) and Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson. See "Democratic Endorsements," *CQ Weekly Report*, 29 February 1992.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Robin Toner, "Arkansas' Clinton Enters The '92 Race for President," *New York Times*, 4 October 1991.

[80] Compare Clinton's speech transcribed in Gwen Ifill, "Clinton's Standard Campaign Speech: A Call for Responsibility," *New York Times*, 26 April 1992, with the DLC's "New Choice: Draft for a Democratic Platform" (pamphlet, 1992).

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Because Clinton entered the campaign after most other prominent moderates had announced their decisions not to run, both he and those at the DLC assumed that he would be the only prominent moderate in a field of liberals. Their further assumption was that the nomination campaign would be the final battleground for the intraparty struggle between the New Democrats and the liberals, whose strongest potential candidate was Cuomo. Clinton would define himself as a New Democrat and even if he lost the nomination to Cuomo, he would be well positioned for 1996 if Cuomo lost the general election.[81] Ultimately, however, the only traditional liberal in the race, Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, went nowhere, and Clinton found himself to the left of his chief competition, former Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas, on the main issue of the campaign—the economy. Clinton's message was blurred further because of the time spent explaining character issues. As a result, even though he stayed well within the parameters of the New Democrat message throughout the primary campaign, Clinton did not establish a clear public image as a different kind of Democrat. Ironically, the dynamics of candidate positioning in the nomination race helped Clinton win the support of skeptical liberals, which made it easier for him to appeal to the middle at the convention and in the general election campaign.[82]

The renewed effort to appeal to the middle began with the selection of Al Gore, a fellow DLC member, as running mate and continued with the adoption of the party platform, and the convention itself, which was well choreographed to convey the New Democrat identity to the public. The platform, titled "A New Covenant with the American People," echoed the main themes and policy proposals as the DLC's "New Choice."[83] Its Preamble concluded as follows:

> [W]e seek a *New Covenant* to repair the damaged bond between the American people and their government, that will expand *opportunity*, insist upon greater individual *responsibility* in return, restore *community*, and ensure *national security* in a profoundly new era.[84]

The text of the platform was organized around the main themes of the New Democrats. Opportunity, Responsibility, Community, and National Security were main headings with specific agenda item subheadings listed underneath these main headings. A comparison of the platform with the DLC's New Choice Platform revealed striking similarities between the two. Of fifty-one specific agenda item subheadings in the platform, thirty-seven were in agreement with agenda items in the DLC's New Choice Draft, and nothing in the platform was in disagree-

[81] Peter Goldman and Tom Matthews, "America Changes the Guard," *Newsweek*, special ed., November/December 1992.

[82] E. J. Dionne, "Clinton Strives to Regain The Mantle of Innovator," *Washington Post*, 4 May 1992.

[83] L. Sandy Maisel, "The Platform-Writing Process: Candidate-Centered Platforms in 1992," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Winter 1993–94): 671–698.

[84] The Report of the Platform Committee to the Democratic National Convention, "A New Covenant With the American People" (pamphlet, 1992), 2. (Emphasis in original.)

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ment. None of the positions taken in the fourteen platform items not covered in the New Choice Draft were found to be not in accordance with the gist of the DLC document.

Clinton won the general election because widespread concern over the state of the economy prompted voters to seek a change in leadership, but the new identity of the party presented to the American public at the convention can be credited with putting him in the position to win. Clinton emerged from New York City as the leader of a different kind of Democratic party, one that nominated a ticket of young moderates full of ideas who appealed to the white middle class and liberals. The convention improved the public image of the party from 49 percent favorable before it began to 58 percent by midweek, and more than four in ten voters after the convention thought Clinton and Gore indeed represented a different kind of Democrat.[85]

The argument could be made that Clinton's election simply shows that any Democrat could have defeated George Bush in 1992, given the state of the economy. In the lead-up to the election, however, those who attempt to predict election outcomes on the basis of economic indicators were maintaining that Bush would win.[86] In other words, economic conditions were bad, but not so bad that Bush was a sure loser. Clinton's New Democrat credentials put him in the position to compete with Bush on a level playing field for the mantle of economic leadership by preempting the Republicans from using the liberal-bashing tactics that had worked so well for them in 1988. Had the Democratic nominee been from the party's liberal wing, the Republicans could have used cultural issues to divert attention from the economy, once again driving a wedge between white middle class swing voters and the Democrats.

The New Democrats' triumph in 1992 is attributable to the following factors. First, the DLC's institutionalization established it as a true force in the party and freed it from the perception that it was little more than an auxiliary organization for a few prominent moderate politicians. Second, the DLC developed a message, agenda, and set of policy alternatives that had the potential to serve as the basis for a centrist presidential candidacy. Third, the DLC offered its membership a leadership structure through which its active members, especially its chair, could establish themselves as leaders of party centrists. Finally, Bill Clinton availed himself of this leadership opportunity, using the DLC chair to position himself as a prominent party moderate and using the DLC message as the basis of his campaign message. Ultimate success depended on having a candidate win the party's presidential nomination, for the nomination process is the final arbiter of party message.

[85] Kathleen Frankovic, "Public Opinion in the 1992 Campaign" in Gerald M Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1992* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993).

[86] For example, Lewis-Beck and Rice estimated that Bush would receive 58 percent of the electoral vote. See Michael Lewis-Beck and Thomas Rice, *Forecasting Elections* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992).

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GOVERNING AS NEW DEMOCRATS, 1993–94

Governing as New Democrats has proved difficult in the first two years of the Clinton administration.[87] The continued success and viability of the New Democratic approach now seems bound to the Clinton presidency, yet the new president seemed to govern as often as an old Democrat as a new one during the 103rd Congress. The largely inadvertant early focus on gays in the military, the 1993 economic stimulus program, the FY 1994 budget, and health care reform are all administration initiatives that did not draw significant New Democrat support. On the other hand, the administration's positions on crime, welfare, reinventing government, national service, NAFTA, and the earned income tax credit drew extensive support from New Democrats.

Three possible explanations suggest themselves. First, Clinton himself is more liberal than the New Democrats thought. He saw the advantages of using the New Democratic message in his campaign rhetoric, but in governing he has moved closer to his true positions. Second, insofar as Democrats in Congress are roughly split into liberal and centrist wings, the administration has attempted to bridge the differences between the two, often taking positions that seem too liberal for the New Democrats. Third, while eight members of Clinton's original cabinet were DLC members, the New Democrats lacked the personnel to capture many more administration appointments.[88] The liberal wing of the party may have more influence within the administration than the centrists. This is also the case in Congress, as the administration is unavoidably linked to the Democratic leadership, which is generally seen as more representative of party liberals than centrists. For their part, active New Democrats in Congress have used their informal House caucus, Mainstream Forum, to oppose the administration and congressional leadership when it abandons New Democratic principles.

These tensions between the administration and centrist Democrats in Congress pose a quandary for the DLC itself. First, the DLC sees its new role as a watchdog, trying to hold the administration's feet to the fire to get it to adhere to New Democratic principles in governing.[89] This is similar to the role played by various conservative movement groups and think tanks during the Reagan administration. At the same time, the DLC wants to retain policy influence within the administration. If it barks too loudly as a watchdog, its credibility inside the administration will wane. Confounding matters further, the DLC now has a split constituency—the administration and the New Democrats in Congress. Whom does it serve? Tied too closely with the Clinton administration, their fates are inextricably linked and the DLC risks losing membership. Tied too closely with its active members who oppose administration initiatives, the DLC contributes to the political difficulties of the president it helped elect. To try to extricate itself from these matters,

[87] A detailed treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.

[88] Al From, Interview with author, September 1993.

[89] Ibid.; Will Marshall, Interview with author, 1993. See also Will Marshall and Martin Schram, eds., *Mandate for Change* (New York: Berkeley Books, 1993); Al From and Will Marshall, "The Road to Realignment: Democrats and the Perot Voters" (pamphlet, 1993).

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the DLC has tried to turn its attention to building an infrastructure of New Democrats at the grass roots level around the country.[90]

New Democrats and Party Theory

Out-Party Policy Development and Unofficial Party Organizations

As the present case suggests, out-party policy development can and does occur at various locations within the party network, and not necessarily within official party organizations. The national committee seems especially ill suited for policy development because of pressures to include representatives from all facets of the party. When this does not occur, an effort within the national committee to develop policy is seen as captive of a party faction. When it does occur, the output tends to be a general statement of common ground among party members rather than a settling of differences between different factions in the party. This would appear to be a more acute dilemma for the ideologically diverse Democrats than for the more homogenous Republicans. Yet the conservative themes that have dominated the Republican party since the late-1970s were fashioned in conservative groups outside of the official party. Republican National Committee policy development efforts during that period are more accurately characterized as policy *publicity* efforts, promoting the new conservative agenda.[91] Additionally, the party-building and supplemental campaign activities of the national committees are so extensive that they have little time or resources to devote to policy development.

Alternative party organizations arise when the official party fails to address important party functions. In the case of the New Democrats, the DLC emerged to develop party message and policy after efforts inside the official party failed to do so. The DLC demonstrates that unofficial organizations can play an important role for parties. In this case, it helped the party find its voice.

Party Factionalism

Yet the question remains, where were party liberals? Why do they lack an organization like the DLC? Unofficial party organizations also arise from the perception that the official party structure is not adequately representing a particular subgroup within the party. Arthur Stevens et al., using the founding of the Democratic Study Group (DSG) in the House of Representatives as an example, explain the emergence of alternative organizations as arising from the perception of bias in

[90] From, Interview, 1993.

[91] See Philip Klinkner, "A Comparison of Out-Party Leaders: Ray Bliss and Bill Brock" in John C. Green, ed., *Politics, Professionalism, and Power* (Lanham, MD: Bliss Institute/University Press of America, 1994), 135–148.

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institutional structures designed for collective decision making.[92] Just as the DSG was organized to counteract the perception that institutional arrangements in the House were biased in favor of conservatives, the DLC organized to counteract the perception that institutional arrangements in the national Democratic party were biased in favor of activist liberal elements in the party and against moderate elected officials.

This helps explain why party liberals lacked an organization like the DLC, but does not address why they failed to produce a new liberal message for the party, particularly as a response to the New Democrats, regardless of the location in the party network of such an effort. A general answer lies in the nature of the liberal wing of the party itself. Liberal Democrats since 1968 have been more a collection of groups representing some salient characteristic (labor, education, African Americans, Hispanics, women, homosexuals) or issue concern (antiwar, welfare rights, environmental, consumer, gun control, antinuclear, nuclear freeze, abortion rights) than a self-conscious ideological faction. This group-based politics did not produce a broader group identity out of which might grow a coherent liberal message and agenda for the party.

A more specific answer lies in an area that is oft neglected in political science: political leadership, particularly entrepreneurial leadership. In the case of the New Democrats, it took the initial vision of Gillis Long and eventually that of a career staffer, Al From, to bring the New Democrats into existence. The DLC, its organizational structure, and its output are all the result of From's entrepreneurial abilities. In the final analysis, party liberals did not have this kind of leadership.

The Role of Parties in Candidate-Centered Politics

In electoral politics, parties have adapted to the needs of the new style politician, who puts together a capital-intensive candidate-centered enterprise to run for office. As recent scholarship on American parties amply attests, parties have taken on the role of supplementary campaign organizations, providing money and technical expertise to candidates.[93] In contrast, the official party organizations have been less effective at serving the contemporary elected officials' policy needs. Today's politicians, in large part, are descendants of James Q. Wilson's amateurs insofar as they are more interested in the politics of ideas and policy making than the old-style professionals; yet they are, quite literally, too busy to

[92] Arthur G. Stevens, et al., "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955–1970: The Democratic Study Group," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974): 667–681. See also Burdett Loomis, "Congressional Caucuses and the Politics of Representation" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1982).

[93] See Paul Herrnson, *Party Campaigning in the 1980s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); L. Sandy Maisel, *The Parties Respond* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); A. James Reichley, "The Rise of National Parties" in John Chubb and Paul Peterson, eds., *The New Direction in American Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).

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engage in detailed efforts at idea and policy development.[94] Hence, today's politician turns to entities such as congressional caucuses, think tanks, and interest groups for help. The DLC demonstrates that unofficial party groups should be added to the list and that party groups have the potential to adapt to the policy needs of contemporary politicians.

The DLC also demonstrates how parties can get elected officials more involved in party affairs. In the candidate-centered era, elected officials must see involvement in national party affairs as furthering their primary career goals of reelection, policy making, and influence. To get elected officials involved, incentives must be offered that will help them achieve their career goals. The DLC was structured around that basic premise. The DLC enhanced members' reelection goals by providing a "moderate" party organization with which they could identify while continuing to distance themselves from the "liberal" party, and by moderating the overarching ideological landscape in the party. It enhanced members' policy-making goals by providing ideas, policy information, and forums for discussion. The DLC enhanced members' influence generally by serving as an organizational vehicle for moderate Democrats to pursue their interests in Washington and, for those who wished to avail themselves of it, the DLC provided an alternative leadership structure to enhance personal influence and leadership skills. The success of the DLC is tied to this incentive structure. Without it, the DLC would not have drawn the membership and leadership necessary to develop the New Democrat message. The DLC, in other words, is an adaptation to the needs of the contemporary politician.*

[94] James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). On the new-style politician, see Burdett Loomis, *The New American Politician* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 4. For additional descriptions, see David Broder, *Changing of the Guard: Power and Leadership in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980); and Allen Ehrenhalt, *The United States of Ambition* (New York: Times Books, 1990).

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Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold War Military

PAUL STOCKTON

Critics of Congress often attack it for micromanaging the defense budget—that is, for dictating how much to spend on particular weapons and imposing other detailed requirements on the Department of Defense (DOD). Those critics urge Congress to shift its attention toward broader issues of U.S. military strategy, which for budgeting purposes concerns the size and overall characteristics that U.S. forces should have. However, as the old saying goes, beware of what you wish for; you might get it. Since 1990, key legislators have launched a barrage of proposals on defense strategy. This activism highlights the need to rethink how legislators link the details of the defense budget to broader policy concerns, and how the end of the cold war is affecting the mechanisms legislators use to shape defense spending.

Members of Congress have long criticized their own tendency to micromanage at the expense of broader policy oversight. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, legislators have not only critiqued Bush and Clinton administration proposals to reorient the U.S. military, but have advanced such proposals of their own. Changes in the international system appear to have driven changes in congressional behavior: with the end of the cold war, legislators are no longer satisfied to focus on budgetary details and ignore more fundamental issues. Yet, previous studies have argued that the congressional preference for micromanagement over strategy stemmed from powerful domestic factors, including the incentives for legislators to pack the defense budget with pork for their constituents.[1]

[1] Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Summer 1985): 227–248; Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Jacques S. Gansler, *Affording Defense* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Kenneth R. Mayer, "Policy Disputes As a

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What has become of these underlying determinants of congressional behavior? How has the rise of congressional strategizing affected congressional micromanagement? What are the implications for the evolution of Congress and the future of the defense budget?

I argue that the end of the cold war has not only created new political incentives for legislators to rethink U.S. military strategy, but allowed legislators to use strategy as a political tool to win votes on budget legislation, both within their committees and in Congress as a whole. The rise of strategizing on the Hill does not mean that legislators are abandoning micromanagement. Dictating the details of the military budget still offers legislators the tightest, most direct control over defense activities. Rather, members are using strategy initiatives to promote their detailed spending proposals, thereby changing the nature of the budgeting process and the role of Congress in defense policy making.

Micromanagement, Strategy, and Defense Budgeting

In principle, decisions about military strategy should drive the details of the defense budget in a top-down fashion. After assessing U.S. security needs, deciding how much to spend on defense and agreeing on the size, capabilities, and basic characteristics that the armed forces should have, funding levels for specific programs could be established to implement those decisions. Indeed, if strategy is to have any effect on restructuring U.S. forces for the post-cold war era, budgetary details must reflect decisions on strategy.

The Department of Defense has established an elaborate process to incorporate such top-down, strategy-driven analysis in the president's budget request to Congress.[2] Moreover, following the collapse of the Soviet threat, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney claimed that the Bush administration had taken special

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Source of Administrative Controls: Congressional Micromanagement of the Department of Defense," *Public Administrative Review* 53 (July-August 1993): 293–302. Kenneth R. Mayer, "Problem? What Problem? Congressional Micromanagement of the Department of Defense," (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 30 August 1991); Herman A. Mellor, "Congressional Micromanagement: National Defense" in Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini, eds., *The Imperial Congress* (New York: Pharos Books, 1988); Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," *Public Interest* 100 (Summer 1990): 131–146; James W. Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform" in Asa A. Clark, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKitrick, and Reed, eds., *The Defense Reform Debate* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

[2] Harry E. Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy for the Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992); Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992). Rothman argues that in 1990 and 1991, this formal process was circumvented by Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who wanted to revise the Bush administration's military strategy more rapidly than the process allowed.

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care to rebuild the defense budget around a "zero-based look at our security needs."[3]

The Clinton administration followed with its own Bottom-Up Review of U.S. defense policies and force structure.[4] Yet, legislators criticized both of these administration efforts to craft strategy-driven budgets. Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) attacked the Bush administration for failing to propose deeper cuts and argued that the defense establishment is "a giant woolly mammoth [that is] eating us out of house and home. Now that the time has come for a massive diet program, the Administration has become so fond of the beast that it will only agree to give it a haircut and a shave."[5] Republican legislators such as Representative Floyd Spence (SC) attacked Clinton's Bottom-Up Review as dangerously flawed and warned that the administration's defense cuts could produce "disastrous" consequences.[6] These attacks come as no surprise. Legislators have frequently used defense issues as weapons for political warfare, particularly in periods of divided government when partisan conflicts reinforce institutional rivalries. Moreover, if incrementalism did influence the Bush administration's budget request, that would be consistent with the way Aaron Wildavsky and others argue that large, complex budgets are usually made.[7] But a more fundamental constraint limits the effect of strategy on defense budgeting. Even if a president bases his budget request on a thorough rethinking of U.S. defense policy, Congress can alter that request and legislate program funding changes without regard for their strategic implications.

Previous studies have argued that Congress alters the budget in just such a fashion. Robert Art contends that in authorizing and appropriating the defense budget, legislators "look mostly at the details of defense spending, but rarely at the big picture."[8] Legislators themselves have decried their tendency to "micromanage" specific program funding levels and to "lose sight of the major questions

[3] Dick Cheney, *Testimony Before the House Budget Committee in Connection with the FY 1993 Budget for the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 February 1992), 1. The key elements of that policy reassessment are described in George Bush, "In Defense of Defense," reprinted in Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1991* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1991), 131–134; and Colin L. Powell, *The National Military Strategy, 1992* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992).

[4] Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 1993).

[5] Robert C. Byrd, Testimony by Senator Robert C. Byrd Before the Senate Budget Committee. U.S. Senate, Senate Appropriations Committee, 5 February 1992, 6.

[6] Eric Schmitt, "Lawmakers of Both Parties Challenge 2-War Strategy," *New York Times*, 10 March 1994.

[7] Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 13–15. Note that later Wildavsky argued that incrementalism is becoming less dominant in some elements of budgeting. Wildavsky, *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).

[8] Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 227.

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of policy, strategy and priorities."[9] Moreover, while Byrd and other legislators criticized Bush and the DOD for failing to offer an adequate strategy, M. T. Owens argues that Congress continues to block strategy-driven budgeting: "Ironically, although Congress criticizes the Pentagon for lacking a defense strategy, it is Congress that prevents it from having one. Anything approaching a strategy is simply precluded by congressional micromanagement of the defense budget."[10]

However, the meaning of micromanagement and its relationship to strategy needs clarification. Kenneth Mayer argues that micromanagement is such a value-laden term that many analysts fail to define it and use it as a catch-all to describe whatever they consider unwarranted congressional intervention into the details of defense decision making.[11] The Department of Defense includes a particularly broad range of activities under the rubric of micromanagement, from demands for DOD reports to the imposition of far-reaching legal constraints on DOD contracting.[12] However, the form of micromanagement that generates the most controversy is line-item budgeting—that is, the congressional penchant for breaking the defense budget down into individual program funding levels, and to increase or decrease those line-item levels in conflict with the president's budget request.[13] This article focuses on such line-item micromanagement and its relationship to military strategy.

Micromanagement of this sort does not necessarily preclude the use of strategy to guide decisions on budgetary details. Critics of Congress often assume that micromanagement and attention to strategy are mutually exclusive activities, and argue that legislators should shift "from dwelling on small details to looking at the big picture."[14] Nevertheless, Congress might use its proclivity for manipulating line items to serve broader policy concerns. If legislators wanted to, they could alter specific program funding levels to implement the president's declared strategy better or to carry out strategy-related decisions made by legislators themselves. The impediment to top-down, strategy-driven budgeting is not micromanagement per se; rather, it is the lack of congressional interest in strategy.

However, previous studies have argued that this lack of interest stems from political and organizational impediments deeply entrenched in Congress. The

[9] Sam Nunn, "Congressional Oversight of National Defense," *Congressional Record*, 1 October 1985, S.12341-2. See also the quotations from legislators and congressional staff in Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 235, 237; and Gansler, "Affording Defense," 108–111.

[10] Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," 132.

[11] Mayer, "Problem? What Problem," 1–2, 10–11.

[12] Office of the Secretary of Defense, *White Paper on the Department of Defense and the Congress* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 1990).

[13] Wilson argues that Congress is moving away from this focus on line-item micromanagement toward a greater emphasis on issuing general rules to guide executive branch decision making. However, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, legislators often craft such rules in a way that dictates funding for specific contractors or programs, resulting in de facto line-item micromanagement. James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 242–3; Office of the Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 19.

[14] Gansler, "Affording Defense," 109; Mellor, "Congressional Micromanagement," 129.

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electoral incentives confronting legislators create one such impediment. Gordon Adams, Owens and others argue that "the incentives for elected representatives . . . have not favored debate over strategy, since their primary concern is reelection. When it comes to defense matters, the priorities of constituents are typically focused on the level and location of spending, not on its strategic rationale."[15] Barry Blechman and James Lindsay argue that legislators often pay greater attention to policy issues than most studies recognize. However, both argue that while individual members may care about policy, the fragmented structure of Congress makes it "virtually impossible" for Congress "to establish an overall military strategy and broad set of policies, and then derive a coherent set of programs to implement them."[16] These structural impediments are so formidable that they might only be overcome by far-reaching reforms in committee powers and legislative procedures—"too great a change to be realistic."[17]

More important, budgeting on the Hill is an inherently political process, driven not just by abstract policy analysis but by the need for compromise and coalition-building between members with conflicting goals and interests. Les Aspin (D-W), who served as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee before becoming Bill Clinton's first secretary of defense, argued in 1975 that many advocates of congressional budget reform want to "turn Congress into a kind of Brookings Institution or Systems Analysis office," where budget recommendations can be based on rational assessments of military requirements and overall policy goals. However, while "they would like to see a Congress gathering and weighing information on that basis," they fail to take into account that Congress is based on politics. Legislative conflicts in Congress are resolved more often than not by political pressure, not by any rational presentation of the issues."[18]

[15] Gordon Adams, *The New Politics of the Defense Budget* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 19; Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," 142; and Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 240.

[16] On congressional interest in policy, see Barry Blechman, "The Congressional Role in U.S. Military Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Spring 1991): 17–32; and James Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense Budget; Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," *Armed Forces and Society* 17 (Fall 1990): 7–33. On the structural impediments to congressional efforts to formulate military strategy, see Blechman, "Politics of National Security," 54–5; and Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight," 10–13.

[17] Blechman, "Politics of National Security, 62. The most commonly recommended changes are the adoption of multiyear authorization and appropriations bills (which would be intended to shift congressional attention from year-to-year budgetary details) and the reallocation of committee responsibilities, usually at the expense of the Armed Services Committee's influence over program spending levels. John H. Hamre, "Potential New Patterns of Congressional Review of the Defense Budget" in Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lind, eds., *Toward a More Effective Defense: Report of the Defense Reorganization Project* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishers, 1985), 170–174; Michael A. Freney, "Toward a Long Term Integrated National Security Strategy for the United States" in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, eds., *U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 352–3; Gansler, "Affording Defense," 111–6.

[18] Les Aspin, "The Defense Budget and Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress," *Daedalus* 104 (Summer 1975): 163–4.

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Yet, legislators are now offering precisely such rational assessments of U.S. military needs and offering their own proposals for creating a post-cold war defense strategy. In 1990, Senator Sam Nunn helped initiate this congressional strategizing by offering a series of speeches on the need to reorient U.S. military policy.[19] That activism reached new heights in early 1992, when Aspin issued a set of proposals to restructure conventional and nuclear forces—proposals so analysis-laden that they would not seem out of place coming from the Brookings Institution.[20] Indeed, one member of Aspin's committee staff noted that he and his fellow staffers "joke about writing term papers" and refer to the committee as "Aspin U."[21] But this effort was thoroughly serious in terms of the committee resources devoted to drafting the proposals, circulating them among legislators and outside defense experts for comment, and using the final recommendations to influence the House budgeting process.

Other members have joined Aspin and Nunn in shifting their attention toward broader defense policy issues. Senator Byrd, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser (D-TN), House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta (D-CA), and other prominent legislators have held hearings on defense strategy issues and offered their own proposals to change the overall size and focus of the U.S. military budget.[22] Moreover, Democrats were not alone in proposing changes to Bush administration defense policies. Senators John Warner (R-VA), William Cohen (R-ME), and other Republicans offered their own initiatives to reshape U.S. forces and defense spending for the post-cold war era.[23] Legislators from both parties have continued to launch such initiatives during the Clinton administration.

[19] Sam Nunn, "Defense Budget Blanks," *Congressional Record*, 22 March 1990, S. 2965–2970; Nunn, "The Changed Threat Environment of the 1990's," *Congressional Record*, 29 March 1990, S.3444–51; and Nunn, "A New Military Strategy," *Congressional Record*, 19 April 1990, S.4445–4449.

[20] Les Aspin, *National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces*, U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992; Aspin, *From Deterrence to Denuking: A New Nuclear Policy for the 1990s*, U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 21 January 1992; Aspin, *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options*, U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992.

[21] Interviews with three House Armed Services Committee professional staff members, 10-11 June 1992.

[22] Byrd, Testimony, United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Budget Overview for Fiscal Year 1993, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., 18–19 February 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992), 165–290; United States Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget, Hearings, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1993; Defense and Domestic Spending in the Post-Cold War Era, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., 3 and 5 February 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992); United States Congress, House, Committee on the Budget, Report by Leon E. Panetta, chairman, *Restoring America's Future: Preparing the Nation for the 21st Century*, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., December 1991 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991), 11–15. On Cohen and McCain, see Helen Dewar, "GOP Senators Propose Doubling Bush's Defense Cuts," *Washington Post*, 6 April 1990.

[23] Helen Dewar, "GOP Senators Propose Doubling Bush's Defense Cuts," *Washington Post*, 6 April 1990.

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Despite claims that legislators would only focus on policy issues if the budget process were radically restructured, this rise of congressional strategizing occurred without the benefit of far-reaching reforms.[24] Why do members bother with the big picture? Given the inherently political nature of the budgeting process, why are key legislators behaving as if they were in a think tank, playing the quixotic role of strategic pundits?

One possible explanation is that with the end of the cold war, the Bush administration spurred this congressional activism by failing to offer a sufficiently rapid and far-reaching strategic reassessment of its own. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, when Cheney testified on behalf of the administration's Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 defense budget request, he argued that it was "the worst possible time to contemplate changes in defense strategy."[25] And although DOD officials were secretly drafting plans for just such change, Cheney's public stance provoked furious criticism on Capitol Hill and helped encourage Nunn, Aspin, and other legislators in early 1990 to launch their own reassessment of U.S. policy.[26]

However, the president moved to reduce this impetus for congressional activism. In August 1990, President Bush unveiled his own proposal to revise U.S. military strategy and abandoned the business as usual stance that helped spur initial congressional interest in strategy.[27] Yet the attention to the subject by Byrd, Aspin, and other legislators persisted, even as the president proposed further defense policy changes and tied them to additional military spending cuts. This legislative activism has continued under the Clinton administration. Clinton's effort to restructure the U.S. military, built around his 1993 Bottom-Up Review, calls for spending cuts and force reductions beyond those proposed by Bush. However, those additional cuts have prompted congressional Republicans such as House National Security Committee chairman Floyd Spence (SC) to propose their own multiyear, hundred billion dollar plans to increase military spending and shift defense priorities.[28] Key members of Congress no longer strategize in the absence of presidential leadership; rather, they compete with the president to exercise leadership over strategy. However, the question is why legislators are engaging in this competition—and departing so sharply from the congressional behavior described by previous studies.

[24] Some of the more modest congressional reforms suggested by Art have been adopted. In particular, consistent with Art's recommendation that broad policy oversight be given an institutional home, the House Armed Services Committee created a Defense Policy Board in 1985. It was abolished in 1993 by Chairman Ronald Dellums. No such board was created in the Senate Armed Services Committee prior to Nunn's initiatives on strategy. More important than institutional change, Art's argument on the need for greater political incentives for members to engage in policy turns out to have been exactly on the mark. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 242–8.

[25] Nunn, "Defense Budget Blanks," S.2967.

[26] Paul N. Stockton, "Congress and U.S. Military Policy Beyond the Cold War" in James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, eds., *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

[27] Bush, "In Defense of Defense"; and Powell, "The National Military Strategy."

[28] Bill Gertz, "2 Republicans Seek Big Boost in Defense Budget," *Washington Times*, 19 January 1995.

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Another possible explanation for this change is that the end of the cold war has required legislators to shift their attention from the details of defense budgeting to the big picture. Samuel P. Huntington argues that during the late 1930s, when the country was split over isolationism and interventionism, Congress actively considered strategy-related issues and sometimes prevailed over the president. After the late 1940s, when a consensus emerged between Congress and the president on the need for containment-oriented defense policies, legislators shifted their attention from strategy toward narrower structural concerns such as officer pay.[29] The breakup of the Soviet Union has shattered whatever remained of this cold war consensus and rekindled congressional interest in broad defense policy.

Arnold Kanter argues that the degree of consensus over cold war policy making is often exaggerated and that Congress has made more frequent policy-driven changes in the budget than is usually recognized. However, he concludes that congressional activism on broad policy issues increases with shifts in the international security environment.[30] That assessment might also support the hypothesis that the end of the cold war has spurred congressional strategizing—or, to put the argument more broadly, that change in the international system has driven a change in congressional behavior.

However, as Aspin noted in 1975, defense budgeting is a political process where abstract reasoning about policy requirements does not always drive congressional action. Previous studies have argued that the congressional bias against strategy resulted from the political constraints facing legislators, the process that congressional committees use to draft their own versions of the defense budget, and the competition for budgetary influence between committees. How did these factors help shape congressional behavior in the past? Have they simply melted away with the end of the cold war, leaving Congress with a less politicized budgeting process? Or has the collapse of the Soviet threat made strategy more politically useful within that process, changing the way members such as Nunn build winning coalitions on budget legislation?

Budgeting Incentives for Individual Members

Critics of micromanagement often attribute it to pork-driven parochialism—that is, the desire by legislators to boost spending on defense programs that provide jobs for their constituents. According to Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, "Congress has made the defense bill a jobs bill."[31] Some members engage in this behavior because they hope to

[29] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 131.

[30] Arnold Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960–1970," *American Political Science Review* 66 (Fall 1972): 129–143.

[31] Quoted in Mackubin T. Owens, "Congress' Role in Defense Mismanagement," *Armed Forces Journal International* (April 1985): 94.

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improve their prospects for reelection. Others with safe seats do so because they consider "helping the folks back home" part of their job. In either case, legislators turn to micromanagement as the most direct means to bolster specific job producing programs. Blechman argues that these budgeting incentives make it difficult to build the budget around broader policy goals: "Congress is sacrificing overall consistency and coherence of national policy for narrow interests and short-term objectives. This is a natural consequence of the political calculus that inevitably dominates congressional decision making;" that is, the need to "protect the interests of constituents."[32]

But focusing on pork-driven parochialism misrepresents the nature of micromanagement and the incentives members have to intervene in the budget process. When legislators attempt to add funds to the defense budget, they sometimes do so for programs that have absolutely no job-producing benefits for their own constituents or those of their colleagues. For example, the members of the House Defense Appropriations Committee agreed in their FY 1993 appropriations bill to increase funding for DOD humanitarian assistance abroad.[33] Policy concerns (and the possible political benefits of pursuing them) can prompt micromanagement unrelated to pork.

Moreover, when members intervene in the details of the defense budget, they often do so not to increase programs but to cut them. For example, the FY 1993 Defense appropriations bill passed by the House on 2 July 1992 cut line items by a total of $9.4 billion below the president's overall request. But this overall reduction understates the degree to which legislators slash administration-supported programs. When Congress cuts total defense spending, members may still increase funding for line items the president did not request and make up for that added spending by cutting requested programs even more deeply. While the House Defense appropriations bill cut overall military spending by $9.4 billion, that net reduction included nearly $3 billion in additional funds for weapons that the administration never requested—and in many cases strongly opposed.[34] Funding for those unrequested additions came largely at the expense of administration-backed programs. The FY 93 House defense authorization bill carried this pattern of micromanagement still further. The bill cut total defense spending by $11 billion below the administration request. However, within that overall reduction, legislators added over $9 billion in unrequested spending, requiring still further cuts in Bush-supported line items.[35] This suggests that legislators

[32] Blechman, "Politics of National Security," 21, 45; see also Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," 142.

[33] United States Congress, House, Appropriations Committee, *Report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1993*, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992), 74.

[34] Pat Towell, "Big-Ticket Projects Remain Intact As House Passes Spending Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 July 1992, 1975

[35] The FY 1993 Defense Authorization Bill adopted by the House included a total of $270 billion; Bush requested $281 billion. Data on committee authorizations of unrequested funds were drawn from the spending tables in United States Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, *Report on H.R. 5006, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993*, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess. (Wash-

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engage in two forms of micromanagement—program-cutting and program-adding—and that members practice both when legislating the defense budget.

What motivates program-cutting micromanagement? One impetus is fiscal: in order to make room for unrequested programs within a given defense spending total, members may agree to cut other line items simply to free up the necessary funding. The politics of pork can also contribute to fiscal changes; powerful legislators (or coalitions of members) may grab funds for their favored programs by slashing line items defended by weaker members. However, legislators also have other incentives to cut line items. Just as policy concerns can prompt legislators to increase defense programs, such concerns can encourage program-cutting. Even conservative Republicans such as Representative John Kasich (R-OH) joined the lead in opposing the B-2 bomber as militarily unnecessary.[36] Members can also seek political gains from cutting defense spending, although not necessarily from programs in their own districts. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, James Lindsay noted that legislators such as Senator Charles Grassey (R-IA) were already attempting to improve their reelection prospects through defense cost-cutting initiatives.[37] The growth of the deficit and collapse of the Soviet threat have strengthened these opportunities for program-cutting micromanagement.

This does not mean that pork-driven parochialism has vanished. As the defense pie shrinks, some members are fighting all the harder to preserve their constituent's slice, particularly when military spending constitutes a major source of employment in the local economy. For example, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) repositioned himself in 1992 to battle more effectively for defense spending in his state by abdicating his position as the top-ranking Republican member of the Judiciary Committee and trading it for the equivalent position on the Armed Services Committeee.[38]

Legislators such as Senator McCain argued in early 1995 that the problem of pork in defense legislation may even be worsening. As Congress cuts nondefense discretionary spending, members are using the defense bill as a legislative vehicle to fund projects they previously included in other parts of the budget. McCain claims that "the insertion of these items has become an incredible art form," and that the refusal of Congress to cut such pork indicates that "business as usual" is continuing despite the new Republican majorities in the House and Senate.[39] Enactment of a presidential line item veto may dampen the incentives for members

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ington, DC: USGPO, 1992); and Pat Towell, "Bipartisan Alliance Leaves Mark on Pentagon Spending Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 June 1992, 1610–3.

[36] On the rise of Republican and conservative Democrat opposition in Congress to the B-2 and other strategic weapons, see Paul N. Stockton, "The New Game on the Hill: The Politics of Arms Control and Strategic Force Modernization," *International Security* 16 (Fall 1991): 146–170.

[37] Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight."

[38] Kent Jenkins, Jr., "Warner Bumped From Armed Services Post," *Washington Post*, 30 April 1992.

[39] Walter Pincus and Dan Morgan, "Congress Protects Pork in Pentagon Spending," *Washington Post*, 28 March 1995.

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to promote their pet projects. However, until the president can wield this authority in an effective manner, and avoid the temptation to approve congressional pork in exchange for items he desires, the persistence of congressional parochialism will reinforce pressures for micromanagement.

What of the incentives to strategize? One of the key criticisms of micromanagement is that it drives out congressional attention to broad policy and prevents legislators from following a more top-down, strategy-driven approach to defense budgeting. As Nunn stated in 1985, "Members of Congress and the staff are focusing on the grains of sand on the beach, while we should be looking over the broad ocean and beyond the horizon."[40] While members may cut specific programs because of their policy implications, such case-by-case micromanagement will not necessarily lead members to implement broader prescriptions on strategy. At best, according to one congressional staffer, members and staff "back into policy. We debate policy when we attack or support specific weapons systems, but it should be the other way around. We should debate policy first and then determine which systems to procure."[41]

Analysts of the budget process argue that this behavior reflects the lack of political incentives for legislators to address broad policy concerns. In contrast to micromanagement, which can help members win jobs for constituents and exercise direct control over executive branch activities, "policy oversight does not enhance a legislator's credit-taking posture; it does not garner him electoral votes; nor can it be tied directly to control over executive action.[42] However, new incentives are emerging for members to not only hold defense policy hearings and engage in other oversight activities, but to formulate and promote their own recommendations on defense strategy. While voters may have had little interest in such topics in the past, the demise of the Soviet threat allows legislators to link proposals on strategy to more immediate voter concerns. For example, Byrd has emphasized the "vital" need to cut and restructure the military to permit job-creating investment in the civilian economy.[43] Initiatives on strategy also garnered visibility for Les Aspin and brought him to the attention of Bill Clinton, who named him secretary of defense.

Furthermore, Blechman and Lindsay argue that regardless of the political payoff, many legislators pay attention to defense policy because they consider doing so as part of their job or find such issues personally interesting.[44] The shattering of the basis for U.S. defense planning has strengthened these incentives to strategize. According to one House Armed Services committee staffer inter-

[40] Nunn, "Congressional Oversight," S.12340

[41] Office of Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 30.

[42] Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 240. See also Lauren Holland, "The Role of Congress in Weapons Acquisition Decisions: Process and Policy Considerations," (paper delivered to the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August 1992), 11–12; and Adams, "The New Politics of the Defense Budget," 19.

[43] Byrd, "Testimony," 7.

[44] Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight," and Blechman, "The Congressional Role."

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viewed while Aspin was still in Congress, Aspin "is a guy who is driven by his noodle. His noodle tells him that there has been a fundamental change in the world of defense and he wants to grapple with strategy."[45] A staff member of the Senate Appropriations Committee offers a similar explanation for Byrd's activism: "Byrd's interest in strategy is personality driven. He cared about military strategy as [Senate Democratic] majority leader; now that he's chairman of Appropriations, he still does, regardless of the expectation that appropriators care only about pork and budget details."[46]

This suggests that incentives for members to strategize now exist side by side with incentives for micromanagement. Despite the end of the cold war, the inducements remain for legislators to intervene in the details of the budget and either to bolster or cut line item requests. These changes can also increase the number of fiscal adjustments that must be made in other programs to stay within pre-set budget totals. While the incentives for micromanagement persist, the demise of the Soviet threat has given legislators stronger incentives to strategize. The political calculus of decision making no longer compels members to focus on line items to the exclusion of broad policy. Nor are the incentives for micromanagement and strategizing mutually exclusive. Within today's Congress, both sets of incentives are alive and well.

However, individual members have a powerful impetus to offer proposals on strategy, but those proposals will not necessarily affect the defense budget or the line items within it. The legislation that determines the actual content of the defense budget is drafted by congressional committees. Regardless of the personal incentives that members have to call for top-down, strategy-driven budgeting, their calls will have little effect on the actual budget unless the committees that write spending legislation adopt such an approach.

Moving beyond individual incentives to examine committee behavior is also essential for understanding micromanagement. Studies of congressional efforts to add or subtract funds for particular programs usually focus on floor amendments—that is, on votes by the full House or Senate to amend committee legislation. However, the vast majority of line item changes to the president's request are initially made by the committees themselves when they draft their respective versions of the budget.[47] To what extent does the committee budgeting process enable members to aggregate their individual line item concerns into broader defense legislation? Do proposals on strategy affect committee legislation, or are they empty speeches that serve as a facade for unsavory but entrenched approaches to budgeting?

[45] Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 20 April 1992.
[46] Interview with Senate Appropriations Committee professional staff member, 11 June 1992.
[47] Office of the Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 19.

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Defense Budgeting in Committee

The growth of congressional micromanagement has been especially notable in the annual defense authorization bills drafted by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Until the early 1960s, these authorization bills addressed only broad funding categories, leaving specific program spending decisions to the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense. That reticence toward micromanagement has vanished. Over the past thirty years, the number of line items in defense authorization bills has exploded. Moreover, at least until recently, the HASC and SASC pursued this micromanagement while paying scant attention to broad policy issues. Nunn characterized the authorization process in 1985 as a version of "Trivial Pursuit," in which "our preoccupation with trivia is preventing us from carrying out our basic responsibilities for broad oversight."[48]

The rise of individual incentives to strategize has affected this committee behavior in some respects. As Nunn and other committee members have gained a stronger personal interest in defense policy, they have held dozens of committee hearings on strategy-related issues. Legislators have also directed committee staffers to produce numerous studies of such issues, and to formulate proposals on the appropriate size and composition of future U.S. forces. The collapse of the Berlin Wall prompted the Senate Armed Services Committee to reassess U.S. military requirements as soon as work began on the FY 1991 defense budget. The result of that work was a committee proposal for a new defense strategy to guide U.S. force restructuring, which was included in the committee report accompanying its FY 1991 defense authorization bill.[49]

In the House, the HASC staff worked with committee members to produce three studies of particular note. Dissatisfied with the administration's analysis of changes in the Soviet threat after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the HASC's Defense Policy panel released its own 308-page threat assessment on 9 July 1990, designed to give the committee an independent basis for deciding "where we can reduce our defense effort without harming our security." On 6 January 1992, the committee issued a study that critiqued the Bush administration's long-range defense plans for not being tied to specific threats and offered a more explicitly threat-based approach for evaluating future military requirements.[50]

This analytic effort culminated on 25 February 1992, with *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative*

[48] Nunn, "Congressional Oversight," S. 12341.

[49] United States Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, 101st Congress, 2nd sess., *Report: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), 8–29.

[50] Les Aspin, *National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces*, House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992.

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Options.[51] In that study, the HASC reviewed its analysis of the potential threats from North Korea and other nations, quantified their military capabilities in terms of "Iraqi equivalents," and offered four options for sizing and structuring U.S. forces to meet those threats and perform other possible missions, including that of providing humanitarian assistance abroad. The Force A option would give the United States a far smaller and less expensive force structure than proposed by the Bush administration. Option D would be more costly than the Bush proposal. Bracketed between was Option C, which Aspin claimed would cut the administration's total defense spending recommendations by $64 billion from FY 1993 to FY 1997. Aspin endorsed option C and cited the analysis behind it to help justify his proposal for overall defense spending levels for FY 1993. The HASC also produced an independent assessment of the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war and an analysis of future U.S. nuclear force requirements.[52]

While these committee activities serve individual member interests in strategizing, it is unclear how (and if at all) such activities affect the details of budget legislation. HASC and SASC authorization bill reports claimed that the hearings, analysis, and broad policy recommendations drafted by the committees shaped their budgeting decisions. The SASC report accompanying the FY 1991 authorization bill stated that, "The specific budgetary adjustments that the committee recommends for the fiscal year 1991 defense budget flow directly from the five essential elements of the new military strategy that it is proposing in this report."[53] In the SASC report for the FY 1992 bill, the committee claimed that the "new military strategy" it had developed in 1990 was still guiding the details of its budget legislation, and that those details were also shaped by the committee's own analysis of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.[54] Publications issued by the House Armed Services Committee make similar claims, arguing that the HASC's FY 1993 authorization bill was based on "a bottom-up" analysis of U.S. military needs.

Nevertheless, interviews with committee staff members (all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity) suggest that factors apart from analysis help determine the content of committee legislation. Regardless of how desirable it might be to rethink the entire defense budget, staff members on the HASC and SASC note that many line items are taken directly from the president's request. An aide to one SASC member stated, "We simply don't have the resources to really do the budget from the ground up, and anyway, who would want to? A

[51] Les Aspin, *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options*, House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992.

[52] Les Aspin and William Dickinson, *Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992); Les Aspin, *Thinking Through the New Nuclear Threat*, House Armed Services Committee, 22 June 1992.

[53] Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1991 Report, 21.

[54] United States Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., *Report: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991), 9.

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lot of that stuff is completely noncontroversial."[55] Moreover, many of the line item changes that the committees do make stem from fiscally driven requirements to fit programs within reduced defense spending totals, or to make room for increases in more popular line items. A HASC staffer stated that his committee also adopts much of the DOD request with limited fiscal adjustments: "In reality, the committee accepts the vast bulk of the defense bill as is from the Pentagon. We just pick out key issues to make changes."[56]

This assessment is supported even by the portions of the FY 1993 authorization bill cited by the HASC as having undergone the most thorough policy driven revision. For example, the lead item on the committee's list of major initiatives in the bill was a recasting of DOD funding requests for developing tactical aircraft, reflecting the committee's own judgment of future security needs and the lessons of the Gulf War. Cheney's abrupt cancellation of the Navy's AX attack aircraft in 1991 made research and development funding for navy tactical aviation an especially controversial subject. However, the HASC accepted most of the president's line item requests for that funding, changing six out of twenty-one line items for developing naval aircraft. In the overall budget for all navy tactical developments, which includes the line items for tactical aircraft, the committee changed only twenty-two line items out of a total of 167 (13 percent).[57] Three of the changes involved over $500 million; nevertheless, the HASC left most programs in that highly controversial budget untouched.

Despite committee claims that their budgets are driven by strategy and policy analysis, political considerations still strongly affect the way they draft spending legislation. After the president submits his budget request (usually in January or early February), and the House and Senate Budget Committees begin drafting budget resolutions to set overall defense spending levels, the Armed Services Committees and Appropriations Subcommittees begin their own budgeting process. Committee members and staff review the budget justification books accompanying the president's request and hold hearings on defense spending. The legislative process then begins with the drafting of a chairman's mark—that is, the preliminary version of the authorization bill crafted by the chairman, his staff, and the other members and subcommittees he includes in the drafting effort. The chairman's control over the mark gives him his greatest opportunity to shape the substance of the budget. Hence, chairpersons have a prime opportunity to apply their personal interest in strategy early in the legislative process.

But committees do not automatically approve the chairman's preliminary bill. Committee members have the opportunity to offer amendments to that bill during a mark up session and then vote on whether to approve the bill before sending

[55] Interview with staffer for a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 24 April 1992.

[56] Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 10 June 1992.

[57] The figures for naval aircraft development exclude code-named programs in the budget that may be aircraft-related. All figures taken from the "Navy tactical programs" table of the House Armed Services Committee, "FY 1993 Report," 120–123.

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it to the floor of the House or Senate floor for final action. The chairman's need to build a winning coalition transforms his drafting of the mark into an intensely political process. No matter how sound the strategy Aspin included in his preliminary bill, that mark was doomed to oblivion unless he could get it adopted by his committee and the full House, preferably with as few unwelcome amendments as possible. That approval is far from inevitable, even when Democrats dominated the House Armed Services Committee. In 1989, the HASC rejected Aspin's mark for FY 1990. While Nunn avoided such a defeat, his ability to do so highlighted his skills at coalition-building in a committee with a much thinner Democrat majority.

One way a chair can gain support for his mark is to include the constituent-oriented programs favored by committee members. By dangling the funding carrot in front of project-hungry legislators, and cobbling together their various requests into the mark, a chairman can seek bipartisan support for his legislation. Conversely, by threatening to oppose member projects, the chair can wield a powerful stick. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has a reputation for following this "project aggregation" model of defense budgeting. A staffer on the Senate Appropriations Committee argues that his counterparts in the House have "a casino-type mentality. Their bills are project-driven; members are concerned with who gets what."[58]

However, even in the Armed Services Committees, chairs can run tremendous political risks if they trample on the constituent-oriented concerns of committee members. Aspin's FY 1990 mark adopted the administration's budget request and incorporated a number of defense program cuts, including ones in the V-22 (which provides thousands of jobs in Texas and Pennsylvania) and the F-14D fighter (crucial to Grumman Corporation employment on Long Island). Aspin told his colleagues that he agreed with Cheney that given the decline in the overall defense budget, the committee should no longer demand funding for such unrequested programs: "There's no room for even the deserving add-ons, let alone the ones that go oink." He also stated that in ordinary times, pork-barrel politics would prevail and committee members would defeat efforts to eliminate such funding. "But this time it's different," due in part to growing pressures to shrink the defense budget and fears of appearing beholden to pork interests.[59]

Aspin's judgment was mistaken. George Hochbrucher (D-NY), armed with a small squadron of model airplanes, begged his colleagues to save the F-14 D and argued that the proposed budget "would put Grumman out of business."[60] Committee members from Texas and Pennsylvania waged an equally vigorous campaign on behalf of the V-22. The committee approved funding for both programs and defeated the chairman's overall package. This is not to say that

[58] Interview with Senate Appropriations Committee professional staff member, 11 June 1992.

[59] George C. Wilson, "Aspin, Contractors Trying to Save Defense Budget," *Washington Post*, 15 June 1989.

[60] Molly Moore, "Cheney, Aspin Rebuffed on 2 Projects," *Washington Post*, 29 June 1989.

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the V-22 and F14-D were without substantive merit; on the contrary, supporters of both aircraft argued that they were militarily essential. However, the defeat of Aspin's mark demonstrates how members who have disparate constituent interests can join together to build a winning political coalition.

Aspin later took a different approach to crafting his mark. Reorganizing the committee staff in 1990, one of Aspin's initiatives was to create a "member services group" to handle special requests from his colleagues.[61] His subsequent marks included funding for the F-14, V-22, and other programs that contributed to his defeat in 1989. A chair does not necessarily have to incorporate all such project requests; gaining support from a majority of committee members is sufficient to report out the mark and send it to the full House or Senate for final action. One HASC staffer familiar with the process argued that given the importance of attracting support for the mark, "what's amazing is how little pork there is, not how much."[62] Nevertheless, because chairs must adopt those projects they deem essential for victory, the committee budgeting process encourages program-adding micromanagement and transforms the pork incentives for individual members into legislative action.

The extent to which pork drives this process should not be overstated. Because individual members can also demand program increases for policy reasons, even when no constituent jobs are at stake, a chair may need to incorporate such policy-driven concerns to build support for the mark. Staffers who help draft the mark even have a nickname for the occasionally peculiar programs requested by committee members—"pet rocks." Project aggregation can be built around policy interests as well as pork. Legislation giving the president a line item veto over appropriations could reduce the effectiveness of this coalition-building mechanism. If the president has the power to veto particular projects, he may be able to unravel the legislative packages cobbled together by committee chairs and complicate their efforts to build a majority for their marks. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) argues that a presidential line item veto would hamstring congressional action by enabling the president to cancel portions of a legislative package retroactively. According to Moynihan, "compromises and trade-offs are the key. If these exchanges cannot be sealed in legislation, all or nothing, then accommodation will be much more difficult if not indeed impossible to reach."[63]

However, because individual members also have incentives to cut defense programs, chairs have a second method of coalition-building at their disposal. Legislators who want to eliminate programs they consider wasteful or unnecessary may make their support for the mark contingent on funding reductions. Chairs

[61] Pat Towell, "Aspin Moves To Avoid Reruns Of His Political Missteps," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 April 1990, 1141–5.

[62] Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 10 June 1992.

[63] R.W. Apple, Jr., "Line Item Veto Would Begin Voyage into a Vast Unknown," *New York Times*, 27 March 1995.

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ignore these program-cutting sentiments at their peril. When the HASC rejected Aspin's mark in 1989, his refusal to slash the administration's B-2 bomber funding request prompted Ron Dellums (D-CA) and Pat Schroeder (D-CO) to play decisive roles in that defeat.[64] As with funding increases, a chair may not need to accept all of these proposed cuts to create an adequate block of support. In 1992, Aspin defeated amendments to alter his budget by reducing its funding of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Nevertheless, the political value of aggregating such reductions in the mark encourages program-cutting micromanagement.

What role, if any, does defense strategy and broad policy analysis play in this political process? Prior to submitting his mark for FY 1992, Aspin argued that if the committee performed its own analysis of U.S. defense needs, that analysis might provide the basis for a less politicized approach to defense budgeting. Aspin wrote on 22 January 1992 that "By laying out clear linkages between the force structure and the threats they deal with, perhaps we can leave behind us the old Cold War politics over defense spending and build a new consensus based on a common sense assessment of our needs."[65] Analysis would replace politics as the basis for coalition-building; strategy would drive budgetary details. Aspin argues that his committee followed just such a "bottom-up, threat-based" approach in drafting the FY 1993 authorization bill.[66]

Other HASC members disputed Aspin's claim. Although the committee's FY 1993 report described how the details of the budget were based on policy analysis, some members who opposed the mark argued that politics drove key program funding decisions. The FY 1993 report offered an extensive policy rationale for National Guard funding increases that the administration deemed wasteful.[67] However, according to Herbert Bateman (R-VA), John Kyl (R-AZ), and Jim McCrery (R-LA), that funding decision stemmed less from analysis than from the political popularity of the Guard, which provides paychecks for constituents and parochial voting incentives for committee members. Thus, "when it came time for the committee to make its choices, politics counted and sound national defense policy did not."[68] Critics of Nunn charge that he also exaggerates the extent to which analysis has supplanted politics in SASC budgeting. A former staffer for a Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services Committee argues that in 1990 and 1991, when the SASC claimed to be formulating and implementing its new defense strategy, "Nunn was putting a thin veneer of analysis over crass politics. He was driven by the need to put together a bill that would pass in committee and on the [Senate] floor. Aspin learned from Nunn." And

[64] Moore, "Cheney, Aspin."

[65] Les Aspin, *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Cold War Era*, House Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1992, 20.

[66] Les Aspin, *Continuing the Strategic Drawdown: A Bottom-Up Threat-Driven Bill for the Post-Soviet World at the House Budget Level*, House Armed Services Committee, 1 June 1992, 2.

[67] House Armed Services Committee, "FY 93 Report," 255–62.

[68] Ibid., 398–9.

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well he has learned, according to the staffer for a senior Democrat on the HASC, who claimed that Aspin's "big picture is a complete sales job."[69]

But this same staffer emphasized that the sales job has been extremely effective, and that Aspin used strategy as a political tool to win support for his mark. Aspin's own staffers on the committee argued that strategy offers two important political advantages in coalition-building. First, by drawing other members into the policy analysis effort and soliciting their input, Aspin was able to give them more of a stake in the mark that followed. Even members who opposed the mark praised Aspin's attention to strategy. Ron Dellums (D-CA) stated "that for the first time in my tenure on the Committee, there was an honest attempt to look at the long term goals and needs of our nation and its military, and to have the budget drafted on the basis of what the threat is, instead of auctioning up or down the numbers from the previous authorization."[70]

Strategy also helped build support for the mark in a second way, by giving members a politically attractive rationale for backing Aspin's budget. One committee staffer who helped draft the mark argued that "the key was to give members something they could vote for and defend to their constituents."[71] By linking the bill to a reassessment of U.S. security requirements, Aspin offered Democrats a way of justifying their vote against Republican accusations of parochialism, and provided them with what another staffer termed "a safe haven" on defense issues. Viewed from this perspective, strategy is not a substitute for politics (as Aspin claimed) but is an instrument of politics. Aspin used defense analysis as a new means of winning support for his mark.

This suggests that committee chairs follow three different models of coalition-building on the defense budget. In project aggregation, a chair bargains for votes by adopting the line item changes in his mark that members desire, either for parochial or program-specific policy reasons. In cut aggregation, the chair solicits support by incorporating line item reductions favored by committee members. In both models, the chair's need to build a winning coalition leads him to package member-specific concerns into the mark, and to transform individual incentives for micromanagement into committee legislation. The third model is that of strategizing. By offering studies on U.S. military requirements and other fundamental policy issues, and using that analysis to justify specific program funding decisions, the chair can cater to member interests in strategy and provide supporters a politically defensible rationale for supporting his mark. Following this model gives committees at least the appearance of pursuing a top-down, strategy-driven budget process.

The extent to which strategy actually drives committee line item decision making is difficult to measure. On spending issues where pork incentives are weak or diffuse, and few opportunities exist for project aggregation, committee

[69] Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 11 June 1992.
[70] House Armed Services Committee, "FY 1993 Report," 393.
[71] Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 10 June 1992.

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claims of having been guided by strategy are plausible. But most line item increases involve both parochial and strategy-related issues. Army National Guard funding raises fundamental concerns over U.S. force structure and war fighting requirements; that funding also elicits support from constituents. Aspin's decision to support the Guard catered to a mix of member interests. Furthermore, because member interests are diverse, and because a mark includes thousands of line items that mix pork and policy, chairs can pursue all three models of coalition-building simultaneously. Project aggregation, project cutting, and strategizing are not mutually exclusive, but represent an array of political tools for winning committee support. And as long as chairs consider all three tools useful for garnering votes, the politics of the committee budgeting process will continue to promote both micromanagement and strategy initiatives.

However, while strategy now plays an important political role within congressional committees, no single committee can impose its own strategizing on Congress as a whole. Congressional power over the defense budget is extraordinarily fragmented, with autonomous committees (each drafting their own legislation) battling for the final say over military spending. How does this competition for power encourage micromanagement? Given the fragmentation of congressional budgeting authority, how could Congress as a whole adopt a single, unified defense strategy, and impose broader policy judgments on the details of spending legislation?

Micromanagement and the Fragmentation of Budgeting Power

Robert Art argues that the competition between committees for influence creates a powerful spur to micromanagement. Until 1959, the Armed Services Committees conducted policy oversight hearings and only authorized the budget in broad, general funding accounts. However, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), the chairman of the SASC at the end of the 1950s, concluded that his committee was having less impact on defense policy than the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, which were already dictating funding levels for specific programs. Russell and his colleagues began to compete for more control by adopting annual budget authorizations that split funding accounts into more program-specific categories. According to Art, the committees did so "precisely because their members felt that general policy reviews were ineffective and put them at a competitive disadvantage with the Appropriations Defense Subcommittees, which actually controlled policy because they had the say over the details of defense spending. In short, annual authorizations were begun precisely because policy oversight failed."[72] Even SASC members who criticize their own committee for excessive micromanagement recognize the competitive advantage that annual line item budgeting provides. Nunn told his colleagues in 1985, "Annual authorizations provide a strong lever to influence defense policy and provide broad oversight. Unfortunately,

[72] Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 241.

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we have abused that lever; as the old saying goes, 'We have found the enemy and it is us.'"[73]

Secretary of Defense Cheney argues that this impetus for micromanagement is strengthened by the tendency of the four key defense committees (Armed Services and Defense Appropriations in both Houses) to represent conflicting pork and policy perspectives. According to Cheney, "The desire of each member to be able to advance constituency or policy goals has the effect of pushing committees into competition with one another, driving the defense committees in particular into deeper and deeper levels of detail in an effort to secure a preferred outcome."[74] Strategizing offers chairs a political tool within committees. Between committees, however, micromanagement appears far more attractive than strategizing as a lever of influence.

Moreover, even if members had stronger incentives to strategize beyond their own committees, many analysts argue that the fragmented structure of Congress would impede any efforts to agree on a single, coherent strategy. No single committee has the authority to dictate a defense strategy for Congress as a whole; nor does the Speaker of the House, the Senate majority leader, or any other congressional leader. Barry Blechman, James Lindsay, and Stanley Heginbotham argue that this lack of hierarchy prevents Congress from formulating broad defense policies.[75]

The fragmentation of congressional power is especially disruptive for linkages between strategy and defense budgeting.[76] Under the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Congress adopts an annual budget resolution that sets a ceiling for defense spending and other budget categories. However, Defense Appropriations and Armed Services committees remain free to alter line items within the ceiling (and to spend less than the ceiling permits, as the HASC did in its FY 1993 authorization bill).[77] That committee latitude persisted under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (the so-called budget summit). That act set caps on defense spending through FY 1993 and barred efforts to move money from defense accounts into domestic spending.[78] Nevertheless, within those constraints, the Defense Appropriations and Armed Services Committees have retained the power

[73] Nunn, "Congressional Oversight," 12340.

[74] Office of the Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 20.

[75] Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight," 10–13; Blechman, "Politics of National Security," 55; Stanley Heginbotham, "Congress and Defense Policy Making: Toward Realistic Expectations in a System of Countervailing Parochialism" in Robert Pfalzgraff and Uri Ra'anan, eds., *National Security Affairs: The Decision Making Process* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1984), 251–61.

[76] Reed, "Congress," 239–241; Allen Schick, *The Capacity to Budget* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), 170; Dennis S. Ippolito, *Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget Policy from Roosevelt through Reagan* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 148.

[77] The FY 1993 Authorization bill reported out by the HASC authorized $3 billion less in total defense spending than called for by the final House-Senate budget resolution. Aspin, "Continuing the Strategic Drawdown," 2.

[78] Richard Doyle and Jerry McCaffery, "The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path to No Fault Budgeting," *Public Budgeting and Finance* 11 (Spring 1991): 26–40.

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to adopt total spending levels below the designated caps and to alter program allocations within them.

This committee latitude is particularly important because each of the committees drafts and adopts its own version of defense spending legislation. The House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees produce independent versions of the annual defense appropriations bill, as do the House and Senate Armed Services Committees with respect to the defense authorization bill. Each individual committee is free to use its own proposal on strategy (or none at all) as the basis for making line item funding changes. After the full House and Senate vote on the HASC and SASC bills, and members of both committees meet in a House-Senate conference to resolve the differences between their bills, HASC members can attempt to agree on strategy-driven changes with their SASC counterparts. A similar House-Senate conference meets to hammer out the final version of the appropriations bill. However, no such conference takes place to resolve line item disagreements between the authorization and appropriations bills, much less to formulate and implement a unified defense strategy. James Reed argues that this "bifurcated" process "tends to fragment control over the military budget, thus compounding the difficulties inherent in congressional efforts to influence military policy."[79]

The intracommittee impediments to strategizing have declined with the end of the cold war, but what of these intercommittee obstacles? The competition for influence between the authorizers and appropriators remains intense and continues to encourage a fixation on budgetary detail. Despite an agreement by Nunn and Byrd that each committee would "try to avoid reversing the policy directions of the other" and that the appropriators would avoid funding programs that had not been authorized, the two Senate committees fell into open warfare over the FY 1992 defense appropriations bill.[80] Nunn complained that the bill included $11 billion in defense line items that were either unauthorized or above the authorized levels. Moreover, in dictating line item changes that overturned SASC policy decisions, Nunn argued that the appropriators were making a power grab that reflected "a breakdown in the legislative process."[81] Appropriators charged in return that the authorizers were exceeding their authority by attempting to control the details of the defense budget. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), ranking Republican member of the Defense Appropriations Committee, told his colleagues that "the Armed Services Committee is not only micromanaging the [authorization] bill [and] the Department of Defense, but [also] trying to micromanage the appropriations process; every single nut and bolt that the Department of Defense must buy this year is line itemed now in the authorization bill."[82]

[79] Reed, "Congress," 239.
[80] United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, 23 November 1991, S.17835.
[81] Ibid., S.17802.
[82] Ibid., S.17792.

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The fragmentation of congressional power also continues to block agreement on a single, Congress-wide defense strategy. Now that the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have begun including broad policy initiatives in their defense authorization bills, that legislation offers the best opportunity for Congress as a whole to vote on adopting a strategy. The full House has the opportunity to vote on the HASC bill (and the strategy it espouses) when that bill comes to the floor after committee markup. The Senate has a similar opportunity vis-à-vis the SASC bill. Thus, to the extent that the authorization bills include broader policy initiatives, the House and Senate could be said to adopt their own versions of U.S. defense strategy.

But differences always exist between the HASC and SASC bills. And when committee members have met in House-Senate conferences to resolve their conflicts and draft a final bill, the resulting conference reports have authorized line item spending levels without offering an explicit resolution of disagreements over strategy or any compromise statement of what U.S. strategy ought to be. This lack of strategizing persisted even in the FY 1991 and FY 1992 conference reports, when SASC members claimed to have based their legislation on a fundamental rethinking of defense policy. Thus, when the conference report goes to the House and Senate floor for final action, members no longer have a legislative vehicle for voting on an explicit, Congress-wide strategy. Congress as a whole votes to micromanage the defense budget without enacting a common vision of strategy.

While the fragmentation of congressional power impedes agreement on a single strategy, strategy is becoming a new weapon in the competition between committees for budgeting influence. Aspin and the House Armed Services Committee used their broad policy initiatives to affect decision making by other committees. On 24 February 1992, before the House Budget Committee voted to set the defense spending ceiling in its FY 1993 budget resolution, Aspin briefed Budget Committee members on his analysis of long-term defense options. Committee Chairman Leon Panetta (D-CA) endorsed that analysis, and the Committee adopted the spending figure Aspin recommended for his preferred overall force structure. Critics of Aspin subsequently charged that by focusing on analysis and withholding his spending recommendations until the Budget Committee voted, he had made his position much more difficult to challenge.[83]

Aspin's analytical efforts also encouraged the House leadership to turn to the HASC for guidance in crafting a House-wide Democratic approach to dealing with the post-cold war defense budget. Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA), Majority Leader Richard Gephart (D-MO), and Panetta endorsed Aspin's effort to devise a new strategy, and offer members beyond the HASC a rationale for their votes

[83] Pat Towell, "Move to Cut Pentagon Spending Falls Short of Critic's Goal," *Congressional Quarterly*, 29 February 1992, 478; House Armed Services Committee, *The FY93 Defense Authorization Bill: Summary of Major Actions*, 13 May 1992, 2; Letter from Les Aspin to Leon Panetta, 26 February 1992 (provided by the House Armed Services Committee); James W. Canan, "Aspin's Agenda," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1992, 15.

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on military spending.[84] Aspin even attempted to use strategy to reach across the Capitol building and influence Senate behavior on defense. One HASC staffer stated that "its no coincidence that we've sent early drafts [of the Aspin studies] over to the Senate side, and tried to target key Senators."

This is not to say that strategizing has displaced micromanagement as the primary means to compete for budgeting influence. Setting line item funding levels remains the most direct, effective approach for committees to battle for control over military spending. Moreover, while Aspin's analysis helped him exercise considerable influence over the House Budget Committee's decision making, his success was less complete in affecting House Defense Appropriations Committee legislation. For example, despite Aspin's extensive rationale for reordering the administration's tactical aircraft plans, the House appropriators adopted a plan that differs from both HASC and administration proposals.[85] And while Aspin prevailed on the House version of the Budget Resolution, the Senate Budget Committee endorsed the administration's spending recommendation, and the final House-Senate resolution ended up splitting the difference between the two versions.

Nevertheless, Aspin has demonstrated that strategy offers a newly attractive weapon in the budgeting competition between committees. The fragmentation of congressional power will continue to impede agreement on any single, Congress-wide defense strategy. However, this structural impediment does not prevent committees from promoting their own broad policy initiatives. On the contrary, Aspin attempted to use strategy to overcome the fragmentation of congressional power and exert influence far beyond his own committee.

Whether that influence will extend to the Pentagon remains to be seen. Kenneth Mayer and others argue that micromanagement offers Congress the most effective means for controlling DOD. By specifying individual program funding levels and imposing other detailed constraints on defense spending, Congress can use its power of the purse to seek direct control over the military. In contrast, broad congressional policy recommendations offer a less precise tool for guiding DOD. Such policy recommendations are also easier for DOD to evade, unless enforced by detailed changes in the budget. Thus, Mayer argues that Congress is "destined to fail in any attempt to exert more general direction on defense policy," and that many who urge Congress to focus on broader issues are actually hoping to weaken its power over the executive branch.[86]

However, Cheney and other Pentagon leaders went out of their way to castigate Aspin's strategizing and urge legislators to oppose his broad policy recommendations. Cheney testified that adopting Aspin's overall force structure (option C) could lead to "a hell of a lot of casualties" in future wars.[87] General Merrill

[84] Canan, "Aspin's Agenda," 15.

[85] "U.S. Government Disunity Clouds Naval Aviation Plans," *Defense News*, 3 August 1992, 6.

[86] Mayer, "*Problem? What Problem.*" 19–20.

[87] "Stick with Pentagon Downsizing Plan or Risk Casualties in War: Cheney," *Aerospace Daily*, 5 March 1992, 370.

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McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, attacked the proposal as "kind of senseless, and claimed that if it were adopted 'What you'll have to do is close down the Air Force.'"[88] Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan testified that Option C would "break the institution" of the American military.[89] Navy leaders offered similarly dire predictions, and called on the House to reject Aspin's force structure and the analysis it relied on.[90]

Why were these Pentagon leaders so vociferous in their criticism? After all, Aspin's studies imposed no legally binding requirements on DOD, and much of the strategizing included in the FY 1993 HASC bill (and accompanying report) offered only general policy recommendations. The answer is that strategy can affect congressional spending decisions, and those decisions have a direct impact on DOD activities. Cheney and the armed service leaders testified against Aspin's strategy because they worried that the House would adopt the Budget Resolution spending level tied to his recommendations. That fear turned out to be well founded when the Budget Committee adopted the spending total based on Option C. Congressional strategizing is important to legislative-executive relations, not because it might constrain DOD activities, but because it gives members stronger control over the budgeting process and allows them to enact a budget that reflects congressional rather than administration preferences.

Conclusion

Congress has moved beyond micromanagement into the realm of strategy. Although legislators continue to manipulate the details of the defense budget, broader policy concerns now affect individual and committee behavior, with important implications for the nature of the budgeting process and assessments of Congress itself.

Previous studies have argued that the congressional focus on micromanagement rather than broad policy stemmed from constraints built into the heart of congressional budgeting. However, Art was prescienct in arguing that "if more policy oversight of defense is to occur, the political incentives to do it will have to be strengthened."[91] With the end of the cold war, political incentives have grown not only for legislators to examine fundamental defense issues, but to formulate and promote changes in U.S. military strategy. This shift in political incentives has occurred at three levels of Congress. Past studies argued that at the level of individual legislators, the need to get reelected created a powerful

[88] Huge Defense Cut Rolling in Congress Despite Bush, Pentagon Opposition," *Journal of Commerce*, 4 March 1992, B-5; Rick Maze, "DoD: Personnel Would Take Brunt of Cuts," *Air Force Times*, 23 March 1992, 3.

[89] "Aspin Plan Would Cut Chance of Decisive Victory in War: Army Chief," *Aerospace Daily*, 4 March 1992, 359.

[90] "Another Top Navy Official Questions the Merit of Aspin's Base Force Concept," *Inside the Navy*, 30 March 1992, 1.

[91] Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 242.

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inducement to micromanagement; by increasing line item spending that benefited constituents, legislators could boost their political fortunes. However, with the collapse of the Soviet threat, members can also seek political benefits and satisfy their personal interests in policy by cutting line items and dealing with strategy-related budgeting issues.

The political appeal of strategizing is still stronger at the committee level. In the FY 1993 budget process, Aspin used strategy as an important new means of building support for his mark. Other approaches to committee coalition-building remain important. In particular, as the HASC demonstrated in 1989, project aggregation and program-cutting can be vital to the chair's legislative success. However, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. They represent an array of tools for winning committee support where issues (and member interests) reflect a mixture of pork and policy concerns. Moreover, while the fragmentation of power between committees is usually thought to impede congressional strategizing, Aspin demonstrated how strategy can be used to overcome that fragmentation and push for influence far beyond his own committee.

This strategizing suggests some broader conclusions about the congressional budgeting process. In the realm of budgeting, strategy is usually thought of as a planning guide that ideally should drive the details of the defense budget in a top-down fashion. The inherently politicized nature of congressional budgeting has led many analysts to dismiss the possibility that strategy could play a significant role in that process. Strategy is the province of think tanks and—perhaps—the Pentagon. But strategy is more than a guide for planning. It is also a weapon for legislators to wield in battling for votes. The rise of congressional strategizing does not mean that the institution has been transformed into an apolitical Brookings Institution. Strategy is a tool of congressional politics, not a substitute for it.

The rise of strategy in the congressional budgeting process will also affect the output of that process, but not necessarily in the ways that critics of micromanagement have wished. Many of those critics have argued that micromanagement displaced Congress's earlier attention to broad policy concerns and have called for a return to that broader focus. Nunn, Aspin, and other legislators have attempted to reformulate the foundations of U.S. defense policy. However, despite this attention to broader issues, political incentives to make line item funding changes persist both for individual members and within the committee budgeting process. Dictating the details of the budget continues to offer legislators the most effective means of increasing or cutting defense programs. More important, micromanagement does not conflict with increasing congressional attention to the big picture. On the contrary, to the extent that members do want to make fundamental changes in U.S. force structure, they will press all the harder to alter the details of the defense budget, and implement their broader policy goals through line item changes.

This suggests that the congressional budgeting process may now be compatible with a more top-down, strategy-driven approach to defense spending than has been possible for decades. As long as Congress micromanaged the defense budget

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while ignoring broader policy concerns, efforts to shape defense spending around strategy were futile. That constraint has vanished with the burst of legislative interest in strategy. Moreover, congressional interest in the big picture is likely to continue. The attractiveness of strategy as a political tool (and as a subject of member interest) varies with the degree of change in the international security environment, and with the extent of dissensus over the administration's proposed response. The end of the cold war provided a particularly vivid opportunity for congressional strategizing. While the transition to the new security era may not provide such inviting opportunities in the future, disagreements are certain to persist over the future purposes and structure of the armed forces.

Nevertheless, three factors will continue to limit efforts at top-down budgeting. First, while strategy can play a stronger role in shaping defense spending, that strategy may not be the president's. Legislators are now crafting their own versions of the big picture instead of deferring to the executive branch. In periods of divided government, when partisan conflicts reinforce institutional struggles between Congress and the president, defense strategy is particularly likely to be a source of divisiveness rather than policy coherence. Yet, as in the attack of Senators McCain and Cohen on the Bush administration, legislators may sometimes struggle to shape defense policy and budgeting against a president of their own party. Second, even if legislators are able to dominate this struggle, the opportunities for Congress to agree on a single, coherent strategy will remain limited. Congressional budgeting authority is fragmented; and while members will use strategy in attempting to overcome that fragmentation, struggles to dominate the budgeting process seem likely to persist. Finally, even the most concerted efforts at top-down budgeting will always be suffused with politics. But that does not detract from the significance of what Aspin and his colleagues have accomplished. Congressional strategizing is more than a facade for business as usual; it represents a new way of doing business.*

* I would like to to thank Robert Art, Lynn Eden, James Lindsay, Kenneth Mayer, and my colleagues in the Department of National Security Affairs for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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Democracy and Islamic Revivalism

S. V. R. NASR

The nature of Islamic revivalism's impact on political development in the Muslim world in general and on the ongoing process of democratization in particular has been the subject of heated debates among academicians and policy makers alike.[1] Islamic revivalism in broad brush strokes is a distinct interpretive reading of Islam.[2] It emphasizes the exoteric dimension of the faith; disparages traditional religious practices, which form the basis of popular faith and the rule of religious law in particular; formalizes and rationalizes religion, predicating eschatology and salvation on social action and gaining control of political power. In general, Islamic revivalism is viewed as a revolutionary force whose aim is to topple the established order in the Muslim world, be they authoritarian or democratic.

As unpalatable as the prospects of additional Islamic revolutions and Islamic republics have been, by the end of the 1980s it became clear that the secular state in the Muslim world, through oppression and accommodation, has by and large stayed its ground and in large measure contained Islamic revivalism. Crises of governability, which create circumstances that are conducive to the growth of Islamic revivalism, persist.[3] But ruling regimes have thus far successfully dealt with revolutionary challenges to their authority by revivalism. The examples

[1] For an overview of this debate, see John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[2] For a fuller definition of Islamic fundamentalism, see John O. Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan" and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "Activist Shi'ism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon" in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 345-402 and 403-56.

[3] For a discussion of this issue in the case of Algeria, see John Entelis, "The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of Algeria," *Problems of Communism* 41 (May-June 1992): 71-81.

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of Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Syria under Hafez al-Asad are most instructive in this regard. In 1980, Saddam ordered the execution of the Shiite revivalist leader, Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, and proceeded to ruthlessly suppress all religious opposition to his rule during the course of the following decade.[4] Similarly, Asad deployed 12,000 troops in the city of Hama in 1982 to suppress an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood.[5] Thousands of people were killed in the process. Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, and a host of other Muslim countries have also resorted to brute force to contain revivalism. Few have exceeded the brutality of the Iraqi and Syrian regimes but have nevertheless checked the growth of revivalism. In the meantime, state-sponsored experiments with Islamization in Bangladesh and Pakistan have come to an end, just as the Islamic Republic of Iran, exhausted by war and economic stagnation, has become only a ghost of its 1979-1980 existence.[6]

The prospects for democracy, however, have drastically altered the political balance in the Muslim world and renewed concern over the prospects for greater prominence of Islamic revivalism. As Muslim countries appear poised for greater democratization,[7] threatening the oppressive state structures that have contained Islamic revivalism to date, the future of the secular state has come into question. Democracy will open the political process to Islamic revivalism and will provide it with a new avenue through which it can pursue its political agenda. As secularism is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for viable democracy, the rise in the fortunes of Islamic revivalism is viewed with alarm.[8] It is argued that in Muslim countries democratization will sow the seeds of its own demise by giving Islamic revivalism a handle to monopolize the political discourse and possibly take over power. As a result, fear of Islamic revivalism has led to ambivalent responses to Muslim societies' experiments with greater pluralism. Policy makers and academicians have viewed democratization in Muslim societies with suspicion; and in cases such as that of Algeria or Tunisia, they have actually ignored popular aspirations and tacitly approved of government crack-downs or even

[4] See Hanna Batatu, "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah" in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 179-200.

[5] Derek Hopwood, *Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 66.

[6] On routinization of Iran's revolution, see Fouad Ajami, "Iran: the Impossible Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Winter 1988/89): 135-55; Ruhollah K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); and Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran After Khomeini* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

[7] Michael C. Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World," *Middle East Journal* 45 (Summer 1991): 407-26; Hudson, "Democratization in the Middle East," *Arab-American Affairs* 36 (Spring 1991): 1-47; J. E. Peterson, *The Gulf Arab States: Steps Toward Political Participation* (New York: Praeger, 1988); Asad Abukhalil, "A Viable Partnership: Islam, Democracy and the Arab World," *Harvard International Review* 15 (Winter 1992/93): 22-23, 65; and Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 223-50.

[8] See Leslie Gelb, "The Free Elections Trap," *New York Times*, 29 May 1991; and Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," *The Atlantic*, February 1993, 89-98.

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military coups. In similar vein, in no uncertain terms, most observers have endorsed the creation of authoritarian republics by old commissars and former Communist party bosses modeled after Turkey in the newly-created Central Asian states. Succinctly put, given dangers inherent in democratization, Muslims are better off under secular dictators.

Such suppositions reflect a fear of Islamic revivalism, which is a legacy of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 and the sordid diplomatic and international crises that followed it, on the one hand, and an absence of confidence in the ability of democracy to contend with the challenge of Islamic revivalism, on the other. In this regard, the prevailing attitudes also bear the influence of the modernization perspective in associating development, especially in the direction of democracy with secularization.[9] However, the challenge of Islamic revivalism to the secular state and its views on and role in the democratization process are far more complex and nuanced than modernization theory suggests.[10] Democracy may prove to be far more resilient before the challenge of revivalism than most observers concede. It is the contention of this article that the feebleness of democracy before the challenge of Islamic revivalism is not a foregone conclusion. To the contrary, democracy is perhaps the best means for contending with revivalism. Not only should the West not abandon its support for democratization in the Muslim world for fear of a revivalist victory, but it should redouble those efforts with the aim of containing revivalism. The oft-asked question: "What is the danger of revivalism to democracy?" should be turned on its head; we should ask, "What is the danger of democracy to revivalism?"

This point is best elucidated by the case of Pakistan and its leading Islamic revivalist party, the Jama'at-i Islami (the Islamic party). The Jama'at is one of the oldest and most influential contemporary Islamic revivalist movements. Its ideology and plan of action, harkening Muslims to an Islamic revolution, have made the party a primary example of what the West has feared most in revivalism. At closer examination, the Jama'at is far less threatening than its rhetoric, which calls for an Islamic revolution and the creation of an Islamic state in Pakistan may suggest. Rather than a testament to the unstoppable power of revivalism, the party's history is a clear example of the limits to the revivalist challenge, confirming the fact that pluralism can successfully withstand the revivalist challenge. Ever since Pakistan was established in 1947, its politics have been relatively

[9] Fred R. von der Mehden, *Religion and Modernization in Southeast Asia* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 1-98; and Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970). The linkage between secularism and democracy is most clearly presented in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 298-311.

[10] In this regard, see John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal* 45 (Summer 1991): 427-40; Robin Wright, "Islam and Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Summer 1992): 131-45; John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, "Islam's Democratic Essence," *Middle East Quarterly* (September 1994): 3-11; and Timothy D. Sisk, *Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).

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open. For twenty-one years (1947-1958, 1971-1977, and 1988-present) of its history, Pakistan has been a democracy. In the remaining twenty-four years during which the country was ruled by the military, an open political process was maintained in which the Islamic revivalist parties were able to participate.[11]

Throughout Pakistan's history, the Jama'at has been ideologically significant and politically consequential, but despite five decades of indefatigable activism it has not been able to translate its power into control of the state and the political process. This paradox is important insofar as it casts doubt on popular notions about the power and reach of revivalist movements, especially in an open political process. It also provides clues about the working of an Islamic movement and its potential in light of the constraints imposed on its operation by its sociopolitical context. The working of this process in turn will shed further light on the dynamics of interaction of religion with politics, ethnic conflict, and democratization. To examine the nature of this process, the notions of ideological prowess and political weakness, which define the loci of the Jama'at's power and reach, should be examined in turn.

The Jama'at-i Islami: Ideology and Plan of Action

The Jama'at-i Islami was formed in 1941 in what was still united India.[12] It was the brainchild of Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979), who also served as the party's chief ideologue and titular head until 1972. The Jama'at, therefore, is one of the oldest of contemporary Islamic revivalist movements. Since its formation, the Jama'at has operated as a revivalist party. It has articulated a distinctly political interpretation of Islam and has demanded the restructuring of society and politics and the establishment of a state that would embody the spirit of Islamic law—replacing the secular state with an Islamic one.[13] The Jama'at is perhaps the first movement of its kind to develop systematically an Islamic ideology, a modern revolutionary reading of Islam, and an agenda for social

[11] On the importance of this issue, see Mumtaz Ahmad, "Pakistan" in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 230-40.

[12] On the Jama'at's history and the life and thought of its founder, Mawlana Mawdudi, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama't-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat" in Marty and Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed*, 457-530; Abad Shahpuri, *Tarikh-i Jama'at-i Islami* (History of Jama'at-i Islami) (Lahore, Pakistan: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, 1989).

[13] See Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi" in Donald E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 371-97; Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Risalah-i Diniyat* (Treatise on Religion)(Hyderabad, India: n.p., 1932); Mawdudi, *Tahrik-i Islami ki Akhlaqi Buniadin* (The Basic Ethical Principles of the Islamic Movement) (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1968); and Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Jama'at-i Islami; Tarikh, Maqsad, Awr La'ihah-i 'Amal* (Jama'at-i Islami: History, Aims, and Plan of Action), (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1963).

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action to materialize its vision.[14] The party's history is illustrative of the dynamic evolution of the revivalist discourse and social action.

Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, Mawdudi along with the bulk of the Jama'at's leaders and members moved to the newly-created state of Pakistan. Independent Jama'at-i Islamis, however, continued to function in India, as well as in the Indian province of Kashmir. Today there are additional independent Jama'at-i Islami organizations in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, and North America.[15]

Ideological Prowess and Political Reach

To those who have studied the development of Islamic revivalism, the extent of the significance and influence of the Jama'at's ideology has been apparent. Pakistani politics is today far more permissive to Islamic forces than when it was created,[16] in good measure owing to Jama'at's impact on the national political discourse and the process of cultural change in the country.[17] Outside Pakistan, the mark of Mawdudi's ideas and world view is evident on the sundry of revivalist formulations from Morocco to Malaysia. The Jama'at's literature is available in twenty-six languages ranging from Arabic, Malay, and Persian to Spanish, Swahili, Japanese, and Malayalam. Through them, Mawdudi's ideas have impressed Egyptian revivalist thinkers, especially Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt; Hasan Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood of the Sudan; the Iranian revolutionary leaders; revivalist activists in Afghanistan, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey, to name only a number of cases.[18] The ripples of the Jama'at influence continue to wash onto new shores, influencing revivalist thought and action. Most notably, the newly-formed Islamic parties of Central

[14] See Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State" in John L. Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 99-133. Also see Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Jama'at-i Islami ki Untis Sal* (Twenty Nine Years of Jama'ar-i Islami) (Lahore, Pakistan: Shu'bah-i Nashr'u Isha'at-i Jama-at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1970).

[15] Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," 501-07.

[16] See Barbara D. Metcalf, "Islamic Arguments in Contemporary Pakistan" in William Roff, ed., *Islam and Political Economy of Meaning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 132-59; Anita M. Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986); and Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization of Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1986).

[17] Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); for the Jama'at's account of its activities, see Mawdudi, *Jama'at-i Islami ki Untis Sal.*

[18] On the Jama'at's influence in the Arab World, Afghanistan, Iran, and Malaysia, see Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 154-55; Abdelwahab El-Effendi, "The Long March From Lahore to Khartoum: Beyond the 'Muslim Reformation'," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin* 17 (1990): 138-39; Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68-70, 80; Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Zainah Anwar, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Malaysia* (Kualalampur, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1989).

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Asia, such as Tajikistan's Nihzat-i Islami (Islamic Movement), which play an increasingly important role in their newly-formed countries, have gained inspiration from and sought to emulate the Jama'at.[19] So significant is the Jama'at's contribution to the rise of Islamic revivalism that it is safe to conclude that (local variations and political programs withstanding) Islamic revivalism as an ideological perspective is, in good measure, the brainchild of Mawdudi and Jama'at-i Islami.

Although not able to gain control of power in Pakistan, the Jama'at's impact on that country's politics has been equally notable. In Pakistan the Jama'at has played a significant role in galvanizing a grand Islamic alliance, which has become an established facet of Pakistani politics, discerning an Islamic vote bank, articulating a distinct pattern of religiopolitical activism, and Islamizing the national political discourse.[20]

At the more immediate level, the Jama'at has played a direct role in key political events that have shaped Pakistan's history. The party occupied a central place in the constitutional debates of 1948-1956, and again in 1972-1973, which formalized the shape of the Pakistan state and determined the place of Islam therein.[21] The party has acted prominently in a number of important social movements such as the anti-Ahmediya agitations in Punjab in 1953-1954, and the nonrecognition of Bangladesh movement of 1972-1974.[22] Each of these movements grew into notable popular compaigns with far-reaching implications. The anti-Ahmediya agitations led to the declaration of the first martial law ordinance in Pakistan in 1954, while the nonrecognition of Bangladesh campaign posed a serious threat to the government of prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during the first two years of his rule.

Since 1958 the Jama'at has also been active in movements for democracy. Most notably, it helped mobilize popular opposition to authoritarian rule in the 1962-1965 period, and in 1969 against Ayub Khan's government, and in 1977 against Z. A. Bhutto's increasingly autocratic rule.[23] The party's role was particu-

[19] Interviews with two leaders of the Nihzat-i Islami in Lahore, Pakistan in 1990.

[20] See Binder, *Religion and Politics*; and Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi."

[21] Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, *Pakistan Main Jama'at-i Islami Ka Kirdar* (Jama'at-i Islami's Activities in Pakistan) (Lahore, Pakistan: Markazi Shu'bah-i Nashr'u Isha'at-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1990).

[22] The anti-Ahmediya agitations demanded the formal declaration of the Ahmediya sect as a non-Muslim minority, and the nonrecognition of Bangladesh campaign opposed Pakistan's promise to India in the cease-fire agreement of 1971 to recognize the independence of its former province of East Pakistan. On the two movements, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jama'at-i Tulaba in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal* 46 (Winter 1992): 67; and Salim Mansur Khalid, ed., *Talabah Tahrikain* (Student Movements), 2 vols., (Lahore, Pakistan: Al-Badr Publications, 1989).

[23] S. M. Zafar, *Through the Crisis* (Lahore, Pakistan: Book Center, 1970); Kawthar Niyazi, *Awr Line Kat Ga'i* (And the Line was Cut) (Lahore, Pakistan: Jang Publications, 1987); Niyazi, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan: The Last Days* (New Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing House, 1992); and 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad, *Pher Martial Law A-Giya* (Then Came the Marital Law) (Lahore, Pakistan: Jang Publications, 1988).

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larly central in the last two democratization movements. In 1969, the Jama'at acted as a leader of the Democratic Action Committee, which demanded an end to Ayub Khan's authoritarian rule; in 1977 it served as the main force in the Pakistan National Alliance's struggle against the Bhutto regime. The party's role in the democratization movements is of theoretical significance. Samuel Huntington has correlated religion's contribution to democratization with internal changes in religion's outlook on society and politics leading to a reformation of its doctrinal outlook. Huntington points to changes in the Roman Catholic church's teachings on society and politics since the 1960s as critical in the success of democratization in Catholic countries. More to the point, the fact that reforms introduced by the Vatican II Council and the Medellín Conference made notable concessions to liberalism go a long way in explaining the role of Catholic movements in the emergence of democracies in Spain, Portugal, the Philippines, and especially Latin America.[24] The case of the Jama'at shows that such axial changes are not prerequisites for the participation of religious movements in the democratization process. Whether parties such as the Jama'at remain true to the ideal of democracy once they are in power is predicated on a separate set of factors from those that determine the extent of their participation in democratization. Revivalism's continued commitment to democracy, when and if in power, is as much open to speculation as are the actions and policies of secular leaders of democratic movements. Islamic parties do not have a monopoly over reneging on democratic promises. Ferdinand Marcos, Adnan Menderes, Z. A. Bhutto, and Alberto Fujimori, to name a few, have already preceded them in this regard.[25] There is, furthermore, reason to expect more from Islamic parties in a democracy than mere lip service to freedom and equality.[26] John Esposito and Robin Wright's examination of the ideologies and programs of Islamic movements in this regard is instructive.[27] They find the commitment to democracy and when and where it is espoused, although still evolving, to be real. It is rooted in the prolonged experience of Islamic movements of all hues with authoritarian regimes from Indonesia to Morocco. Islamic movements, in many instances, have sought to incorporate the democratic ideal into their ideologies.[28] Although this task is far from complete, it is nevertheless real. It is just as complex and theoretically interesting as the emergence of Eurocommunism in the 1970s.

[24] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 75-85.

[25] Factors identified by Huntington in understanding the reversion of democracy to authoritarianism shed more light on how Islamic parties may operate once they take power in a democratic order than their ideologies alone; see ibid, 280-93.

[26] Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Islami Riyasat* (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1969); and Mawdudi, *Islami Hukumat Kis Tarah Qa'im Huta Hey* (How Is the Islamic State Established) (Lahore, nd).

[27] Esposito and Piscatori, "Islam and Democratization"; and Wright, "Islam and Democracy."

[28] Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, Khurshid Ahad, ed. (Karachi, Pakistan: Jamaat-e-Islami Publications, 1955).

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The years of political activity have permitted the Jama'at to create an organizational structure. Since the mid-1970s its street power has been an important element in national politics as a means of creating unrest against governments, as well as bolstering the chances of right-of-center candidates in elections.[29] The party's organizational prowess has not catapulted it into power but has enabled it to project power well beyond Pakistan's boundaries. For instance, the condemnation of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* that led to an international diplomatic crisis was, in large measure, precipitated by the Jama'at. Ayatollah Khomeini took notice of the *Satanic Verses* because of the Jama'at's ability to mobilize resources in England, Saudi Arabia, and South Asia in protest against the book.[30]

Islamic Revivalism, the State, and Ethnic Politics

An interesting aspect of Jama'at's political power is its legitimation function, which has a direct bearing on the success of democratization. In Pakistan the greatest challenge to democracy comes from ethnic forces.[31] Islam is the glue that keeps disparate ethnic communities together.[32] The viability of democracy hinges on the continuation of the federal arrangement, which in turn relies heavily on parties such as the Jama'at to bolster its position. Pakistan was established in the name of Islam, and as has been evident at times of crises, it has had little else to rely on to strengthen the federal unit other than Islam. What Rupert Emerson observed of Pakistan in 1947, by and large holds true today: "By accepted criteria of nationhood it was obvious that there was in fact no such thing as a Pakistani nation."[33] Despite the secularism of its leaders from Muhammad Ali

[29] On the ability of a small but organized minority to project power in elections, see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), chap. 4; and Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[30] The Islamic Foundation, a Jama'at-i Islami organization located in Leicester, England, was in fact one of the initiators of the entire anti-Rushdie campaign in England, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Following the publication of *Satanic Verses*, the foundation circulated numerous photocopies of passages from Rushdie's book in England, distributed them far and wide across the Muslim world, and the Jama'at's emissaries traveled to Saudi Arabia to secure funding for the anti-Rushdie campaign. The Jama'at activists in England then utilized Saudi support to galvanize the Muslim community of England and to alert Muslims across the world of their cause. It was following weeks-long agitations in England that Pakistan and later Iran joined the fray and converted the issue into a diplomatic imbroglio; personal interviews in London and Islamabad, also cited in *Kayhan* (London), 23 November 1989, 12.

[31] On ethnic politics in Pakistan, see Theodore P. Wright, "Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis," *Comparative Politics* 23 (April 1991): 299-312; and Selig S. Harrison, "Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Baluch, Pashtuns, and Sindhis" in Joseph V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA; Lexington Books, 1991), 301-26.

[32] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Pakistan: Islamic State, Ethnic Polity," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 16 (Summer 1992): 81-90.

[33] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 92.

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Jinnah to Field Marshal Ayub Khan to Z. A. Bhutto, Pakistan has been compelled to look to Islam to legitimate the state. The result has been an ambivalence toward the role of Islam in statecraft. In the words of Freeland Abbott, "In the view of government leaders a viable Pakistan could not develop under the political leadership of the mullah [religious divine]; on the other hand, a strong Pakistan was not likely to develop without their help. The central government both wooed the mullahs and ridiculed them."[34] While this ambivalence continues to characterize the rapport between Islam and the state, since 1947 the state has become more reliant on Islam. A state that has fought two major wars with India (1965 and 1971), two civil wars in the span of a decade (1971 in East Pakistan and throughout the 1970s in Baluchistan), suffered two military coups followed by decade-long authoritarian rules (1958-1971 and 1977-1988), imposition of martial law and emergency rule in the various provinces (Punjab in 1954, East Pakistan in 1971, Baluchistan in 1972, and Sind in 1992) and now the collapse of state authority and resurgence of ethnic and sectarian tensions, has found lease on life, in large part, because of Islamic solidarity.

The Jama'at has played a pivotal role in extending the much needed Islamic legitimacy to the state; by mobilizing Islamic symbolisms it made religion available to the state for political ends. It has even become an important broker in the relations between the federal center and the provincial and ethnic forces that have challenged the primacy of the Pakistan state. In the 1969-1971 period, the Jama'at acted directly to assist the Pakistan state in suppressing the secessionist Bengali nationalism.[35] It did so again in the 1970s in Baluchistan and Sind.[36] As such, the party found a legitimation function for the state, which soon extended beyond ethnic issues. For instance, the Jama'at support proved pivotal in mobilizing mass support for the Afghan Jihad and for General Zia's martial rule in the 1980s.[37] So central was the importance of the Jama'at to the Zia regime that Bhutto is alleged to have told the Pakistan Supreme Court, which had convened to try him in a murder case, "I chose a chief of staff from the Jama'at-e-Islami and the result is before us."[38]

Since the return of democracy to Pakistan in 1988, the Jama'at has emerged as a strong defender of the central government—the seat of democracy—against ethnic forces in Baluchistan, Northwest Frontier, and Sind. The party's propa-

[34] Freeland Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), 193.

[35] Nasr, "Students," 64-65.

[36] Nasr, "Pakistan," 85-86; and Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Southwest Asia: Political Development or Political Decay?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Winter 1984-85): 657-79.

[37] Charles H. Kennedy, "Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-89," *Pacific Affairs* 63 (Spring 1990): 62-77; Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, eds., *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and Weiss, *Islamic Reassertion*.

[38] Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 162.

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ganda has clearly bolstered the position of the central government and the democratic order before the challenge of ethnic forces.

CONSTRAINED POLITICAL GROWTH: THE LIMITS TO THE REVIVALIST CHALLENGE

As a party whose avowed aim has been to rule Pakistan, the Jama'at's record hardly adds up to a success story. As significant as the Jama'at's ideological reach and its plan of action have been in shaping Pakistan's politics, they have not served the party's aims. This development is theoretically important in that it suggests that the linkage between revivalism and political power is not as direct as is often believed to be the case. Factors built into the political process, if allowed to function, can impede the progress of revivalism. The fact that a party so closely associated with the rise of Islamic revivalism has lagged behind other Pakistan political parties should qualify popular conceptions of revivalism and its perpetual and perennial threat to the political process.

It will be useful to examine the roots of this paradox, specifically to determine what accounts for the fact that after five decades of indefatigable religiopolitical activity the Jama'at has failed to gain control of power. The deciding factors can be parceled into four general categories: the impact of participation in the political process, the nature and scope of the state's reaction to the Jama'at, the extent of control of the Islamic discourse and vote bank, and the efficacy of the ideological posture and organizational model to the party's political agenda.

The Impact of the Political Process on the Jama'at's Agenda

Islamic revivalism, as a phenomenon as well as a political force, first caught the attention of Western scholarship in 1979, when a seemingly atavist revolution toppled a modernizing regime in Iran. The ascendance of revivalism defied time-honored social science theories and as such necessitated new approaches to understanding the role of religion in social change in general, and in the development of Muslim societies in particular.[39] This process occurred in the context of the challenge of the Iranian revolution to the position of the United States in the Muslim world. As a result, approaches to the study of revivalism became colored by the adversarial relations between the United States and Iran.[40] A paradigmatic view of revivalism thus emerged, explaining the resurgence of Islam to scholars

[39] Cheryl Benard, and Zalmay Khalilzad, *"The Government of God": Iran's Islamic Republic* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), chap. 1; and Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 24-84.

[40] A primary example of such approaches to fundamentalism may be found in Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); and R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

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and policy makers. Far from a satisfactory explanation, the assumptions and shibboleths which have punctuated the thinking on the role of Islam in politics increasingly conceal more than they reveal about the dynamics of the societies that they study.

The principle folly of the Western scholarship on revivalism has been the fact that it has adopted elements from the rhetoric of the most radical revivalists and viewed them as self-evident axioms. The first of these is the "inevitability of the Islamic revolution"; the second is that revivalists are inherently antistate; and the third is that revivalism has a lock on Muslim political choices and if given a free reign will succeed in taking control of the state.[41] Needless to add, none of these axioms are based on hard evidence, and in most cases they are not likely to stand the test of facts.

Far from the culmination of an inevitable process, the political success of Islamic revivalism, wherever it has been observed, has been the product of specific circumstances.[42] It has been the result of the confluence of a set of factors particular to the sociopolitical context, which is likely to explain more about the success of revivalism than general readings of its ideological directives.[43] This is exactly why, despite its ostensibly imminent threat to the established order in the Muslim world, there are so few cases in which revivalism has actually realized its aims.[44]

The most important factor in the success of revivalism has been surprise: It has capitalized on popular political discontent to take the political process unawares. Protracted involvement with the political process, as has been the case with the Jama'at in Pakistan, will elicit concessions from the ruling order in terms of new laws or distribution of political and economic power—Islamization. But it will also create barriers to further progress of revivalism and immunize the political process to its ultimate challenge.[45] It will compel revivalism to turn to pragmatic politics in lieu of ideological posturing, will encourage other political forces to respond to the revivalist threat, and also will provide them with sufficient time to do so. Similarly, it enables the state to formulate policies that would accommodate dissent at the expense of revivalism. The Jama'at's meager parliamentary representation over two decades, as shown in Table 1, bears ample testimony to this fact. Similarly, the Jama'at experience echoes that of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood.

[41] Esposito has argued that there are hidden agendas behind the current approach to Islamic fundamentalism, namely, it serves the need to protect entrenched U.S. foreign and defense policy interests; see Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 168-212.

[42] Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*.

[43] See the incisive analysis of Ira M. Lapidus in "Islamic Political Movements: Patterns of Historical Change" in Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus, eds., *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 3-16.

[44] Henry Munson, Jr., *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 125-38.

[45] In this regard, see Daniel Brumberg, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Democracy, and the Gulf War" in James Piscatori, ed., *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis* (Chicago: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), 186-208.

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TABLE 1

The Tally of Jama'at-i Islami's Seats in National and Provincial Elections, 1970–1993

Year	National Assembly Seats Contested	National Assembly Seats Won	Provincial Assembly Seats Contested	Provincial Assembly Seats Won
1970	151	4	331	4
1977[a]	31	9	—	—
1985[b]	68	10	102	13
1988[c]	26	8	44	13
1990[c]	18	8	37	20
1993[d]	103	3	237	6

[a] In these elections the Jama'at participated as a member of PNA.

[b] These elections were nonparty elections.

[c] In these elections the Jama'at participated as a member of IDA.

[d] In these elections the Jama'at contested alone under the banner of Pakistan Islamic Front.

Source: compiled by the author from data provided in *Report on the General Elections Pakistan 1970–71* (Islamabad, nd.); *Report on the General Elections 1985* (Islamabad, nd.); Tariq Isma'il, *Election '88* (Lahore, 1989); and Election Bureau of the Jama'at-i Islami, Lahore, Pakistan.

In the November 1993 elections in that country, the second one in which the Brotherhood has participated openly, the party lost seats to other political forces.

This is an important point to bear in mind. Revivalists have by and large responded positively to the burgeoning democratization process in many parts of the Muslim world, from Algeria to Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and they have abandoned their antistate platforms of earlier times and become involved with the political process.[46] They are an important element in the civil society that will serve as the pillar of democracy. However, the reaction to this development in the ruling regimes in the Muslim world and among Western policy makers and academicians has not been positive. Memories of the Iranian revolution and the United States debacle in the Middle East in the 1980s have led many to fervently oppose any political role for revivalism, for the fear that once they gain a foothold in the political process they will inevitably overwhelm it. Such instinctive responses have led to confounding policy choices and scholarly conclusions. The examples of Algeria and Central Asia come to mind most readily. Rather than extend the demand for democratization to the Muslim world, many argue that it is better for Muslim states to languish under military rule rather than adopt an open political system susceptible to revivalist activity, implying that democracy is not an appropriate form of government if the people do not vote for secular parties. Not only are these arguments untenable and a mockery of the campaign to promote democracy in Muslim countries, they are in fact rooted in fears and perceptions not borne out by the evidence at hand. The example of Pakistan suggests that revivalism's involvement in the political process does not ipso facto translate into taking over the control of the state;

[46] Esposito and Piscatori, "Islam and Democratization."

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rather, an open political process that will involve revivalism is far more likely to control religiopolitical activism than authoritarian regimes that exclude the revivalists from the political process.

Democracy engenders exactly the kind of protracted involvement with the political process, which as the case of the Jama'at shows, will check the progress of Islamic revivalism. The Jama'at became enfranchised in the early 1950s. It joined the political process in Pakistan and since then has participated in that process during its democratic periods (1951-1958, 1971-1977, and 1988 to the present) as well as authoritarian ones (1958-1971 and 1977-1988). By abandoning its antistate posture and endorsing the state and the political process, the Jama'at became subject to the influence of those political forces that govern the ebb and flow of the political process. Its revolutionary image faded, and it became bogged down in debates, policy decisions, compromises, and political maneuvering that have stymied its progress and constricted its maneuverability. This has been particularly true during the country's democratic periods, when open political debate has forced the Jama'at to elaborate on its ideology and conversely has provided other political forces with the opportunity to immunize themselves to its challenge. During the democratic periods, moreover, the Jama'at has been forced to divert its attention from opposition to the government to competition with an array of other political forces, with the effect of diffusing its political energies. In the long run, this has been the single most important cause of the Jama'at's constricted political development.

The Effect of the State's Reaction

While in the long run, involvement with the political process impedes the development of revivalism, in the short run the prospects for the success of revivalism hinge on the nature and scope of the state's reaction to it. Revivalism is an imminent threat to a state lacking the will or power to respond to a challenge to its position. Far from a proof of the "inevitability" doctrine, the Iranian revolution owed its success to the shah's inaction in the face of a challenge to his authority.[47] Conversely, decisive state actions in Iraq in 1980, Syria in 1982, and Algeria and Tajikistan since 1992 have successfully forestalled further progress of revivalism toward the centers of power. While state action explains constriction on the growth of revivalism, it is a far less effective means of contending with religiopolitical activism than democratization. Decisive state actions, as witnessed in Iraq, Syria, Algeria, or Tajikistan are costly affairs that can scar the political process and derail the democratization effort. The brutality involved in such state action can in many cases out-weigh the dangers that are perceived to entail further growth of revivalism; the case of Iraq in the 1980s is the most obvious example. In the latest instance of decisive state action against revivalism in Algeria, too,

[47] Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*; and Marvin Zonis, *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

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the sociopolitical costs have quickly added up. The coup, which was launched by the military to deny the Islamic Salvation Front its victory at the polls, has led to the internment of thousands of civilians and the dangerous polarization of society. In some cases, such as Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, and again in Algeria since the coup, suppression of revivalism will lead to its strengthening and will convert a political movement into a revolutionary one, which in time could produce a far more intractable problem. State action, moreover, only closes the political process to the revivalists; it does not hinder their social and political position. At best, state action can serve only as a stop-gap measure. It can ward off a revivalist challenge until such time as the secular ruling order is strengthened sufficiently to contend with it, although the cases of Iraq or Syria do not warrant vesting much hope in this process. In the case of Algeria, furthermore, state action has proved to be successful only in the short run and has in fact contributed to both the strengthening and radicalization of Islamic revivalism. It goes without saying that the manner in which state action can impact the progress of Islamic revivalism is itself consequential. Again the case of Pakistan and the Jama'at is instructive.

Most observers of Pakistan contend that the Jama'at has never been the party of choice for the Pakistani electorate, and that despite its ability to influence the course of political developments in the country, it has never been in a position to take control of the government. The consensus here is proof of the assertion that involvement in the political process will more often than not undermine the progress of revivalism, but it does not tell the whole story. Forty years of involvement with the political process does explain the Jama'at's political constriction. The political fortunes of the party have not always been uniform. At various junctures in the country's history, the Jama'at has been in a position to exert greater power than is often acknowledged. If it failed to realize its aim of ruling Pakistan and eventually succumbed to the writ of its long-run involvement in the political process, it is due to direct state action.

Since it joined the political process in Pakistan, the Jama'at has launched two serious drives for gaining control of power, in 1958 and again in 1977. Each time, the government acted directly to check the Jama'at's bid. Although the response of the Pakistan state in these occasions was somewhat similar to state action in Algeria, there were important differences. Most notably, the state did not exclude the Jama'at from the political process and hence did not reverse the long-run impact of the party's involvement in the process. As a result, it did not radicalize the party.

Soon after Pakistan's creation in 1947, the Jama'at articulated a religiopolitical opposition platform to challenge the government's agenda. The party's activities discerned a base of support for the party, which increased in size between 1947 and 1958 when the first national elections were scheduled. The party's growing strength was reflected in the municipal elections in the capital, Karachi, in April 1958. The elections to the ninety-six seats of the Karachi Municipal Corporation

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were contested closely and stirred much popular enthusiasm.[48] The elections were used by most parties as a trial run before the expected general elections and were widely viewed as a gauge of the popularity and prowess of various parties,[49] much like the municipal elections in Algeria in 1991. The Jama'at did unexpectedly well in these elections. It contested twenty-three seats, winning nineteen. Although the Karachi electorate was by no means typical of Pakistan as a whole, the election results gave the party momentum. The American Embassy reported to the secretary of state that the Jama'at did surprisingly well in the elections, producing "the most striking aspect of the election results."[50] The party won a high proportion of seats it contested, coming second after the ruling Muslim League party with sixty-one seats.[51]

Taking the results as a sign of greater victories to follow, the Jama'at began preparing for the expected national elections. Its hopes were, however, dashed when on 7 October 1958, Generals Iskandar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan staged a military coup, dismissed the civilian government, and shelved the plans for national elections. Although the coup was in large measure a response to the crisis of governability in the country, fear of the Jama'at's possible showings in the national elections also played an important role.[52] The decade of authoritarian rule that followed the coup, however, did not push the Jama'at out of the political process and did not alter the general direction in which the party's politics was moving.

More ominous for the Jama'at was the military's intervention in the political process under the leadership of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in 1977. Throughout the 1970s the Jama'at had led the opposition to the increasingly autocratic rule of the civilian Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the socialist policies of his party, Pakistan People's Party (PPP).[53] The Jama'at mobilized religious symbolisms to launch an effective social movement, which demanded

[48] U.S. Embassy, Karachi, dispatch #678, 4/10/1958, 790D.00/4-1058, National Archives, Washington, DC.

[49] U.S. Embassy, Karachi, dispatch #939, 4/11/1958, 790D.00/4-1158, National Archives.

[50] U.S. Embassy, Karachi, tel. #2708, 5/1/1958, 790D.00/5-158, and despatch #1094, 790D.00/5-2958, National Archives.

[51] The Jama'at, moreover, defeated Awami League and National Awami Party (with one seat each), both of which were deemed far more powerful than the Jama'at. The U.S. Embassy attributed the Jama'at's success to its good rapport with the Muhajir (migrants from India) community of Karchi, owing to its long history of social work among that community, its good choice of candidates, and the efficiency of its campaign. The Jama'at, it is reported, spent a total of Rs.40,000 on the campaign, an average of less than Rs.2000 per candidate; U.S. Embassy, Karachi, despatch #1094, 790D.00/5-2958, National Archives.

[52] In his memoirs, General Mirza pointed to the possibility of greater Islamization of Pakistan as a primary reason for staging the coup. To underscore his point, he named the Jama'at and its leader, Mawlana Mawdudi. See unpublished memoirs of General Iskandar Mirza, 109-10.

[53] For a discussion of the Bhutto years, see Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977* (London: Macmillan, 1980). On the Jama'at's politics during this period, see Niyazi, *Awr Line* and *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto*; and Ahmad, *Pher*.

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that the government abide by the country's constitution. As the PPP government fell out of favor with the masses, the opposition gained in strength. A nine-party oppositional alliance—Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)—emerged to challenge the government. National elections were scheduled for March 1977. The government hoped to renew its mandate, while the opposition hoped to replace the government. Concerned with the growing strength of the opposition, the government resorted to massive rigging of the election results. This action produced a national crisis and led to nation-wide agitations. The Jama'at served as the bulwark behind the opposition in the streets, as well as in the parliament. The party not only provided the organizational muscle needed for launching a national protest movement, but through its use of Islamic idioms in articulating the opposition's demands, it was able to further push the government into retreat. So central was the role of the Jama'at, that on 16 April 1977, when Prime Minister Bhutto sought to diffuse tensions, he visited Mawdudi's house.[54] When that initiative produced no result, he excoriated Mawdudi before the parliament as the person responsible for the agitations across the country.[55] The prime minister clearly saw the crisis as a struggle between the PPP and the Jama'at.

As the crisis escalated, the government agreed to negotiate with the opposition over holding fresh elections. Lengthy negotiations produced a working arrangement. However, before a final agreement could be hammered out, the military took action. In July, the military staged a coup and took over the reigns of power.

In the elections of March 1977, the results of which led to the agitations, the PNA had won thirty-six seats. Jama'at candidates won nine of the thirty-six seats.[56] The 25 percent share of the seats won by PNA shows that the Jama'at was headed for its most successful electoral showings to date. Given its control of nine of PNA's thirty-six seats—which was the second largest block of seats after the Muslim League's in the nine-party alliance—the Jama'at would have dominated, if not controlled, the PNA. A large segment of the Pakistan electorate believed that the elections had been rigged by the government. It follows that PNA had actually won many more than thirty-six seats in the elections, and the Jama'at many more than nine. In fact, the PNA had most likely won enough seats to reduce the PPP to a slim parliamentary majority, if it had not forced it into outright defeat. The political fortunes of the Jama'at, therefore, would have been considerably different if the elections had been fair.

Moreover, during the months of agitations following the March elections, the Jama'at's political prospects became considerably more promising. The government lost legitimacy among the masses, and the PNA grew in strength. The Jama'at spear-headed the PNA's agitations for new elections and as a result was the greatest beneficiary of the rise in the alliance's fortunes. By July, the Jama'at

[54] Personal interview with Kawthar Niyazi, minister of religious affairs from 1971 to 1977, Islamabad, May 1990.

[55] Niyazi, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto*, 91.

[56] *Report on General Elections, 1977* (Islamabad: General Commission on Elections, 1977).

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had become confident of a solid electoral victory, largely because of its central role in managing the antigovernment agitations.[57] Had the military not intervened in the political process and fresh elections had been held, or had the military held elections soon after the coup as it promised to do, the Jama'at would have most probably reaped the benefits of its anti-PPP stance in terms of a solid electoral showing. The party would have done at least as well as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria or the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India. This was by no means a far-fetched scenario, The shah of Iran was sufficiently alarmed by the prospects of a more "Islamic Pakistan" to actively lobby with secular elements in the PNA in 1977 to break up the alliance and shore up the PPP government.[58]

The military coup of 1977 was in many ways similar to the Algerian coup of 1992, but there are also notable differences between the two. The 1977 coup was led by a devout general, whom the Islamic parties held in high esteem. Zia's Islamic credentials gave him a great deal of latitude in dealing with the PNA and the Jama'at. Unlike Muhammad Boudief and General Liamine Zeroual in Algeria, he was able to keep the Islamic forces in check while he consolidated power under the military.

The coup of 1977 denied the Jama'at their chance to make a serious bid for power, but did not alienate them from the state. Zia consciously sought to keep both the PNA and its Islamic elements involved in the political process.[59] In fact, Zia appealed to the PNA in general, and the Jama'at in particular, to legitimate the coup and the following military rule. He incorporated the Jama'at's demands, especially on Islamic issues, into state policy, intensifying its participation in the political process. The combination of keeping the Jama'at away from the polls, especially during the 1977-1979 period, and increasing its involvement in the political process created significant impediments to the party's progress.

Between 1977 and 1979, when the memory of PNA's struggle against Bhutto was fresh, new elections would have favored the PNA and the Jama'at. Eager to avoid elections, Zia conceded to the PNA's demands on selective issues, most often concerning Islamization. He coopted many elements of the alliance—notably, the Jama'at and other Islamic parties—and rewarded the anti-Bhutto forces politically and economically. The general, however, avoided holding elections. which had been the central demand of the PNA and the Jama'at in their struggle against the Bhutto regime. The Jama'at had demanded elections, not simply Islamization; the general gave it Islamization but not elections. By 1979 national politics had changed direction. Opposition to the PPP was no longer an emotional political

[57] See *Ijtima' Se Ijtima' Tak (1974-1983); Rudad-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan* (From Convention to Convention [1974-1983]; Proceedings of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan) (Lahore, Pakistan: Jama'at-i Islami, 1989).

[58] *Akhlaqi Jang* (Karachi), 29 March 1990, 20-23.

[59] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jama'at-i Islami 1977-1988," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25 (May 1993): 261-83.

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issue, while the specter of prolonged martial rule became a source of popular concern. As the PNA and the Jama'at saw their moment pass, they settled for the niche in the political process given to them by the Zia regime. They gradually moved away from the general, but stayed in the political process. The consequences became apparent in the national elections of 1985, 1988, and 1990 in which those parties that had constituted the PNA, the Jama'at included, performed modestly (see Table 1). In 1985 the Jama'at won ten of sixty-eight seats contested in National Assembly elections, and thirteen of 102 seats contested in provincial elections. In 1988 the party won seven of twenty-six seats contested in National Assembly elections, and thirteen of forty-four provincial assemblies seats that it contested. In 1990 the party won eight of eighteen seats to the National Assembly and twenty of thirty-seven seats to the provincial assembles that it contested. The Jama'at participated in the last two elections as a member of the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) coalition.

In a word, the Zia regime's policy of keeping the Jama'at involved in the political process confused and weakened the party politically. It was torn between its ideological commitment, which Zia was serving, and its political interests, which Zia was hurting. In containing the Jama'at, no doubt, the ruling regime made concessions to the Jama'at; but it also avoided the dangers of alienation and radicalization, which preceded the revivalist onslaught against the state.

The full impact of continued inclusion in the political process became apparent in the 1993 elections. Between 1988 and 1993 both the PPP and the Muslim League (the core party of IDA) lost credibility with the masses as their leadership stood accused of corruption and mismanagement. The Jama'at decided that Pakistan was now ready for a purely Islamic electoral platform. The PPP and the Muslim League were discredited and exhausted, clearly vulnerable to a direct challenge by the Jama'at, which formed the Pakistan Islamic Front to serve as the third force in Pakistan's politics. The Jama'at launched a religiously-charged and overtly anti-American campaign.[60] Pakistanis took the Jama'at's challenge seriously, especially after it fielded 103 candidates to contest for national assembly seats and 237 to contest for provincial seats. Still, in these elections the Jama'at received only three national assembly seats, and six provincial assembly seats. Qazi Husain Ahmad, the party's chief, who had attained the status of a national figure during the campaign, was not even elected to the parliament. The Jama'at received only 3.9 percent of the popular vote compared with 37.9 percent for the PPP and 39.9 percent for the Muslim League; and 674,484 of the votes cast for national assembly seats as compared with the tally of over seven million each for the PPP and the Muslim League.[61] All religious parties put together in fact tallied only one million two hundred thousand—hardly a challenge to the secular parties. This was the Jama'at's worst performance since 1970.

[60] See *Herald* (Karachi), September 1993; and the Jama'at's open letter, 22 September 1993.
[61] *Herald* (Karachi), November-December 1993.

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The Impact of the Islamic Competition

An important argument in favor of using an open political process in contending with Islamic revivalism is that an open process results in competition among Islamic parties to the advantage of other political actors. In Pakistan, the Jama'at's political fortunes have suffered greatly as a result of its competition with other Islamic parties. The openness of the political process has meant that the party has been unable to create barriers to entry of other Islamic forces into the political arena, thereby monopolizing the Islamic vote bank. The Jama'at's activities and its ideological prowess have made Islam an important force in Pakistan's politics; but an inclusionary political process cannot guarantee the party political success. Over the years, the size of the religious vote has increased considerably in Pakistan, but the Jama'at's share of it has grown at a much more modest pace.

The Jama'at has been unable to monopolize the fruits of its toil and the enthusiasm which its politics has generated. This too is a facet of the party's participation in the political process, especially during democratic periods; it constitutes yet another danger of democracy to revivalism. Democracy encourages the flowering of the diversity of Muslim political expression and prevents the reduction of the national discourse to revivalism versus secularism. Democracy, moreover, encourages competition for votes and political spoils. The emergence of an Islamic vote bank in a democratic order translates into a proliferation of Islamic parties, which will divide the Islamic vote, form a variety of alliances, and thereby diffuse a revivalist challenge against the state.

The Jama'at fielded 151 candidates in the national elections of December 1970 to challenge the two secular and left-of-center parties – PPP in West Pakistan and the Awami League (People's League) in East Pakistan.[62] The Jama'at was taken aback when two other religious parties, primarily affiliated with the *ulama* (religious divines) – the Party of *Ulama* of Islam (Jami'at-i Ulama-i Islam, JUI) and the Party of *Ulama* of Pakistan (Jami'at-i Ulama-i Pakistan, JUP) – entered the political fray in competition with the Jama'at. The two *ulama* parties did not view the Jama'at's revivalist ideological position favorably. The Jama'at's increased political activism and the party's ambitious electoral agenda mobilized the two *ulama* parties to challenge the Jama'at's position as the premier Islamic party in the political arena.

The two *ulama* parties were also enticed into the political arena after they concluded that the Jama'at's prospects in the elections were good. In May 1971 the Jama'at held the nationwide Glory of Islam Day. The success of the campaign convinced the *ulama* parties of the potential of an Islamic platform in the elections. Unwilling to leave the spoils of political success to the Jama'at, the two *ulama* parties entered the political arena to claim their share of the electoral votes.[63] Similar conclusions led an array of smaller Islamic and right-of-center parties

[62] Sharif al Mujahid, "Pakistan's First General Elections," *Asian Survey* 11 (February 1971): 159-71.
[63] Nasr, *The Vanguard*, chaps. 4 and 10.

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to also appeal to the religiously-conscious electorate. In all, in the elections of 1970 the election manifestos of four parties demanded an Islamic constitution, and the manifestos of another four favored it.[64]

The result was that the Jama'at, the two *ulama* parties, along with the other contenders for the Islamic vote, divided the Islamic vote among themselves, often to the advantage of the secular parties. In eighty-two electoral constituencies of the Punjab where the PPP did best, 260 candidates from Islamic as well as right-of-center parties, and another 114 independent rightist candidates who appealed to Islam divided the vote.[65] The impact of this competition becomes more apparent when one looks to the student elections in that province during the same time period, when the Jama'at's student union, which alone represented the Islamic vote, defeated PPP's student union.

The competition between the three principal Islamic parties in the elections was most noted. The JUP, for instance, ran in forty-two contests across Pakistan where Jama'at candidates were challenging PPP candidates.[66] The competition between the Islamic parties reduced their total share of seats in the parliament; but more importantly, they reduced the share of the seats of the most revivalist contender, the Jama'at. The three principal Islamic parties won eighteen seats among them, with JUP and JUI winning seven each and the Jama'at only four. In provincial elections, JUP won eleven seats, JUI ten, and the Jama'at four.[67] Without the competition, the share of Islamic parties in the parliament would have been more than eighteen (and more than twenty-five in provincial assemblies), and the number of seats won by the Jama'at in national as well as provincial assemblies would have been more than four in each. The results also show that the Islamic vote bank is not necessarily revivalist in orientation. If given an option, it is likely to opt for the nonrevivalist Islamic candidates. JUI and JUP entered the political arena long after the Jama'at, had less articulate political strategies, and did not espouse an ideological vision; yet they did better than the Jama'at in the elections.

The elections of 1993 confirm these findings. In these elections the *ulama*-led parties once again refused to join in an alliance with the Jama'at, and instead formed two separate electoral alliances of their own. In several constituencies, these alliances competed with Jama'at candidates, once again dividing the Islamic vote to the advantage of secular parties. The *ulama*-led parties together won five seats to the National Assembly and eight seats in the provincial assemblies—two seats more than the Jama'at in each case. In fact, the competition among parties that appealed to the Islamic vote is responsible for Benazir Bhutto's return to the office of prime minister. In twelve constituencies, the Jama'at, religious parties,

[64] See Mujahid, "Pakistan's First General Elections," 170.

[65] Ibid.

[66] *Report on the General Elections Pakistan 1970-1971* (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, nd), vol. 2.

[67] Ibid.

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and the right-of-center Muslim League together tallied more votes than the PPP, but shared that vote to PPP's advantage. The twelve seats would have given the Muslim League the elections and denied Benazir Bhutto the premiership.[68]

A similar trend emerged in student politics in Pakistan in the 1980s.[69] Throughout the 1970s, the Jama'at's student wing dominated campus politics across Pakistan. The Jama'at students were able to dominate the student scene by monopolizing the religiously-conscious vote bank. The status of the Jama'at on campuses throughout this period translated into tangible political dividends. As a result, by the early 1980s, most Islamic as well as right-of-center parties, who also appealed to the Islamic vote bank, had launched student organizations of their own with the aim of accruing the same political benefits as the Jama'at had enjoyed during the preceding decade. The competition between the various Islamic and right-of-center student organizations precipitated a crisis in the country's higher education; but it also diminished the Jama'at's control of student politics significantly. The Jama'at's revivalist student organization lost most of the campuses it had controlled to nonrevivalist Islamic and right-of-center student organizations, thus confirming the conclusion made earlier.

The Relevance of Ideology and Organizational Model

The political effectiveness of an Islamic revivalist party is no doubt dependent on its ideological position and organizational model. It is commonly believed that the more revolutionary the ideological outlook and organizational model of an Islamic revivalist party, the more pronounced its danger to the state will be. The case of the Jama'at suggests a caveat. In an open political process, revolutionary ideologies and organizational models are less effective and tend to constrict revivalism politically. In a word, the very rhetoric and posturing that make revivalism a threat to authoritarian regimes, in an open political process can be the undoing of revivalism.

The Jama'at was initially conceived of as a holy community with limited membership. The party's founders emphasized quality and caliber of the members over their numbers.[70] The party adopted a rigid hierarchical organization and based its power on its cadre of workers.[71] In political terms the Jama'at became what Philip Selznick referred to as an "organizational weapon" in describing the Leninist party model.[72] Despite its political enfranchisement in the early 1950s, the Jama'at has failed to reform its organizational model accordingly. It continues to view itself as a "holy community" and an "organizational weapon," although

[68] *Herald* (Karachi), February 1994, 67.

[69] Nasr, "Students," 74-75.

[70] Mawdudi, *Jama'at-i Islami Ki Untis Sal*, 38-41.

[71] Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," 490-96.

[72] Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1952).

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its aims are those of a mass party. Even when the Jama'at addresses the concerns of the masses, its approach is elitist rather than populist.

A disciplined and exclusive membership can project significant power in single battles with other political forces or the government and conceivably in election campaigns. The Jama'at has indeed been the most noted political machine in Pakistan, capable of nationwide action in agitations and elections. The example of its role in this regard is the anti-PPP agitations which followed the elections of 1977.

Yet, as effective as an organizational weapon may be in waging protest campaigns and influencing elections, it is not an efficacious model for a political party in an inclusionary political process. The Jama'at's organizational model is predicated upon a prohibitive membership criteria. The restricted membership places limits before the party's ability to translate social demands into policy positions and also reduces its control over the Islamic vote bank. The Jama'at has been operating as a vanguard force in a political context that is favorable to mass parties.

Similarly, the Jama'at's ideology has not fitted its needs. The Jama'at continues to harp on the theme of Islamic revolution—which was first coined by Mawdudi—whereas the party has accepted the legitimacy of the state and joined the political process. The party's avowed aim, therefore, does not correctly define its actual agenda. Moreover, the Jama'at has defined revolution as a process initiated from above rather than from below, and through education rather than cataclysmic social change.[73] It is not populist in aim and does not address popular demands directly or immediately. Insofar as the rhetoric of revolutionary change could be efficacious in an inclusionary political setting, the Jama'at's interpretation of revolution does not appeal to the electorate, nor does it actually espouse revolution as the term is understood in the West. The party's rhetoric claims to be revolutionary, but it advocates incremental change from above. This brings to the fore an important dilemma in current approaches to Islamic revivalism: the revivalist rhetoric is accepted at face value without a proper examination of its content.

The problem of ideology is compounded by the fact that, while the Jama'at talks of revolution, in reality it has been a defender of the territorial and political integrity of Pakistan as the homeland for South Asian Muslims. This defense has been necessitated by the incessant challenges to the unity of the state by ethnic forces. Its commitment to revolution is checked by its commitment to upholding the Pakistan state. A revolutionary struggle would imply an antistate posture through and through, one that would push for change at all cost. The Jama'at has in practice proven unwilling to assume any and all cost in its revolutionary struggle. Notably, it is unwilling to push the demand for revolutionary change to the point of endangering the unity of the state. As a result, the party's ultimate commitments belie its rhetoric, and as such reduce the political efficacy

[73] Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1980).

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of its ideological position. This was most clearly evident in 1969-1971, when East Pakistanis decried socioeconomic injustices perpetrated against them by the Punjabi elite and demanded autonomy. The Jama'at turned a blind eye to their grievances and took the side of the Pakistan military in suppressing Bengali secessionists.[74] Consequently, the Jama'at's untenable position has closed it to the mass of Pakistan electorate, who identify closely with ethnic politics and the demand for socioeconomic justice. Despite its populist pretense, the Jama'at has avoided becoming embroiled in the demands of the country's various ethnic groups against the state, which have often stemmed from socioeconomic grievances. Symbolically, it has continued to operate in the Urdu language, which although the official language of Pakistan has little following among the masses in the country's provinces. Support for the state despite the party's revolutionary pretense has limited its downward mobility and geographical spread.

More to the point, the Jama'at has accepted and joined in the very process it allegedly seeks to overthrow. By joining the political process in the 1950s, the Jama'at accepted the legitimacy of the state. The party's continued adherence to the rhetoric of revolution, therefore, flies in the face of the party's enfranchisement. The party abandoned its antistate posture in the 1950s; it failed to revise its ideology accordingly. The apparent dissonance between the party's ideology and its political action have proven costly.

The incongruities in the Jama'at's organizational model and ideological position go a long way in explaining the paradox of its weakness. They also suggest that broad conclusions about the potential of revivalist ideology and organization are no longer very useful. Variations in revivalist ideology and plan of action, as well as the sociopolitical context in which revivalism operates in different countries are sufficiently pronounced to produce drastically different outcomes. More important, the Jama'at's case shows that the more open a political process, the more those incongruities come to light, forcing revivalism to change. This change is more often than not in the direction of pragmatic politics, reducing the ultimate impact of Islamic revivalism on the political process.

Whither Jama'at-i Islami?

The Jama'at's leadership has been acutely aware of the predicament before the party, particularly so after democracy returned to Pakistan in 1988. The opening of the political process has placed greater pressure on the Jama'at to streamline its ideology and organizational model in accordance with the political imperatives before the party. During the Zia years, the Jama'at remained content with token concessions from the ruling regime and took comfort in its popularity of the 1977-1979 period. The party's lackluster performance in the national elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993, winning seven, eight, and three seats to the National Assembly (and thirteen, twenty, and six to provincial assemblies respectively)

[74] Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," 475-76.

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has put an end to any illusions the party may have still had about its political prospects.

The party's leadership and rank-and-file members have become embroiled in intense debates over the fate of the party.[75] Many in the Jama'at favor opening the party's ranks to greater numbers of Pakistanis. While the party as a whole is in agreement over the need for some form of organizational reform, there is no agreement over the shape the changes must take. The absence of a consensus, in large measure, results from the fear many in the party have of dissipating the Jama'at's organizational prowess without making any tangible gains.

There has been more progress in revising the party's ideological position. The party has shown more willingness to engage in pragmatic decision making, serving the party's political interests even if that has meant compromising ideological fervor. In addition, the party's leadership in recent years has sought to adopt populist themes and appeal to greater numbers. It has addressed popular socioeconomic concerns to a greater extent and has sublimated its revivalist rhetoric and made concessions to popular religious practices that the Jama'at had heretofore frowned upon, such as visits to shrines, a practice which constitutes the crux of popular religious beliefs among South Asian Muslims.

As the 1993 elections results indicate, these changes have not as yet enhanced the Jama'at's political position in a significant fashion. In the first place, the Jama'at's politics remains anti-ethnic and pro-state. Populist politics and even the traditional forms of Islam, which the Jama'at hopes to incorporate into its platform, are closely tied to local vernaculars and ethnic sentiments. Populism and traditional Islam cannot be mobilized without some acknowledgment of their ethnic component. Those parties in Pakistan that have been able to create a mass following for themselves, such as the PPP or the Migrants' National Movement (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz, MQM) did so by combining populism with an appeal to ethnic sentiments. Given the rise in ethnic tensions in the country in recent years, the importance of appealing to ethnic sentiments has become all the more evident. As a result, in the absence of a conciliatory posture towards ethnic forces, the Jama'at has failed to cultivate a following. Second, the Jama'at's turn to populism came at a time when the party joined the right-of-center anti-PPP coalition, Islamic Democratic Alliance. At the core of IDA is the Muslim League, a party dominated by the landed gentry. Participation in the coalition, therefore, has undermined the Jama'at's populist posturing. The party was unable to reverse that effect before the 1993 elections.

Finally, the Jama'at has not as yet changed its ideology or organizational model swiftly and drastically enough to make an impact on its political standing. Given the weariness of the electorate with the Zia regime's manipulation of Islamic themes, the imperative of new thinking in the Jama'at is more evident than ever.

Although the ultimate direction the party may take is not as yet clear, there is little doubt that it has set upon a course of change. What is important to note

[75] Nasr, "Islamic Opposition," 261-83.

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is that the direction of change that the realities of the political process have necessitated is away from doctrinaire revivalism. The more open the political process in Pakistan has become, the more clear this imperative has become. In the final analysis, participation in the political process can do more to tame Islamic revivalism than repression by the state. Excluding revivalism from the political process is likely to radicalize it, reproducing the experience of the Iranian revolution. Rather than radicalizing revivalism, participation in the political process will push it in directions that will constrict its political growth. Those concerned with the possible threat of Islamic revivalism should take the implications of its greater participation in that process seriously, and they should continue to push for greater democratization of Muslim societies, despite the possibility of the participation of revivalists in them.*

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Contra Aid Fundamentals: Exploring the Intricacies and the Issues

RICHARD SOBEL

As a foundation for understanding and evaluating the policies of the Reagan administration on funding the contra opposition to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, this examination clarifies the basic factual background surrounding the provision of aid to the contras during the 1980s. In particular, the article identifies from public information how much aid the U.S. government, third countries, private donors, and arms sales provided to the contras. In addition, it indicates the periods during which outside funds sustained the contras when U.S. funding was unavailable. It also explains at what points during those periods funds to the contras may have conflicted with the legislative restrictions known as the Boland amendments.[1]

Because the public record is often incomplete and the events are complex and open to differing interpretations, these answers are provisional. Since much of the information on nongovernmental aid is imprecise or contradictory, the article cannot fully clarify questions such as the exact amount of funds that reached the contras from arms sales to Iran or how much aid came from additional miscellaneous sources. Because the contras received less money than nongovernmental sources contributed as aid, each answer must distinguish between how much a particular source provided and how much the contras apparently obtained.

[1] While clarifying the basic issues about funding the contras, this article also identifies when shipments of arms to Iran occurred, the amounts of money they generated, and the diversion of profits to the contras. But it does not discuss the details of the contacts between the U.S. and Iran or the 1986–1987 Iran–contra scandal. For more details, see Daniel K. Inouye and Lee K. Hamilton, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran–contra Affairs (With Minority Views)*, abridged version (New York: Times Books, 1988).

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A clear understanding of the factual background provides the basis for evaluating policies during the 1980s. The contra rebels were created in the early 1980s from the old Nicaraguan national guard and other opposition groups with U.S. financial and technical support. They sought to dislodge the Sandinista government that came to power in the 1979 revolution overthrowing the Somoza regime. Compared to other defense-related expenditures, U.S. government funding for the contras was modest in size. Although both private contributions from Americans and profits from arms sales to Iran received major publicity, only contributions from third countries were significant in helping to sustain the contras financially when U.S. government funding was unavailable. Though the second Boland amendment (Boland II), one of a series of legislative restrictions on U.S. aid to the contras, was in effect during periods when the contras were receiving non–U.S. government military aid, the applicability of the restrictions to some nongovernment funding depends on interpretations of the circumstances. While relatively modest, U.S. government funding of the contras contributed to the demise of the Sandinistas. In terms of policy goals and legitimacy, the controversy and scandal over extra-governmental contra aid made such funding a poor investment and a dubious means of attaining U.S. government aims.[2]

Questions on Sources, Amounts, and Timing of Funding

The most straightforward question involves the amounts and sources of funding to the contras. How much aid did the United States government and other parties provide for the contras, and how much of that aid did the contras actually receive? The answer distinguishes between aid from the U.S. government, third countries, private donors, and arms sales to Iran.

More complex questions involve the timing of the funding and possible conflicts with the fundamental restrictions in the Boland amendments. When did the contras have funds and when did they lack financial support? For what periods did the U.S. government authorize aid? During what periods did the government provide the authorized funds? When during the authorization periods did funds run out? Were nongovernmental funds provided during periods when the Boland amendments were in effect, and did those funds conflict with the Boland restrictions?

U.S. Government Funding

How much aid did the U.S. government provide for the contras? Between 1981 and 1990 (fiscal years 1982–90), the U.S. government appropriated a total of

[2] For an overview of the issues and politics surrounding U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras, esp. see Cynthia Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America*, 2nd ed. (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1993); and Richard Sobel, ed., *Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy Over Contra Aid* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), esp. William LeoGrande, "The Controversy Over Contra Aid, 1981–90: An Overview," chap. 2 and Robert Pastor, "The War Between the Branches: Explaining U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, 1979–89," chap. 11.

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TABLE 1

U.S. Assistance to the Anti-Sandinista Guerrillas Approved by Congress Fiscal Years 1982–1989 (in millions of US$)

Fiscal Year	*Total*	*Nonlethal*	*Military*
1982	19.0	—	19.0
1983	29.0	—	29.0
1984	24.0	—	24.0
1985–86	27.0	27.0	—
1986	13.0	13.0	—
1987	100.0	30.0	70.0
1988			
Oct. 1–Dec. 21	7.1	7.1	—
Dec. 22–Feb. 29	8.1	8.1	—
Apr. 1–Sept. 30	17.7	17.7	—
1989			
Oct. 1–Mar. 30	27.0	27.0	—
1989–1990			
Apr. 18–Feb. 28	49.75	49.75	—
	321.65	179.65	142.0

Source: Nina Serafino, "Contra Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congressional Actions" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 1989), 17.

$322 million for contra aid. About $142 million was for military purposes and $179 million for nonmilitary purposes.[3] As Table 1 shows, for fiscal years 1982 through 1990, respectively, the U.S. government provided for the contras (FY82) $19 million (military), (FY83) $29 million (military), (FY84) $24 million (military), (FY85–86) $27 million (nonmilitary), (FY86) $13 million (nonmilitary), (FY87) $100 million ($70 military, $30 nonmilitary), (FY88) $32.9 million[4] (nonmilitary), (FY89) $27 million (nonmilitary), and (FY90) $49.8 million (nonmilitary). The (FY85–86) $27 million and (FY87) $100 million were the most prominently debated contra aid measures.[5] The contras apparently received all

[3] Nina Serafino, "Contra Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congressional Actions, 1981–89" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 1989), table 1.

[4] The FY 1988 funds involved three different appropriations of $7.1 million, $8.1 million, and $17.1 million. See Serafino, "Contra Aid," table 1.

[5] The first two allocations (FY82, $19 million and FY83, $29 million) were classified expenditures reprogrammed from CIA or DOD funds and not directly voted on by the Congress for these purposes (Serafino, "Contra Aid," table 1). All the other allocations were voted by the Congress, though not all were recorded votes. Prior to FY85, the contras received mainly military funds from the U.S. government. After FY85, the U.S. funds were all nonmilitary ("humanitarian") except for $70 million of the $100 million in FY85–86. The contras may have gotten more than the $24 million limit in CIA funds in 1984 authorized in the 1983 legislation; see Joy Hackel and Daniel Seigel, *In Contempt of Congress* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), 80–81. The $27 million humanitarian aid for 1985 could not be fully accounted for (Hackel and Seigel, *In Contempt of Congress*, 30–34), and part of it may have been spent for military purposes. The $13 million in FY86 was a classified expenditure for intelligence and communications which might have had military applications (Serafino, "Contra Aid," table 1. See Serafino, "Contra Aid" and 10–14 here for authorization periods.)

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the $322 million U.S. appropriated aid.[6]

Third Country Aid

How much assistance did third parties (third countries and private donors) provide for the contras, and how much of that aid did the contras receive? In total, third parties gave the contras about $54 million: third countries provided $44 million and private donors about $10 million. Among third countries, Saudi Arabia ("Country 2") was by far the largest donor. From June/July 1984 through about March 1986, Saudi Arabia provided $32 million in a series of donations.[7] In late 1985 and early 1986, Taiwan ("Country 3") donated $2 million in "humanitarian" aid.[8] In August 1986, the sultan of Brunei gave $10 million for "humanitarian" aid, but that money did not reach the contras, because the funds were deposited in the wrong Swiss bank account.[9] Thus, during the 1984–1986 period, third countries[10] gave $44 ($32, $2, $10) million for the contras, but the contras received at most $34 ($32, $2, $0) million.[11]

[6] For details, see Kathryn Roth and Richard Sobel, "Chronology of Events and Public Opinion," chap. 1; and William LeoGrande, "The Controversy over Contra Aid, 1981–90: A Historical Narrative," chap. 2 in Sobel, *Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy*.

[7] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 55, 114–115.

[8] Ibid., 54, 67.

[9] Ibid., 316. Before assisting in the 1985 arms transactions, Israel may have provided $4–5 million in 1984. See Alfonso Chardy, "Israel, Honduras, Argentina Help Replace Aid from U.S.," *Miami Herald*, 9 September 1984, after the FY83 $24 million allocation ran out in May 1984. Israel may also have provided several million dollars in equipment in 1984 (Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 54). Former Panamanian President Manuel Noriega may have provided $100,000 for the contras and permitted contra training in Panama. Walter S. Mossberg, "While Noriega May Have Some Secrets to Disclose, His Testimony Isn't Likely to Cause Bush Trouble," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 January 1990; "House Panel Reports Finding No CIA Link with Thrift Failures," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 December 1990; Peter Truell, "CIA Gave 'Several Hundred Reports' about BCCI to Other Federal Agencies," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 October 1991.

[10] Former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane solicited the first Saudi Arabian contribution of $8 million in May 1984 and the second contribution of $24 million in February 1985 (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 48, 52, 54–55). Former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams requested but lost the Brunei contribution of $10 million in August 1986 in a belatedly acknowledged solicitation (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 76, 316). But the money was sent to the wrong Swiss bank account and never reached the contras; see Elliott Abrams, *Undue Process* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 89–90.

[11] Third countries also contributed in kind, particularly by providing arms for the contras. Argentina originally helped develop the contras in 1980–1982 (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 38), but U.S. support of Britain in the spring 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war led to Argentina's stopping their help for the contras. Honduras may have supplied the contras from their own U.S.-provided arms. Israel provided the first two shipments of TOW missiles to Iran in August–September 1985 and the first shipment of HAWK missiles in November 1985. In effect, these were Israeli advances, since the TOW shipments were replenished by the United States in May 1986. See, for example, John Tower, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Times Books, 1987), 438–441. All but one of the HAWKS were returned.

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Private Donors

From June 1985 through March 1986, private donors provided another $10 million.[12] Only $4.5 million was spent on the contras, however. And only about $2.7 million of that actually reached the contras, since the remaining $1.8 million was paid for political advertising, lobbying, and other activities on the contras' behalf in the United States.[13] In sum, third countries and private parties provided about $54 ($32, $2, $10, $10) million, of which the contras received about $36.5 ($32, $4.5) million.

Arms Sales Diversions

How much money did the diversion of profits (residuals) from U.S. arms sales to Iran during late 1985 to late 1986 produce for the contras, and how much of that did the contras receive? In the 25 November 1986 announcement of the diversions, former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese estimated that the residuals may have produced $10 to $30 million for the contras, but subsequent estimates were lower.[14] In early 1987, the report of the Tower Commission, a group set up by President Ronald Reagan to investigate the National Security Council process and the Iran-contra scandal, suggested that the arms sales produced about $19.8 million for potential diversion.[15] In late 1987, the joint congressional Iran-contra committee estimated that the last four of six arms sales produced $16.1 in profits.[16] Of the $16.1 million from the arms sales, the contras only received about $3.8 million from November 1985 to November 1986.[17]

[12] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 93–99. The private donors were solicited by National Security Council aide Oliver North and other fundraisers from the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), (ibid., 93ff). The $10 million included $5.37 million donated by two elderly widows from 1985 to 1987 (ibid., 97–99, 103).

[13] Ibid., 99–100.

[14] Richard J. Meislin, "46% Approve Reagan's Work, Down 21 Points," *New York Times*, 2 December 1986.

[15] Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 180–185. See also Scott Armstrong et al., *The Chronology: The Documented Day-By-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras* (New York: Warner Books, 1987), 161–162.

[16] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 297, 302. The arms sales to Iran produced $31.3 million in revenues to pay for $15.2 million worth of arms and related costs (ibid., 300), producing the $16.1 million surplus (ibid., 307). Adding congressional Iran–contra committee figures for profits ($4 million) from the first two arms sales to the Tower Commission figures produces an estimate of profits of $20 million. The "Enterprise" set up to supply arms to the contras received $48 million (ibid., 297), including the $31.3 million from Iran-arm sales, and spent $35.8 million, including $15.2 million for contra arms (ibid., 300). This left a surplus of $12.2 million (ibid., 307). (See note 40 for the distribution of the $12.2 million.) Of the $15.2 million spent on contra arms, $7.2 million was spent during the period of arms sales profits diversions (November 1985–November 1986). About $3.4 million of that $7.2 million came from donations for the contras, so an estimated $3.8 million came from arms sales profit (ibid., 307, 438).

[17] Ibid., 307, 438.

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Because of the complexity of the process, a chronological review of the arms shipments and payments helps to clarify the timing and the sums involved. There were six different shipments to Iran (seven counting separately two spring/summer 1986 shipments of parts). First, on 20 August 1985, Israel delivered ninety-six of its TOWs antitank missiles to Iran.[18] Second, on 14 September 1985, Israel delivered another 408 of its TOWs to Iran.[19] Third, on 25 November 1985, a CIA proprietary company delivered to Iran 18 (of a planned 120) Israeli HAWK antiaircraft missiles.[20] Fourth, on 17 February 1986, and on 27 February 1986, respectively, the CIA proprietary company delivered 1000 (500 + 500) more TOWs (and picked up seventeen of eighteen HAWKS rejected by Iran as obsolete).[21] Fifth, on 25 May 1986, and on 4 August 1986, the CIA delivered 240 HAWK spare parts.[22] Finally, on 30/31 October 1986, the CIA proprietary delivered 500 more TOWs.[23] In total, the six shipments provided 2004 TOWs, 18 HAWKs, and 240 HAWK parts.

How much profit did the arms sales produce, and how much did the contras receive? Relying mainly on congressional Iran-contra committee figures, but drawing on Tower Commission figures as needed,[24] the profits can be estimated by comparing what Iran paid for the missiles with their U.S. dollar value. Since the policy of diverting residuals was not developed until early 1986, any profits from the first three shipments were not planned to be sent to the contras, while those from the last three were part of the program to aid the contras.

For the first two TOW shipments, the Tower Report estimated that Iran paid $1.2 million for the initial (S1) 100 (actually 96) TOWs, and $5 million for the next (S2) 408 TOWs, for a total cost of about $6.2 million.[25] The 508 (504) (S1 + S2) TOWs had a U.S. value of about $2 million, so the profit was $4.2 ($6.2 − $2) million.[26] (But that profit was not diverted to the contras and went instead to arms merchants.)[27] Although Iran originally paid $5 million in No-

[18] Ibid., 151.

[19] Ibid., 151. On 4 May 1986, the U.S. replenished the 504 TOWs provided by Israel in August and September 1985. The 25 May 1986 delivery, accompanied by Robert McFarlane and Oliver North, supposedly included a cake and a Bible signed by Ronald Reagan; see Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 380.

[20] Ibid., 164–65.

[21] Ibid., 190, 192.

[22] Ibid., 209, 216.

[23] Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 408.

[24] The Tower Committee provided figures for the first two sales, whose costs were not estimated by the congressional Iran–contra report. (The profits apparently went to the arms dealers.) Because the congressional report came out in 1988 after the Tower Report in 1987 and was based on extensive public and private hearings, its figures are considered more reliable.

[25] Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 174–77.

[26] Ibid., 52, 161–62.

[27] These figures suggest sales prices of about $10–$12,000 per TOW. TOWs normally cost about $6000 each, which appears (ibid., 186) to be what their U.S. dollar value was. Apparently, North would have accepted older ones costing $3400 for delivery to the Iranians (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 187–88).

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vember 1985 for the eighteen HAWKs (S3),[28] there was no completed sale to produce any profit, because the Iranians returned seventeen of the missiles as unsatisfactory after test-firing one. However, because Israel advanced $1 million, of which only about $150,000 was spent on the abortive sale, and the rest was not returned, the third transaction produced $850,000, some of which was used for the contras.[29]

The last three shipments (S4–S6), all in 1986, involved planned diversions. For the 1000 TOWs (S4) in February 1986, Iran paid about $10 million for missiles worth $4.5 million, producing at least a $5.5 million profit.[30] (Tower figures: $10 million − $3.7 million = $6.3 million; 444–445). For the 240 HAWK parts (S5) in May and August 1986, Iran paid $15 million for $6.7 million worth of weapons, producing a $8.3 million profit.[31] (Tower: $15 million − $6.5 million = $8.5 million; 446). For the last 500 TOWs (S6) in October 1986, Iran paid $3.6 million for $2.2 million worth of arms, producing a $1.4 million profit.[32] (Tower: $7 million − $2 million = $5 million, 448). The total payments for the last three shipments (S4–S6) were $28.6 million ($10 million + $15 million + $3.6 million) [Tower: $32 million] for $13.4 million ($4.5 million + 6.7 million + $2.2 million) [Tower: $12.2] million worth of equipment.

These last three sales produced a profit of $15.2 million ($5.5 million + $8.3 million + $1.4 million).[33] (Tower total: $19.8 million, 448). Combining the $850,000 residual from the (S3) HAWK transactions with the $15.2 million ($19.8 million) produces a total profit of about $16.1 million ($20.6 million). Adding the $4.2 million profit from the first two sales (S1 + S2) of 504 missiles produces a total profit of about $20.3 million (Tower: $24.8 million).[34] Table 2 provides a summary of the sales and funds involved.

In short, the six shipments of arms to Iran produced as much as $25 million, at least $16.1 million of which could potentially be diverted for the contras. When the Iran arms sales operation was exposed and stopped in late 1986, however, less than a quarter of the $16.1 million in residuals had been spent on the contras:[35] according to the congressional report, the contras only received about

[28] Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 442–443.

[29] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 159, 234, 302.

[30] Ibid., 302.

[31] Ibid., 302–304.

[32] Ibid., 304.

[33] Ibid., 302–304.

[34] The congressional report estimates a total profit of $16.1 million (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 238, 304), based on $15.2 million for the last three arms sales plus $850,000 for the third. The Tower Reports estimates $19.8 million profit from the last three arms sales, but it does not add in the profit from the first two ($4 million), or mention the $850,000 from the aborted third sale.

[35] What the contras actually spent in any year on fighting the Sandinistas is also difficult to say. A 1 April 1985 memo from Oliver North to Robert McFarlane estimated that during the ten months between July 1984 and April 1985, a period when there was no U.S. funding, $17.1 million had been expended for military supplies and operations (Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 458). At that rate, the contras would have spent about $20 million for that year (see note 38).

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TABLE 2

Residuals Generated from Arm Sales to Iran, 1985–1986

Shipment/Date	*Quantity and Type*	*Cost to Iran*	*Cost to U.S.*	*Residual (Iran–U.S.)*
S1 8/20/85	96 TOWs	$1.2 m	$2 m	$4.2 m
S2 9/14/85	408 TOWs	$5 m		
S3 11/25/85	18 HAWKs	$5 m	—	—
		($1 m)	$0.15 m	$0.85 m
S4 2/17 & 2/27/86	1000 TOWs	$10 m	$4.5 m	$5.5 m
S5 5/25 & 8/4/86	240 HAWK parts	$15 m	$6.7 m	$8.3 m
S6 10/30–3/1/86	500 TOWs	$3.6 m	$2.2 m	$1.4 m
Total S4–S6		$28.6 m	$13.4 m	$15.2 m
Total S3–S6		$29.6 m	$13.5 m	$16.1 m
Total S1–S6		$35.8 m	$15.5 m	$20.3 m

m = millions of U.S. dollars.

Source: John Tower, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Times Books, 1987); Daniel K. Inouye and Lee K. Hamilton, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affairs (with minority views)*, abridged version (New York: Times Books, 1988).

$3.8 million of the $16.1 million in residuals.[36] That figure is based on congressional Iran-contra Committee budget analysis that the so-called Enterprise, a funding mechanism set up to supply arms to the contras,[37] spent $7.2 million on contra arms[38] during the diversion period of November 1985 to November 1986. Private and third country donations produced $3.4 million of the $7.2 million for the contras.[39] The committee concluded that the other $3.8 million ($7.2 − $3.4 million) came from the $16.1 million of diverted Iranian arms sales profits.[40]

[36] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 307, 438. In a 4 April 1986 memo, North estimated that "residual funds" from Iran arms sales total about $12 million (ibid., xxi; Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 327). Adolfo Calero originally claimed the contras only received $300,000–500,000 in 1986 (ibid., 595), but later mentioned $18 million in arms (ibid., 652); Alfonso Robelo claimed the contras got $7.5 million from the arms sale during the congressional ban period (ibid., 625).

[37] Ibid., chap. 21. The Enterprise, or Project Democracy, was a nominally private organization, but in reality an arm of the National Security Council staff for financing and conducting covert operations in Nicaragua (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 63).

[38] It is not clear how much money the contras needed to operate. The total for 1984 through 1986 alone ($83–97 million, or roughly $28–33 million per year) received was "nearly twice what they needed for the war effort" (Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 657). In April 1985, the 10,000 plus (ibid., 42) contras needed about half a million dollars a month to operate (Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 96) at their current levels, or roughly $6 million a year. Even at twice that rate ($12 million), the troops seemed amply funded, though equipment costs could easily have made up the difference. On the other hand, the complete exhaustion of the $24 million appropriated in FY83 in the six months between November 1983 and May 1984 suggested a rate of about $48 million per year.

[39] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 297.

[40] Ibid., 293, 307, 436. Of the $12.3 million difference between the $16.1 million in residuals the arms sales produced and the $3.8 million received by the contras, $4.4 million was paid as commissions, $2.2 million for personal use, and $5.6 million remained in their bank account (and might have been spent on the contras if the diversion had not become public).

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TABLE 3

Amounts and Periods of U.S. and Private Aid to the Contras, 1983–88



Jfma . . . = January, February, etc.
( ) = Period of authorization.
--- = Period of expenditure.
$ = Aid in millions of U.S. dollars.
? = Unclear or unknown.
0 = No allocations for the year.

In full, third countries ($44 million), private donors ($10 million), and arm sales profits ($16–$25 million) produced about $70–80 million for the contras. But the contras only received net about $40 ($32, $4.5, $3.8) million. That $40 million, which the contras received from non–U.S. governmental sources during 1984 to 1986, was roughly equivalent to what Congress appropriated for FY85–86 in nonlethal funding ($27 million + $13 million).

Timing and the Boland Amendments

Regarding issues of timing and legal restrictions, when did the contras receive non–U.S. government aid, when did they lack it, and when did any of the aid occur during the periods of Boland amendment restrictions? Specifically, did the contras receive non–U.S. government aid in late-1984 to late-1985 to bridge the gap during the first period[41] after U.S. government funds were exhausted (May 1984) and Boland II prohibited additional U.S. funding (14 October 1984–30

[41] Ibid., 52.

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September 1985)? Did they get any covert or lethal aid during the late 1985 to 1986 period (19 November 1985–30 September 1986) when an extension of the central Boland amendment (Boland II) banned all but nonmilitary aid?[42] Table 3 indicates the period of authorization for U.S. funds, the periods of the Boland bans, and the periods without funding.

In addition, did the contras receive any military funds to bridge a second gap period in mid-1986[43] between the end of the authorizations of the FY85–86 $27 million nonmilitary appropriation on 31 March 1986 (the classified $13 million began in December 1985) and the beginning of the FY87 $100 million on 18 October 1986?

The first bridge period without U.S. funds lasted about eighteen months between spring 1984 and fall 1985 (May 1984–December 1985). The FY84 authorization allocated in December 1983 was limited to $24 million, and though scheduled to expire on 30 September 1984, actually ran out by May or June of 1984;[44] this was after an expedited attempt for a supplemental $21 million for the rest of FY84 failed in February 1984. Thus, the $24 million FY84 U.S. allocation to the contras ran out five months before the beginning of the FY 1985 Boland II ban of military funds for the contras began on 12 October 1984 (ending on 30 September 1985).[45] No U.S. funds were authorized or available during the rest of 1984 after May and most of 1985 until the FY85–86 allocation of $27 million (authorized for 15 August 1985 through 31 March 1986 but delayed to the end of 1985 by a series of continuing resolutions) became available on 19 December 1985.[46] At the same point, the additional classified $13 million (PL 99-169) was allocated for communications and training for FY86 (ending

[42] There were actually several Boland amendments and other passed (or proposed) Boland-like restriction on aid from 1982 to 1986 (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 343–44). The first Boland amendment (passed on 12 December 1982) prohibited use of funds from December 1982–October 1983 for overthrowing the Sandinista government. In 1983 those restrictions continued and the law limited FY84 aid to $24 million to prevent CIA supplements (Serafino, "Contra Aid," 1). In October 1984, the second Boland amendment (Boland II) cut off all aid by restricting DOD and CIA "or any other . . . entity" of the U.S. Government from "supporting . . . military operations in Nicaragua" (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 414) or from providing lethal aid (14 October 1984–30 September 1985, extended to 19 November 1985). But the law allowed the administration to seek release of $14 million in funding in February 1985. The $27 million in nonlethal aid authorized in 15 August 1985 modified the ban from all funding to only military. The renewal of Boland II on 19 November 1985 extended the ban on military aid until late 1986 (19 November 1985–30 September 1986). However, it allowed State Department solicitation of third country "humanitarian" aid. In short, military aid was restricted from December 1982 to September 1984, and banned from October 1984 to November 1986 under various Boland-like restrictions. Nonmilitary aid was banned only from October 1984 to August 1985.

[43] Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 52–53.

[44] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 48; Armstrong et al., *The Chronology*, 56.

[45] Before the June 1985 authorization of $27 million, there was no "humanitarian only" (that is, solely nonmilitary or "nonlethal") aid, since all the previous aid was available for military purposes. Moreover, the use of the word "humanitarian" in this context is questionable since humanitarian aid typically means aid to noncombatants.

[46] Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 66.

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30 September 1986, though perhaps extending beyond). Thus, for the eighteen months from June 1984 to December 1985, the contras had no U.S. funding, military or nonmilitary. From December 1985 to June 1986 they received only nonmilitary ($27 million + $13 million in U.S. aid).

In addition, for the six months during the second bridge period from June 1986, when that $27 million ran out, until November 1986,[47] when the $100 million began to flow, the contras again had no U.S. funds, military or nonmilitary.[48] In summary, before (June 1984–September 1984), during (October 1984–September 1985), and after (October 1985–November 1986) the period of the initial Boland ban (October 1984 to September 1985), the contras were without U.S. allocated military funds for a total of over a year and a half during the two bridge periods (June 1984–December 1985; June 1986–November 1986).

The contras, however, were not without military funds during the two and a half years from May 1984 to November 1986, when U.S. funds ran out or were restricted by the Boland II ban to nonmilitary aid. The contras received military funds from third countries and third parties during most of that first bridge period (June 1984–November 1985). Third country support began in mid-1984, half a year before the FY 1985 Boland ban started in October 1984. From July 1984 to March 1986, during most of the first unfunded bridge period, Saudi Arabia contributed $32 million—$8 million at $1 million a month from July 1984 to February 1985 and $24 million at $2 million per month from March 1985 to about March 1986.[49] This helped to sustain the contras militarily through most of the two and a half year period (June 1984–November 1986) without U.S. military funding.[50]

Beginning in early 1985 and continuing into 1986, the private contributors network organized in mid-1984 and connected to the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and the Enterprise also raised about $10 million for the contras.[51] Of that $10 million, about $4.5 million was spent for contra-related activities. But only about $2.7 million went for military aid, since about $1.8 million was spent in the United States on lobbying and publicity for the contras. The solicitation of private funds continued into 1986.

[47] The first $60 million of the $100 million was appropriated on 18 October 1986, and the last $40 million was appropriated in March 1987. Part of the $27 million, whose authorization ended 31 March 1986, continued to be spent after March since it was already in the pipeline. It was supplemented by the $13 million authorized in December 1985 until 30 September 1986, which ran out by summer 1986.

[48] In July 1986, following the exhaustion of the $27 million for FY85 spring, the contras supposedly went $2.5 million in debt (Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 341). During that period from July until October 1986, when $60 million of the $100 million was disbursed, the contras received only part of $2.7 million in private donations and $3.8 million in arms sales diversions, and no third country donations.

[49] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 52, 55.

[50] Ibid., 55.

[51] Ibid., 88, 91, 97.

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Arms Sales Profits and Third-Party Donations during Periods of No U.S. Funds

The Iranian arms sales profits also provided some funds for the contras when U.S. aid was stopped. However, none of the $4 million in profit produced by the first two sales (S1 and S2) of August and September 1985, which fell toward the end of the June 1984 to December 1985 period when there were no U.S. funds, went to the contras. The $850,000 produced by the third transaction (S3) in November 1985 did go to the contras slightly before the $27 million and $13 million in nonmilitary aid began to flow in December 1985.[52]

Thus, from December 1985 to June 1986, U.S. aid for the contras consisted of only those combined $40 million nonmilitary funds; and between July and November 1986, again no U.S. funds were available for contra aid. The first planned diversion of arms profits—as opposed to the unplanned $850,000 residual (S3)—took place with the fourth arms sale (S4) in February 1986,[53] which produced $5.5 million in profits. The fifth arms sales (S5) in middle to late summer 1986 produced $8.3 million[54] in profit (after the $27 million and $13 million ran out in summer 1986). Thus at least $13.8 ($5.5 + $8.3) million of the residuals from the mid-1986 arms sales (S4 and S5) was available for contra military supplies during the June through October 1986 bridge period, when no U.S. aid was available. On 30 October 1986, the first $60 million of the FY87 $100 million in ($70 million) military and ($30 million) nonmilitary aid voted in summer 1986 was allocated (and supplemented by $40 million in March 1987). A month later on 25 November 1986, the last shipment (S6) of 500 TOWs produced $1.4 million in profit, some of which probably went for the contras.[55]

In short, the third country funds, private donations, and arms sales profits were needed to sustain the contras during the periods after U.S. government funds ran out in May–June 1984. In particular, the contras needed outside money, especially for military supplies, during the periods of the Boland bans (October 1984–October 1986). When the contras lacked U.S. funds, third countries, private donors, and arms sales provided them.

In sum, during June 1984 to December 1985, when there were no U.S. provided funds, there was $24 million of the $32 million Saudi donation that produced a significant amount for contra arms. During the December 1985 to October 1986 period, when the contras had only nonmilitary U.S. funds, the last $6 million in Saudi donations, the $2.7 million in private funding, and $3.8

[52] Ibid., 159, 234, 302.

[53] Though the $850,000 in November 1985 was apparently spent on the contras, the idea of purposely diverting arms sales profits for the contras was evidentally not suggested until late 1985 or early 1986 (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 117–19, 124, 178, 234–35).

[54] Ibid., 302–304.

[55] Out of the total $16–20 million profits from S3–S6, the $3.8 million that went to the contras constitutes less than a quarter of the potential funds.

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million in arm sales residuals provided additional funds for military purposes ($12.5 million).

Moreover, some humanitarian U.S. funds may have served military purposes. From December 1985 through June 1986, within the October 1984 through October 1986 period of the Boland II bans, part of $27 million in nonmilitary U.S. funds was unaccounted for and may have been spent for military supplies;[56] the $13 million was also spent for quasi-military, intelligence, and communication purposes.[57] By July 1986, after the Saudi contributions had ended, however, only part of the $2.7 million in private donations and $3.8 million from arms profits were still available, and the contras supposedly went $2.5 million in debt.[58] In short, until late 1986, the third-country aid, arms sales profits, third-party donations, and possibly inappropriately spent U.S.funds provided some military funds after the U.S. government allocations ran out in spring 1984.

In total, from 1981 to 1990, about $400 million in military and nonmilitary funds was allocated ($322 million) or raised ($70–80 million) for the contras, of which about $360 million reached them. While a considerable sum, it is relatively small compared to the roughly $1 billion in U.S. military aid and $2 billion in United States economic aid during the same period to the nearby government of El Salvador.[59] By comparison, during 1986 alone, Soviet bloc aid to Nicaragua was roughly $580 million.[60] The $400 million in aid to the contras was only about five times the $75 million in aid the Carter administration approved for the Sandinistas in 1980 ($60 million was provided before the Reagan administration cut it off).[61] Less than half a billion dollars is not much for the United States; but it is a significant amount when directed against Nicaragua with a gross domestic product of about $2.6 billion.

Donations and Diversions during the Boland Ban

Did the third party (third country and private donor) funding that occurred during periods of Boland restrictions conflict with the Boland bans? The answer depends both on whether funding occurred within the ban periods and whether the restrictions were applicable to the specific types of funding. Boland II banned all U.S.-related aid from 12 October 1984 to 30 September 1985, and all military aid from 1 October 1985 to 18 October 1986. Some of the nongovernmental funding (for example, from Saudi Arabia in June 1984) occurred before Boland II started in October 1984, and thus could not have initially conflicted with Boland II. The

[56] Hackel and Seigel, *In Contempt of Congress*, 30–34.

[57] Serafino, "Contra Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congressional Actions," 18.

[58] Tower, *The Tower Commission Report*, 341.

[59] *National Journal*, 9 September 1987, 232–233. The Vietnam war cost about $29 billion ($29,000 million) in 1969 alone (*Congressional Quarterly*, 26 April 1975, 847). One Stealth bomber used in the Panama invasion in 1989 cost about $500 million (*Facts on File*, 1989, 534).

[60] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 411.

[61] Cynthia Arnson, *Crossroads* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 46–47.

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FY85–86 allocations of $27 million and $13 million in nonmilitary aid were approved (15 August 1985 and 18 December 1985, respectively) during the period of the Boland II ban (through 30 September 1986), but their authorization modified the ban to permit nonmilitary funding. Most of the nongovernmental funding, however, including third country (June 1984–March 1986), private donor (May 1985–November 1986), and arms sales profits (November 1985–November 1986) occurred after Boland II began in October 1984 and before its extension expired in October 1986.

Thus, third party funding and arms sales occurred during periods of the Boland ban. But did they conflict with restrictions of the Boland amendments? Beyond timing, identifying violations of the Boland ban also involves legal and political questions. The key issue is whether the ambiguously worded ban was applicable to third party funds and funds diverted from the arms sales.[62] The Boland II amendment only restricted funds available or handled by any U.S. government "entity . . . involved in intelligence activities." Therefore, third party funds given directly to the contras or to a private organization for the contras did not per se conflict with the Boland restrictions. The money that private organizations raised in 1985–1986, and the Saudi contributions of $32 million in 1984–1986 supposedly did not go to the U.S. government but went directly to the contras.[63]

The initial solicitations of Saudi donations in May 1984 and some of the private donations occurred before Boland II took effect in October 1984; moreover, a December 1985 amendment to Boland II specifically permitted administration solicitation of third countries for humanitarian aid,[64] for which the sultan of Brunei contributed $10 million, which may have been intended for military purposes.[65] Had the Brunei solicitations actually been for humanitarian aid and involved no quid pro quo, they would have been legal.

When personnel paid by the U.S. government solicited third country or private funds for military purposes or handled privately contributed funds during the ban period, however, these actions conflicted with Boland restrictions and other laws. The arms sales diversion of funds beginning with the November 1985 residual of $850,000 from the third shipment, moreover, occurred during the Boland ban period (October 1984–October 1986) and was partially handled by the CIA and coordinated by U.S. government personnel on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Because these funds were collected and managed by the NSC staff and thus were "available" to government intelligence agencies (and the NSC was involved in intelligence activity), they conflicted with the Boland

[62] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 414.

[63] Ibid., 48–49, 54–55. On two occasions, Robert McFarlane explained to the Saudi ambassador to the United States that the contras needed funds, for which the Saudis contributed $32 million. McFarlane claimed these were not solicited but provided as gifts.

[64] Ibid., 315.

[65] Ibid., 344.

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ban. As violations of appropriation restrictions, however, they were not criminal actions per se.[66]

The Majority and Minority Congressional Iran-Contra Committee reports differ, however, in their interpretation of whether the Boland ban necessarily prohibited solicitation or handling of funds available to the U.S. government, and in their constitutional interpretations of the procedures or laws. The majority held that the rule of law,[67] the principle of government accountability, the power of the purse, and specific statutes required that any money solicited or spent by U.S. government entities or officials must be appropriated by the Congress.[68] In this view, governmentally-related funding mechanisms circumventing official procedures are unconstitutional and thus illegal.[69] Since the private funds were solicited by government personnel and the diverted funds were controlled by and thus available to the CIA or NSC, under the majority logic, they were restricted under Boland II.

The minority report, however, claimed that the president's foreign relations powers permitted such activities, including solicitation of third-party military funds.[70] Even if laws like Boland II prohibited such actions, those restrictions were unconstitutional and thus void because the president has the constitutional right to communicate with the third parties to urge them to make military contributions to U.S. allies.[71] The diversions themselves, moreover, would have been legal in this view, if they had followed proper procedures and been sanctioned by a presidential finding, an authorization under the Hughes–Ryan Act of 1974, which permitted properly approved covert activities deemed to be in the national interest.[72]

The diversions, however, did not follow proper procedures. They were apparently not approved by the president, since he claimed not to have known about them.[73] The November 1985 arms sales (but not the diversions of profits) were retroactively approved by presidential finding in December 1985, and the 1986 sales were prospectively approved by a January 1986 finding.[74] Since, however, the president approved only the arms sales and not the diversions, the minority claim of constitutional protection is moot.[75] In short, the diversions were illegal under Boland II even in the minority logic.

Under the majority logic, the Boland II ban prohibited any solicitation by government officials and the use of arms profits diverted under NSC guidance

[66] Ibid., 356, 414.
[67] Ibid., 397.
[68] Ibid., 348–349.
[69] Ibid., 350.
[70] Ibid., 371ff.
[71] Ibid., 391.
[72] See also Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: The Inside Story* (Washington: Regency Gateway, 1992).
[73] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 377–378.
[74] Ibid., 436.
[75] Ibid., 383, 438.

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between October 1984 and November 1985. It also prohibited solicitations of military aid through November 1986, because the requests and diversions involved monies collected by government personnel or available to an entity of the U.S. government. Under the minority logic, however, the third-party and third-country private funding of military operations were not per se restricted by the Boland ban, because private citizens can donate funds and the president had the foreign policy powers to solicit such funds.[76]

In sum, third-party contributions and arms sales diversions did occur during the Boland II ban and sustained the contras when they had no U.S. funds.[77] Third-country funding provided a significant amount of military aid ($34 million) for the contras. Private donations ($2.7 million) and diverted arms sales profits ($3.8 million) provided little ($6.5 million) for military supplies. Though the third-country donations to the contras started before the Boland restrictions began, the ban did prohibit the solicitation of most private donations, military contributions by third countries, and diversions of arms sales profits because U.S. government personnel were involved in the requests or implementation.

Policy Questions

To this point, the analysis has clarified the details of contra funding and the Boland bans in order to provide a basis on which to evaluate the policy itself. The rest of the article explores the debate about U.S. policy on funding the contras and suggests provisional answers. Did funding the contras, both by congressionally appropriated U.S. aid and outside funds, advance U.S. interests? Were the administration's attempts to find extragovernmental or extralegal monies when U.S. government funds were not available worth the efforts? In short, were the benefits of the policy of supporting the contras worth the costs?

The answers to these questions depend, in large part, on whether or not one agrees with the Reagan administration's approach to dealing with Nicaragua. While both the Reagan policy and the pattern of U.S. interventions have been widely questioned,[78] this analysis begins by examining Reagan policies on their own terms as administration attempts to achieve its goals. It then compares the administration approval to potential alternatives. It also looks at some of the wider implications for democratic governance of the administration's approach.

From the Reagan administration's point of view, U.S. government funding of the contras and related pressures pursued four important policy aims:[79] to prevent Sandinista support of the antigovernment rebels in El Salvador; to pres-

[76] Other laws (for example, the Anti-Deficiency Act, Arms Export Act, Neutrality Acts), including restrictions on tax-exempt donations for nonhumanitarian purposes (Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 349–352, 381) affected the legality of the private and third country funding.

[77] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 383.

[78] Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). See also Arnson, *Crossroads*.

[79] Serafino, "Contra Aid," 6–7.

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sure the Sandinistas to democratize their policies and pluralize their economy; to force the Sandinistas to negotiate security arrangements satisfactory to the United States and the rest of Central America; and perhaps to overthrow the Sandinista regime.[80]

The contra aid policies were relatively successful in pursuing these goals. The policies helped to cut off Sandinista funding of the rebels in El Salvador. They also helped to prevent the Sandinistas from consolidating power and sustaining popular support,[81] and forced the Sandinistas to negotiate with the opposition. They also kept the Sandinistas from expanding into the rest of Central America and negotiating a Central American peace agreement, though the Sandinista army did at one point cross over into Honduras in March 1988. Ultimately, though ineffective militarily, aid to the contras contributed to the Sandinista's electoral defeat in 1990. Thus, from the perspective of the Reagan administration, the contra aid policy attained its goals and was wise and effective.

At a relatively low cost to the U.S. government of less than a third of a billion dollars ($322 million),[82] the Reagan administration sustained the contras for nearly a decade. A moderate level of third-country donations ($34 million) and a small amount of third party solicitation and arms sales profits ($6.5 million) filled in during the two bridge periods in 1984–1985 and early to late 1986, respectively, when U.S. government support was not available. Despite all the political controversy, from the administration's perspective, the governmental funding and third party support were relatively inexpensive and worth the expense.

Reflections

Overall, from the Reagan point of view, the public and private aid to the contras, especially third-country assistance, was cost-effective and necessary to maintain the contra forces when U.S. funds were cut off. Yet these approaches were controversial, of questionable wisdom even from the administration's perspective, and at least in part illegal. The diversion of a small amount of arm sales profits (about $3.8 million of $16.1 million profits from $40 million in sales) was particularly controversial and provided relatively little support (about 1 percent of $400 million) for the contras. Though the timing of private funding and arms sales diversions may have been crucial to the survival of the contras, the benefits were probably not worth the political costs to the Reagan administration, its domestic agenda, and its place in history. The diversions ultimately brought guilt and shame upon the Reagan administration and some of its high officials.

[80] Armstrong, *The Chronology*, 83; see also Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-contra Affairs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 18.

[81] Arnson, *Crossroads*, 73; Serafino, "Contra Aid."

[82] Serafino, "Contra Aid," 17.

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The contras were a proxy force under the Reagan Doctrine of helping others fight anticommunist battles that also served U.S. government interests.[83] Fighting wars through proxies is an ancient part of great power struggles and often substitutes for open warfare between superpowers. In general, a democracy should fight its wars with its own soldiers, but using surrogates may be less dangerous than risking superpower confrontations.

While a superpower democracy does not always fight its own battles, it needs to take direct responsibility for funding those fights. The privatization of both foreign policy funding and wars[84] runs contrary to fundamental principles of democratic governance and sovereignty, particularly the rule of law and the power of the purse. Extragovernmental funding, even if not illegal, corrodes democratic legitimacy. The executive cannot decide to finance wars without congressional approval. Moreover, the powers the U.S. Constitution vests in the Congress to decide to fight wars, and the responsibility to carry out the conflict through the armed forces directed by the president, cannot be in executive hands only,[85] because the separation of powers must provide a check on potentially irresponsible actions. In order to sustain the validity of the democratic safeguards, the Congress must be able to end the fighting by cutting off the funding, and the executive must be faithfully bound by such restrictions. The use of private funds for public purposes and, particularly, the privatization of foreign policy funding distort the structure of authorization and appropriation in a democracy.

Moreover, a country should not fight voluntary wars for which it cannot pay. Having others pay for and fight a nation's battles, even through surrogates, distorts basic principles of democratic accountability, which requires a nation to decide to take upon itself the required sacrifice and bear the burden as a nation. Even if most of the outside funding were legal, as the administration and the minority report propose, such mechanisms of support and implementation stray beyond democratic accountability, because they take actions that the people and their elected representatives do not directly support.[86] By soliciting others for funds, the administration was potentially undermining its own prerogatives in the policy-making process.

Furthermore, legal or not, the propriety of government officials soliciting third party or private funds is questionable and fundamentally inappropriate. The

[83] Other Reagan doctrine conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia were less controversial in the United States, U.S. House of Representatives, *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1988* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989).

[84] A somewhat similar method of funding U.S. government operations through third country contributions was used during the Gulf War in 1991, with large contributions from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (each country contributed over $12 billion to the war effort). See Geraldine Brooks and Tony Horowitz, "A Year After Invasion by Iran," *Wall Street Journal*, 1 August 1991.

[85] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 348; see also U.S. House, *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1988*, 7–9.

[86] Under this principle, the funding mechanism of the Gulf War, where the U.S. provided most of the manpower and technology, and the Gulf oil states provided most of the money and some of the legitimacy, is also questionable.

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Reagan administration was subverting its own legitimacy and sovereign power by pursuing private funding of U.S. initiatives. Moreover, as former Secretary of State George Shultz noted about the Gulf War, it was sad to see the United States having to seek funds from other countries "with hat in hand" to pay for U.S. military efforts.[87]

Privatization of funding also reduces public scrutiny and the debate over policy necessary in a democracy for good public policy. Open discussion itself might have scuttled the policy, which is in part why the administration sought to hide its actions. A democracy cannot give up its principles of accountability and full, open debate and stay democratic.[88]

Policy Alternatives

Could an alternative policy have accomplished the same goal of bringing democracy to Nicaragua without creating the antagonisms and scandal of the contra funding approaches? Again, one's partisan position affects the evaluation of the goals and approach of any U.S. policy that might have sought to influence the internal politics of Nicaragua. And the question of whether the United States should have intervened at all in Nicaraguan politics should not be lost in evaluating more peaceful ways of attaining the Reagan administration's policy goals.[89]

Supporters of administration policy may argue that had the Sandinistas not faced the contras while receiving support from Soviet and other Eastern bloc countries, the Sandinistas might have more easily imposed their will on the Nicaraguan people and supported other insurgent forces in Central America. Moreover, the Sandinistas might have crushed their opposition earlier if the contras had not received outside U.S. or private funding. But even supporters of the administration policy recognize that before initiating the contra war, the United States had already successfully encouraged the Sandinistas to curtail support for the Salvadoran rebels; here their success derived from the stick of the suspension of U.S. economic assistance in 1981 with the carrot of its renewal rather than from armed force.[90]

The administration might have accomplished its goal of democratizing Nicaragua without sustaining a proxy fighting force. Lacking the justification of the contras as a perceived threat, the Sandinistas might have had more difficulty imposing restrictions on the political opposition. In particular, without the state of emergency decreed in 1985 to fight the contras, the Sandinistas might have faced internal political opposition strong enough to force the Nicaraguan government into earlier elections or a political turnover. The United States might have

[87] Southern Center for International Studies, "The Ninth Annual Report of the Secretaries of State" (Atlanta: Southern Center, 1991), 1.

[88] Inouye and Hamilton, *Report*, 188; see also U.S. House, *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1988.*

[89] Arnson, *Crossroads*, 187, 216, 221.

[90] Ibid., 50, 73.

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better provided support to develop political challenges to the Sandinistas than funded armed insurrection. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the ensuing economic and political problems in the Soviet Union, moreover, the Sandinistas would have come under other external and internal pressures, as did the nearby Salvadoran guerrillas. Without the state of emergency or the Soviet financial and military support justified by the existence of the contras, the Sandinistas might not have lasted to 1990. Perhaps, too, such internal opposition might have helped democratize and liberalize Nicaraguan political and economic policies.[91]

Conclusion

In clarifying the amounts and timing of the funding for the contras, this article provides the basis for a clearer understanding of the contra aid policy by both citizens and policy makers alike. In identifying the periods of Boland restrictions, and the differing majority and minority interpretations, it explains possible conflicts between nongovernmental funding mechanisms and the Boland bans. It evaluates contra aid policy on the Reagan administration's terms of cost-effectiveness, but also questions the merits of such funding in a democracy. Support of the contras may have been cost-effective on an economic basis, but it was costly in political terms and in lost legitimacy for the administration that promoted them. An alternative policy to assure democratization in Nicaragua might have been more successful.

A brief review of contra aid funding cannot answer all the factual and policy questions. Moreover, evidence alone cannot answer normative questions, such as whether Reagan administration contra policy was wise. The examination of the policy approaches that the Reagan administration took regarding Nicaragua and the contras should continue to probe the implications and the alternatives. But a clearer understanding of the background to contra funding approaches informs the debate necessary in a democracy to evaluate the validity and wisdom of these controversial issues during the central U.S. intervention of the 1980s.*

[91] The peacefully resolved mutual hostage taking between groups of ex-contras and ex-Sandinistas in late summer 1993 showed that significant issues still divide Nicaraguans. See Douglas Farah, "Contras Free 20 Hostages in Nicaragua," *Washington Post*, 23 August 1993. The limited American aid to President Violeta Chamorro's government since her coalition victory in the 1990 election and the delay in providing $98 million in new aid reveals, too, that the U.S. role and policy toward Nicaragua are still problematic. See *The Economist*, 28 August 1993.

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Book Reviews

Scrambling for Protection: The New Media and the First Amendment *by Patrick M. Garry. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994. 198 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $19.95.*

The magic of the American Constitution lies in its flexibility, which allows successive generations to interpret its clauses to fit the needs of new times. Patrick Garry, a fellow at Columbia University's Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, contends that we live in such a new age. The revolutionary developments in communications technologies begun in the twentieth century require new interpretations of the press freedom clause of the First Amendment. However, the need for changes does not spring solely from technological advances.

Garry believes that the current media system has strayed from crucial functions that the Framers had in mind when they exempted the press from congressional control. The First Amendment, Garry argues, was designed primarily to assure that citizens would receive ample information from diverse sources to allow for free-flowing political debates about public policies. At present, the dominant view—which he attributes to Justice Potter Stewart—is that the press must serve as a fourth branch of government, devoting itself largely to detecting government misbehavior and alerting the public.

Failure to stress the press's role as facilitator of public discourse about politics has had disastrous political consequences. Like muckraking in the Progressive Era, the adversarial journalism of our century has alienated the public from politics and discouraged participation. The news media have become one-way communication channels, spewing out assorted facts drawn from elites, including media gurus, to essentially passive audiences.

To restore a healthy, broadly-based public dialogue. Garry advocates construing the press designation more broadly. First Amendment protection should be extended to all new technologies that fulfill the traditional press functions of transmitting political information, policing government, and facilitating public dialogue about public issues. Computer bulletin boards and telephone information services would be covered, for example, while information that lacks a civic purpose would be excluded, even if it takes print or broadcast journalistic forms. The *National Enquirer*, for instance, would not deserve privileged status because it lacks a serious political focus.

Garry's contention that public dialogue is vital for a participatory democracy and that access to the market place of political ideas should be broadened is well taken. But the remedy that he suggests to foster more inclusive public discussions is not realistic. There is no evidence that an unduly narrow interpretation of the First Amendment that places limits on broadcasters and other media has been a major restraint on public debate. The problem rests on the fact that most average Americans are not very eager to participate in the public dialogue

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or eager to hear what their nonexpert fellow citizens have to say about weighty public issues. Analyses of the substance and quality of political discourse that take place on talk shows, which Garry hails as new forums for public discourse, are not particularly encouraging. Much of the discourse is shallow, overly simplistic, and often unrealistic when judged by the complexities of modern political life.

Nonetheless, Garry is absolutely right that the nature of the American media system and its interface with government needs to be reexamined and that much of the current media fare fails to serve the civic needs of average Americans. His call for reflection and action makes *Scrambling for Protection* worth reading and worth pondering by average Americans as well as by political elites, including members of Congress charged with reforming communications policy. The press clause of the First Amendment is a precious part of our heritage of democratic self-government. It must not be allowed to fail us because we failed to reinterpret it when needed to keep pace with technological and political developments.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990 *by Bruce W. Jentleson. New York, W. W. Norton, 1994. 300 pp. $23.00.*

Bruce Jentleson offers a sober, thorough, persuasive, and yet highly partisan critique of American policy toward Iraq in the decade preceding the Persian Gulf War. He contends that a flawed policy of seeking friendship with Saddam Hussein against Iran led Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush into an unwise policy that culminated in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Jentleson is most convincing in his criticism of the way Republican policy makers assumed that because Iraq was the enemy of Iran it was automatically the friend of the United States. This untested assumption was the basis for many of the mistakes he documents—the granting of extensive credits to underwrite the sale of American agricultural goods to Iraq (some of which were diverted to finance Iraqi weapons purchases); a lax policy of issuing licenses for high technology exports, which contributed to Saddam's nuclear program; and a conspicuous refusal to condemn Iraq's contempt for human rights—most notably, Saddam's use of poison gas against the Kurds. Perhaps if Iraq had proved to be a reliable counterweight to Iran, these concessions could have been written off as part of the price that had to be paid for achieving order and stability in the vital Persian Gulf region.

The heart of Jentleson's argument and its most controversial aspect is his contention that in fact this soft policy toward Iraq led directly to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. While he is careful to admit that other factors entered into the calculus, he nonetheless contends that American policy was "a key factor" (p. 19) in Saddam's decision. First, he argues that in the summer of 1990, the Bush administration failed to make it clear to Saddam that the United States would use force if necessary to defend Kuwait against an Iraqi invasion. Even more crucial, he claims, was the long record of American concessions to Iraq under both Reagan and Bush. Saddam became convinced that the United States would not take effective action to halt his aggression against Kuwait.

It is at this point that Jentleson's partisan instincts overcome his scholarship. As a former aide to Senator Albert Gore, a speechwriter for vice-presidential candidate Gore in the 1992

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campaign (in which he drafted a speech for Gore laying out the essential argument developed in this book), and a State Department official in the Carter administration, Jentleson is clearly biased. It is one thing to argue that the Reagan–Bush policy failed; it is another to claim that it misled Saddam into believing that he could invade Kuwait. Such an argument, in the best tradition of American ethnocentrism, places U.S. foreign policy at the center of all international events and makes the actors, including Saddam Hussein, puppets whose actions are determined by decisions made in Washington. FDR, not Japanese warlords, is responsible for Pearl Harbor by cutting off oil to Japan; Dean Acheson, not Kim Il Sung, bears the blame for the Korean War by failing to include South Korea within the American defense perimeter.

Jentleson takes a solid argument—that a naive American policy that culminated in the invasion of Kuwait was a clear failure—and elevates it into a partisan charge that Reagan and Bush were responsible for the Persian Gulf War. In his concluding section on the lessons of his case study for the future of American foreign policy, he neglects one key aspect—the danger in mixing scholarship with partisan politics.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy *by James M. Lindsay. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 240 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $13.95.*

The literature on Congress is disproportionately copious compared to that on the federal bureaucracy, mostly for reasons of research convenience; but nearly all of it is on Congress in its domestic role. Congress in world affairs is slighted both by students of American government and by students of international relations. It is a long, long time since a book as good as James Lindsay's has come along to fill that gap, and much has changed in the meantime. Caricaturists sum it up as the replacement of the Imperial Presidency by the Imperial Congress. But Lindsay is no caricaturist. He is a determinedly nuanced analyst and commentator, who deals almost always in shades of gray—or, better, shades of silver, for he is decidedly upbeat about the American constitutional and political system. His clouds have luminous silver linings.

I like that. Some may not. At one point Lindsay comes close to acknowledging that "in the absence of an agreed-upon standard for judging Congress, debates over the merits of congressional activism in foreign policy usually devolve into something akin to judging the flavor of ice cream—it's all a matter of taste" (p. 162). But he is dismissive of the view that tastes in such matters can properly depend on policy preferences: scholars (at least) must be detached and not share the participants' inclination to shift their preferences about institutional configurations in accordance with shifts in the likely policy outcomes. Lindsay assumes that in a democracy, institutions should be valued as adaptable to changing purposes, not as promoting or resisting a particular sustained orientation of policy. Yet this mainstream neutrality is not bland; Lindsay enlivens it with a fluent style and scores of illustrative anecdotes. He deserves a wide audience.

Overall, Lindsay is strongly pro-Congress; but he clearly feels on the defensive, and much of his argument is gentle rebuttal, pointing out that executive pots have been calling congressional kettles black and that executives in glass houses have been throwing stones

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at Congress. But the tone is never "a plague on both your houses"; it is always "to know all is to forgive (almost) all." And Lindsay indeed knows and covers almost everything one could want to know about the congressional apparatus for foreign policy (including security and economic dimensions) in the era since World War II. Despite the word "politics" in his title, he does not really cover the substantive content of party or interest group competition in this setting, except episodically. But his range is wide enough to be important—and admirably concise in exposition.

What does trouble me a little is that his consistently sophisticated, often counterintuitive insight seems to have failed him on two points: one small, the other larger. The small one is his very conventional insistence that the 1973 War Powers Resolution is a failure, despite his shrewd explanation elsewhere of how the importance of legislation may be as congressional leverage, not diktat, vis à vis the executive. Since 1973, very few American lives have been lost in military actions, nor have there been actions at all that could have cost many American lives except that in the Gulf 1990–1991, for which (as Lindsay puts it) "the Bush Administration [gave] in to public pressure and requested that Congress formally authorize the use of force." (p. 152). Like the War Powers Resolution, I would say. And the other episodes, small anyway, were not prolonged if strong congressional opposition arose. Did the two-thirds of both houses of Congress that managed to override Richard Nixon's veto and put the War Powers Resolution into law really expect to accomplish more than this? Friends of Congress should stop belittling the resolution as their opponents do.

My other complaint is bigger. Lindsay knows his history but does not track its implications much before or after the cold war, only during it. I would suggest that is important, because there may well be more resemblance between the United States (and Congress) in world affairs 1920–1940 and 1993 to the present than between either of these noninterventionist eras and 1941–1992. We need political scientists to go back and carefully study the 1920s and 1930s with this in mind. Maybe that could be Lindsay's next task. He shows himself admirably equipped for it. Meanwhile, what he has given us is very fine work.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
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Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing *by Brigitte L. Nacos. New York, Columbia University Press, 1994. 214 pp. $32.50.*

The subject of terrorists' exploitation of the media to reach a broader audience—terrorism as theater—has been explored previously. But Brigitte L. Nacos has written a definitive study and provides an exhaustive statistical base to support her analysis. She argues that much of the terrorism experienced by the United States in the past is manipulated by the terrorists themselves for media recognition of their causes. The hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985 demonstrated the ability of terrorists to command media attention, particularly electronic media, in a manner that could instantaneously convey their demands, publicize their objectives to a previously uninformed American public, and limit the policy options with which the American government could respond.

While the swell of support for presidential leadership is common in the beginning of a hostage crisis, the debilitating effect of a prolonged situation can deeply influence the political

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standing of a president. Nacos uses President Jimmy Carter's experience with the Iranian hostage situation as an obvious example. Following steadily declining public support for his reliance on a diplomatic strategy to release the hostages, conditioned in large part by the skillful manipulation of the electronic media by the Iranian hostage holders in Teheran, the pressure on Carter to take decisive action was intense. The imminent approach of the November 1980 presidential elections was clearly an important factor in the decision for the president to authorize a rescue mission that proved to be disastrous. An analogue is found in the Reagan presidency, where the president's personal identification with the fate of the American hostages in Beirut, partly affected by media attention, was an influence in the White House authorization of the Iran/contra operation. Quite apart from the attempts to evade congressional restrictions on aiding the contras in Nicaragua, the president succeeded in undermining his own official policy toward Iran and the well founded restraints against rewarding terrorists for their heinous acts against innocent civilians.

By their very nature, terrorist events have a dramatic context that places terrorists and their sponsors in command of the American policy agenda. To the degree that the target country is unable to deal effectively with the situation, the terrorists are shown to be successful. Some democratic governments—notably the Greek government in 1991—have legally proscribed the press from publicizing a terrorist group's demands on the theory that if an event takes place without public observation it will discourage the terrorists from playing out their deadly theater. But the efficacy of such a basically antidemocratic measure is questionable. Nacos argues that the quality of the information contained in the news reportage is a better response to the terrorists' calculus.

The book is of lesser value when considering the newer forms of terrorism that are now emerging, ones that depend less on state sponsorship and traditional political objectives. Ethnic, subnational, and religious varieties of violence do have a propaganda goal and, therefore, a compelling need to exploit Western media. But the immediate objective may just as well be revenge, to punish the United States for a perceived grievance, as in the Libyan government's sabotage of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 and even in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993. The perpetrators are less interested in having their involvement advertised and are content to leave a narrow group of national security officials to understand who has struck and why. As the nature of international terrorism continues to metamorphose, it is less clear that terrorists will devise their bloody theater for media purposes.

VINCENT M. CANNISTARO
McLean, Virginia

Beyond Peace *by Richard M. Nixon. New York, Random House, 1994. 262 pp. $22.50.*

President Richard Nixon's tenth and final book sets out his vision for post-cold war America. Part I attacks the popular but flawed idea of President Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign, of Ross Perot, and of many Republicans that the collapse of communism has relegated foreign policy to insignificance. Nixon argues for the vital linkage between the imperative of retaining America's leading role abroad and achieving renewal at home. The United States cannot have a strong domestic policy without a strong foreign policy, because it cannot be at peace in a world at war or have a healthy economy in a sick world economy. The United States

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cannot remain strong in the world without addressing long neglected domestic problems that could insidiously erode the prosperity and soul of the nation. This scheme of linkage informs the analysis and policy prescriptions Nixon provides in the rest of the book.

Part II, dealing with foreign policy, updates his familiar, lucid, and credible refrain that there are no adequate substitutes for the United States remaining a global leader and maintaining military capabilities commensurate with that responsibility. The UN's impotence in Bosnia and Somalia confirms Nixon's judgment that this organization lacks the capacity to resolve international conflicts without strong leadership from the United States. For Europe, Nixon argues persuasively for maintaining NATO with strong U.S. participation to ensure that a united Germany remains firmly anchored in the West and as a hedge against resurgent Russian ambitions. He also advocates extending NATO's membership to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (measures which he argues would not menace any legitimate Russian security interest), broadening its mission to include protecting interests outside of Europe (such as access to Middle Eastern oil), and accepting greater European influence—though not a veto of—the use of U.S. forces based in Europe. Unlike Nixon the president, who down-played the impact of domestic structure on foreign policy behavior, Nixon the sage emphasizes correctly that the failure of freedom in Russia would have a profoundly negative impact for the United States and the world, because an authoritarian Russia would be far more likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy than a democratic Russia. He recommends, therefore, that the West adopt a middle course toward Boris Yeltsin, the most pro-American leader in Russian history. Evaluate Yeltsin's conduct generously in light of his precarious domestic circumstances and grant significantly more constructive aid to Russia, while expanding NATO, criticizing dangerous Russian foreign policy behavior, such as selling nuclear technology to rogue regimes, and maintaining links to other leaders in Russia besides Yeltsin.

Because of the Asia-Pacific's enormous geopolitical importance, now probably the most important region for the United States, Nixon argues that the United States must remain as intimately involved there as it has in Europe. Indeed, he considers the imperatives for U.S. acting as the regional balancer in East Asia especially crucial, because the region lacks the tradition of cooperation that more than forty years of regional cooperation and the pacifying effects of stable liberal democracy have instilled in Western Europe. Of the four major East Asian powers—Russia, China, Japan, and the United States—only the United States is not viewed as a potential aggressor by the others or the middle and small powers in the region, which gives the U.S. a unique role in maintaining peace and stability for the benefit of all. A similar blend of geopolitical imperatives inspires Nixon to advocate a strong American presence in the Middle East, a region he identifies as vital to the West because of its dependence for the foreseeable future on the region's oil.

Nizon believes that the United States not only must lead lest the world descend into chaos, but can lead at tolerable cost and risk. His refutation of the declinist arguments, such as Paul Kennedy's, is the logical prelude for Part III, the most controversial of the three, having to do with Nixon's diagnosis of America's serious domestic problems and his prescriptions for American renewal. Unlike his previous book, which focused mainly on foreign policy, Nixon devotes the longest sections here to domestic controversies—over health care, entitlements, welfare dependency, the exploding illegitimacy and divorce rates, family values, education, urban decay, rising crime, government gridlock, distrust of American institutions, affirmative action, and the role of religion in society. Nixon's positions on these issues are as revealing for how far the Republican party and the nation has moved to the right as for their intrinsic merit, which this writer finds considerable, but not necessarily coming from

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Nixon for reasons discussed below. Like William Bennett, The Heritage Foundation, the contributors to *Commentary*, *The National Review*, *The American Spectator*, Dan Quayle, and other international mainstays of the post-1980 Reaganite Republican right (as opposed to the isolationist Pat Buchanan wing of the party), Nixon blames the domestic predicament largely on the combined effects of the counterculture revolution that began in the 1960s and the Great Society that vastly expanded the welfare state.

What Nixon argues is this: the staggering amounts the federal government has spent on domestic programs since 1965 have not helped, but hurt the intended beneficiaries by generating huge budget deficits, perpetuating welfare dependency, and fostering an entitlement mentality, while undermining individual responsibility, accountability, enterprise, and initiative. Because government has not and cannot deliver on its extravagant promises, there is greater cynicism about government even in the areas where, in Nixon's eyes, a strong Hamiltonian executive is necessary, such as in the conduct of foreign and national security policy. Simultaneously, the courts and liberal interest groups have unintentionally deepened racial division and perpetrated a great injustice by endorsing and enforcing racial and gender-based preferences inimicable to the American ideal of equality of opportunity. Like the other internationalist mainstays of the post-1980s Reaganite Republican right, Nixon calls for a dramatic reduction in the size and scope of government, a shift of much federal responsibility back to state and local government, school vouchers, an end to all racial and gender preferences, drastic cutbacks of all entitlements, free trade, a reliance on markets, and a renewal of Judeo-Christian ethic of individual responsibility. He, too, considers the Clinton Health Care program the epitome of what is wrong with contemporary liberalism: a hubristic, costly, and vain attempt that would destroy the world's best medical care by substituting government, price controls, and social engineering for free markets. He departs from the Reaganite, internationalist conservative consensus only on two issues: abortion, where he remains Pro-Choice; and the Religious right, where he issues a veiled warning that the Republican party must devise a way to take its legitimate concerns into account without becoming slaves to the movement's zealots.

Remarkably, writing more than several months before the 1994 election, Nixon managed to articulate and anticipate most of the main themes that catalyzed the smashing Republican victory. What is disturbing is not the substance of Nixon's analysis—often quite compelling and always deserving of intellectual respect even from those who disagree—but the lack of credibility Nixon has rendering some of his advice. Even leaving Watergate aside as a source of cynicism about American institutions, a cynicism which Nixon laments, an informed reader of *Beyond Peace* cannot help but take note of the great chasm between Nixon as president and Nixon the sage. Granted, the responsibilities of power constrain the ability of even the most principled politician to adhere to his ideas, especially in the face of determined opposition. If, also, the results of a policy confound expectations, it is admirable for a leader to change his mind and admit error. But Nixon writes as if he had nothing to do with the vast expansion of the welfare state or the implementation of programs he now disdains. He did. It was President Nixon who remarked when imposing wage and price controls in 1971 that we are all Keynesians now. It was President Nixon who expended almost no political capital to oppose whopping increases in Great Society Programs that a Democratic but not veto-proof Congress handed him. It was President Nixon's Treasury Department that proposed and implemented the 1969 Philadelphia Plan for minority hiring, a prototype for the programs Nixon now opposes so fiercely. Nixon at least owes the reader an explanation for his metamorphosis or the reason for the vast expanse between what he now says and what he did as president. In most cases, he does not provide one. In the case of affirmative action, his

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explanation makes silence look forthcoming. There is no tenable distinction, notwithstanding Nixon's disingenuous attempts to give the impression of one, between his Philadelphia Plan and affirmative action as currently practiced.

Despite the flaws of this book, or more accurately put, some legitimate doubts about the content and consistency of Nixon's convictions, *Beyond Peace* is a well made argument for and bell-weather of the Republican Party's agenda for 1996 and beyond. Senator Robert Dole, a Nixon progégé, also considered the book among Nixon's best, which may well presage what course a Dole administration would take. The country could do far worse than that.

ROBERT G. KAUFMAN
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In Defense of Congress *by Fred R. Harris. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 177 pp. $35.00.*

Congress has seldom been more in need of a good defense, and former U.S. Senator Fred R. Harris provides one. This is a very useful book, for it addresses the wide range of criticisms of Congress that animate so much of talk radio, and point by point shows that they rest on flawed understandings of Congress or are inconsistent with the facts.

In a chapter called "Price, Pay, Perks, and Personnel," Harris works his way through numerous complaints, and finds them without merit. In discussing charges that members of Congress are paid too much, he rightly asks, "Compared to what?" and goes on to explain that compared to other high achieving individuals in our society, congressional pay is not particularly high, especially when you consider the unusual expense of maintaining two residences that members of Congress must bear. In response to complaints that Congress is too expensive, he first shows that critics overstate the cost of Congress by including in the price tag such agencies as the Government Accounting Office, and goes on to argue that legislative branch appropriations, when adjusted for inflation, have fallen since the late 1970s. The perks of members of Congress are not all they are cracked up to be, Harris argues. Senator Trent Lott is quoted describing the once free senatorial gymnasium as an "armpit." The formerly free haircuts are not fancy salon "hairstyles" but more like a $10 haircut at a corner barbershop. He dismisses the House bank scandal as a minor matter that was overblown by politicians interested in bashing Congress and by reckless talk show hosts.

Harris provides a sensible, well documented criticism of term limits as a means of increasing the accountability of Congress. He explains arguments offered by the Founding Fathers against term limits, and they are startlingly similar to present day opposition. Robert Livingstone wrote that "The people are the best judges of who should represent them." Alexander Hamilton (who would also oppose the balanced budget amendment) wrote that term limits "would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior" (p. 49). Harris contends that it would be better to reform Congress by reducing the advantages of incumbents.

Harris is most interesting and original in discussing the perennially low popularity of Congress. Noting the widely observed paradox of popular members of Congress serving in a universally disliked Congress, Harris points out another paradox: while the American people revere their political system, they do not like the institutions that comprise it, or the way they work. Americans love the Constitution and think the United States has the best

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government on Earth, so why do they disparage Congress and the president? Harris argues that Congress is unpopular because it produces conflict: "Congress *is* slow, its work *is* time-consuming and highly conflictual, and it *does* often make a spectacle of itself. But are these not, in fact, the very charges that can be leveled against democracy, itself" (p. 83)? "We say we like democracy, but we hate conflict," Harris writes (p. 92), and in this contradiction he finds the origin of congressional unpopularity, about which he believes little or nothing can be done.

This is an interesting and useful book. I know of no other book that so concisely and ably defends Congress against the many irresponsible charges lobbed its way. Harris has read much of the appropriate political science literature on Congress and deploys it effectively in explaining why Congress is the way it is. By and large, the arguments he presents are not new or original, but they are provided clearly with generous supporting evidence and illuminating quotes. Harris's book will be most useful as a supplementary text for courses on Congress and American politics more generally. But specialists in American politics will also appreciate it as a sensible, fact-based repudiation of common complaints against Congress.

JOHN B. GILMOUR
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The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford *by John Robert Greene. Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1994. 272 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $15.95.*

Do we need a book on the presidency of Gerald Ford? The historian John Robert Greene claims that we do, because we have not heretofore viewed the Ford administration as we do others; we evaluate the Ford presidency as we would a convalescence, not in terms of new policy output but in terms of rest and recovery. Greene, therefore, sets himself the task of treating the Ford presidency as normal and examining its policies. A problem soon emerges, however: the author does not get to questions of policy until the middle third of the book. There are good reasons for the resulting balance—notably Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon—but it weakens the claims that the Ford presidency was normal and that one can write about Ford focusing on policy.

Ford's career reminds one of that of Dan Quayle, whom Richard Fenno considered a typical Congressman without the usual profile of one who rises any higher. In Greene's telling, Ford became House Republican Caucus head, minority leader, vice-president, and president more through prodigious luck than by hard work or intellect. He won over important backers sometimes by fortune, sometimes more nefariously, such as by serving as Nixon's hatchetman in the investigation of Justice William Douglas.

The book is most effective at recounting the day-to-day events of the period. Making good use of available documents and interviews with a number of principals of the period, Greene captures the feel of the White House in the Ford era. This effectively written and edited volume is a fine resource to consult on several of the matters to which the administration turned its attention, including such issues as oil prices and the *Mayaguez* incident, and it contains a useful twenty-page bibliographic essay. Chapter titles consisting largely of obscure quotations that do not convey the subject matter covered do not facilitate reading by the historian or generalist for whom the book is intended, however.

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Political scientists may be disappointed by the book's failure to address the theoretical issues on which its subject has a bearing. The Ford presidency offers interesting material for theories of the presidency such as those of Theodore Lowi, James David Barber, and Stephen Skowronek; the literature on divided government; and studies of regulation. This largely a theoretical work does not enter any of those discussions. That a work by an historian would ignore political science theories is perhaps forgivable, but its failure even to discuss regulatory developments in securities, nuclear power, and automobile safety is problematic.

The issues Greene does discuss are often well presented. Many readers will respect his treatment of the Nixon pardon: he concludes that there was no quid pro quo, but provides much evidence of Al Haig's attempts, both before and after Nixon resigned, to win a pardon for his old boss. The author also recounts Ford's inability to deal honestly with questions of a quid pro quo, showing him stumbling through the pardon and its defense like Chevy Chase playing Ford on "Saturday Night Live."

The notorious Ford bumbling extended to economic issues, where the president seemed to propose fighting inflation by wearing a "WIN" button to Whip Inflation Now. In light of this approach, it is hard to understand Greene's contention that "Ford understood the intricacies of economics and economic policy better than any president of the twentieth century" (p. 68) as anything other than a commentary on other presidents. Greene is more often a diligent, sound interpreter of his subject, even if occasionally one does not buy the Greene Ford.

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Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes *by Giovanni Sartori. New York, New York University Press, 1994. 219 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $18.50.*

Delightfully written, this monograph will be a staple of courses on comparative institutional design. Unfortunately, it is also frequently wholly wrongheaded or incomplete. Its title alone is misleading. Rather than offer practical guidance to those who write constitutions—who contend with micro issues like empowering subjects in a federation to establish independent courts, mechanisms for direct citizen involvement in constitutional reform, the relation of local governments to national and regional ones, secession, supremacy, or constitutional limits on taxation—Sartori focuses on two shop-worn issues: the effects of election rules on party fragmentation and alternative forms of presidential versus parliamentary government. Federalism receives but a page of notice; presidential powers of dissolution and referenda even less. And it is unlikely that drafters of constitutions will be concerned with his views on Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart's count of parties, Douglas Rose's discussion of two-ballot plurality systems versus alternative voting, Arend Lijphart's ideas about consociational democracy, or David Mayhew's arguments about divided government. Excellent material for a course (since I agree with his critiques), but distractions otherwise.

There is a liberal bias to the discussion that too often colors the evaluation of alternatives. Distinctions are made between activist and efficient government, but the two are often confused, with Sartori coming down on the side of activism. The purported gridlock of the American system is something to be avoided, activism in which all parts of government are controlled by a coherent party, something to be sought. "The invisible hand can no longer perform unassisted by the visible one, by governments that intervene and interfere" (p. 113).

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Unexamined is the output of systems that satisfy his objective, which, I suspect, offer a far less convincing argument for the government Sartori prefers.

The book has three parts and improves as we read. For reasons that mystify, Sartori offers only a narrow analysis of electoral systems in Part I. After raising the important question (especially for federal or ethnicly divided states), "how does local two-partism become state-wide two-partism" (p. 36), the issue is deserted. "How a structured party system comes about is a complex matter that cannot be discussed here" (p. 37). This is a profound challenge of constitutional design, but Sartori seems to think otherwise. He attributes Weimar's failure largely to its implementation of pure PR and its method of electing the president, but sees these as "largely extra-constitutional elements" (p. 129).

The book is replete with unsubstantiated assertions. "In the U.S. the melting pot no longer melts and therefore ethnic 'bloc voting' is on the rise" (p. 17); ignoring the incentives of parties to appeal across cleavages to achieve implicit and indirect representation, "majoritarian systems pay no heed to 'exact representation'" (p. 54); ignoring political history, "Americans still fail to perceive how much trouble looms ahead . . . as congressional politics increasingly breaks down into constituency-serving 'retail politics'" (p. 57); and, demonstrating complete unfamiliarity with U.S. federal land policy in the nineteenth century, "greed and corruption have recently reached unprecedented heights" (p. 143).

The argument improves when in Part 2 discussion turns to parliamentary versus presidential systems. Even here we are dumbfounded by some of Sartori's assertions. For example, "the American system works . . . *in spite of* its constitution" (p. 89), and the three key elements of its working are ideological unprincipledness, weak and undisciplined parties, and locality centered politics. Isn't there a connection between these circumstances and the Constitution? It seems that Sartori, at least in this case, wholly rejects constitutionalism and the relevance of his enterprise: "The American system works (in its manner) because Americans are determined to make it work" (p. 91). Unexplored is the question of whether the constitution plays a role in that determination.

The book is best in Part 3 (bypassing some babble about video-politics), when Sartori crafts alternative presidential-parliamentary arrangements. This is also the most controversial part, since the frequency of bold assertions hardly declines, but inventiveness and the weaving of arguments about the interaction of systems and individual incentives increases. I can think of no better example of contemporary political "engineering" than this, and it is precisely this product of research that students of comparative politics must attempt if their other efforts are to have durability.

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The Myth of the Modern Presidency *by David K. Nichols. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. 181 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $13.95.*

"The term 'modern presidency' has become an accepted part of the language of scholars and political commentators," observes David K. Nichols in the first sentence of his new book. He's right. To be sure, scholars disagree about what the modern presidency is and when it began. For example, in various works Sidney Milkis, Jeffrey Tulis, and I have traced it back to the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—Tulis because that is when the "rhetorical presidency" originated and Milkis and I because that is when the

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president, rather than Congress or the political parties, emerged as the leading instrument of popular rule. Fred Greenstein, on the other hand, is the leading exponent of the more prevalent view that Franklin D. Roosevelt is the author of the modern presidency and that the institution he created is marked by four characteristics that distinguish it from its premodern predecessor: the presidency has become a strongly personalized office, the president is constantly involved in the legislative process, the presidency has been supplemented by a large executive office, and the president engages in substantial policy making through executive orders and other unilateral actions.

These differences aside, nearly all presidential scholars agree both that the presidency has been shaped in large measure by its constitutional origins and ante-Rooseveltian history and that the office is sufficiently different now from what it was in the past as to require its own modifier: modern. (Some have gone so far as to add a prefix to that adjective—*post*-modern—but few have followed them down that road.)

Now comes Nichols, drawing heavily on the debates at the Constitutional Convention, to throw down the gauntlet to his scholarly colleagues (the word "myth" in the title of a book on public affairs invariably signals that the author has come to bury and not to praise) and to tell us that we are all wrong.

Or does he? Consider these two statements from Nichols's book, quoted at length because they capture so much of his argument. "[T]he *potential* [my emphasis] for the modern presidency was created not by Franklin Roosevelt but by the Constitution. It was the Constitution that gave the President a major role in the legislative process. It is the Constitution that directs the President to the problems and potential of administrative control. It is the Constitution that lays the groundwork for the exercise of unilateral executive authority. And it is the Constitution that creates the personal dynamic between the people and the President" (p. 31).

"The myth of the modern President correctly identifies some important changes. The President's involvement in the legislative process dramatically increased, and the White House staff was not merely increased but transformed from a few personal aides to a substantial presidential bureaucracy. Executive orders, executive rule-making, and executive agreements provided the most obvious examples of a more general increase in the amount of independent presidential decision-making. Finally, use of the electronic media clearly made the President a more personal presence in the lives of most Americans" (p. 6).

Does anyone disagree? I doubt it. Nichols's avowed effort to unmask the myth that there is such a thing as the modern presidency boils down to the rather uncontroversial observation that within the Constitution has always lain the potential (his word) for something like the modern presidency to emerge, a potential that has been fulfilled in recent decades. He goes on to claim with great fervor that changes in the presidency have come in response to increasing demands on government rather than to demands on the presidency per se, but this claim, too, strikes me as uncontroversial.

It's too bad that so much of what Nichols offers consists of huffing and puffing, because most of the rest of the book is excellent. His chapters on the Constitutional Convention and on the philosophical origins of the modern liberal executive are among the best treatments of their subjects that I have read. Throughout, his discussion of Supreme Court cases involving the presidency are illuminating—the effect on me, a reader who has long believed that constitutional law is much less important to the study of the presidency than constitutional politics, was both chastening and inspiring. In all, *The Myth of the Modern Presidency* is a book better recommended for its parts than for the whole.

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Rhodes College

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Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars *by Deborah D. Avant. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1994. 161 pp. $29.95.*

The author proposes an intuitively appealing hypothesis. Civil-military relations should vary substantially between the United States, where authority over military matters is divided between the legislature and the executive, with the former controlling the money and the latter the policy and direction, and the British parliamentary system, which essentially concentrates authority over military matters in the executive. This difference is the master independent variable of the study. The dependent variable is ". . . the integration of military doctrine with national security goals" (p. 4). Principal-agent theory provides the conceptual backdrop of the study. Though the author packages the exposition as an attack on my *Sources of Military Doctrine*, it seems to me that the argument more directly challenges Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*.

The causal chain by which the independent variable influences the dependent variable is complex, encompassing both long-term and short-term processes. The separation of powers ostensibly permitted the U.S. Army to professionalize with little oversight, and thus it developed a "scientific" approach to war, which contributed to subsequent inflexibility. The British Army developed under tight civilian control and thus had to accustom itself to a high degree of flexibility because of the constant expectation of civilian intrusion. When new crises occur that require speedy adaptation, U.S. presidents fear to use the quickest way to alter a military, which is to change not only the top commanders but to manipulate promotions in the broader officer corps, because the powerful Congress may be aroused. The British Army ostensibly knows that its civilian masters have easy access to the promotions lever, and thus officers anticipate its exercise. Because they are more flexible in any case, quick adaptation to civilian needs without much direct intervention is likely.

It is argued that the U.S. Army failed to adapt in Vietnam to the requirements of counterinsurgency because of its institutional commitment to preparation for conventional war in Europe. Perhaps. But the book fails to demonstrate that the army's inertia had anything at all to do with the role of the U.S. Congress, either during the war or previously. It is asserted, not demonstrated, that the focus on Europe was a result of the budgetary politics encouraged by the separation of powers. The fact that Europe was *the* critical army role under the Kennedy/McNamara national strategy of Flexible Response is overlooked. It is asserted, not demonstrated, that fear of the Congress prevented U.S. presidents from changing commanders and intervening in the promotions process. It is not that the evidence adduced for both strands of the congressional theory is unconvincing; the book presents none. Instead we are treated to familiar material about the army's "conventionalization" of the war and the inability of the U.S. president, the CIA, or the U.S. Marine Corps to change the army's strategy by advice or example. (Stunningly absent is a systematic discussion of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's role.)

The discussion of the Boer War concludes that the British Army was quite adaptive and responsive to civilian needs. Yet the brief account is unpersuasive. The British Army was tactically and technologically unprepared for any war. It suffered serious initial reverses; the first commander was relieved. A counterinsurgency doctrine of extraordinary brutality and little political sophistication was ultimately adopted, a doctrine that would have won the U.S. Army no kudos for political responsiveness had it been employed in Vietnam. The Boer guerrillas were deprived of popular support not by winning the hearts and minds of Boer civilians, but by incarcerating them under horrid conditions in concentration camps. The author neglects that the British relied on overwhelming material superiority, marshaling

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perhaps a 10:1 advantage in troop strength. Transposed to Vietnam, this would have easily generated a requirement for a million additional U.S. and South Vietnamese troops, a political and logistical impossibility. After the war, the British government was so appalled by the whole sorry business that a series of reforms of the national security apparatus was launched.

Insufficient material is presented to permit a reader who might have little knowledge of the cases to judge the author's interpretations. Basic disagreements among military historians are not fully elaborated. The peculiarities of each theater of operations, the nature of the adversaries, and the external political environment are sparsely addressed. This is a shame, because a comprehensive and systematic comparison of the Vietnam, Boer, and Malaya wars would seem a promising enterprise.

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Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965–1990 *by Ted Hopf. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994. 306 pp. $49.50.*

For forty-five years, the United States intervened in successive Third World conflicts to demonstrate its capability and resolve to the Soviet Union. Ted Hopf maintains that this costly effort was largely unnecessary and even counterproductive. He builds his case by examining the lessons drawn by Soviet policy makers and analysts from successful and unsuccessful Soviet and American interventions in the Third World.

Hopf sought to test a number of deterrence-based propositions: that commitments are a seamless web; that allies pay attention to events in the periphery when making alliance choices; that dominoes fall; that military defeats are the best communicators of deterrence lessons; and that credibility is based on the behavior manifested during challenge, not on the basis of ensuing behavior. To test these propositions, he identified thirty-eight cases of intervention in the period under study and chose to concentrate on a representative sample. He selected ten interventions that illuminate the primary variable of U.S. involvement and could be regarded as crucial cases. The latter he defined as interventions in which deterrence propositions should be easy to validate in comparison to alternative explanations.

Hopf's most interesting finding is that not a single Soviet in twenty-five years drew any inferences about American resolve in Europe or northeast Asia from any of the thirty-eight cases. Nor did American credibility suffer from defeats like Vietnam: Soviet commentators concluded that Washington was just as likely to intervene in the future on behalf of its Third World clients and just as likely to lose. American successes, like Grenada, were largely unnecessary because the Soviets already regarded American commitments as highly credible. Hopf reasons that it is much easier to establish and maintain a reputation for resolve than deterrence theorists assume.

Hopf also questions the efficacy of military intervention as a conveyor of resolve. The most telling cases for Soviet policy makers and analysts were Soviet defeats that could not be attributed to American military intervention or arms, but to American political and economic support of its clients. These cases demonstrated Moscow's vulnerability and inability to compete outside the military arena. Soviet defeats that were completely independent of American actions also encouraged caution by making policy makers and analysts aware of the powerful, indigenous obstacles to expansion.

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Deterrence is a strategy that employs threats to dissuade an actor from carrying on some behavior it is contemplating. Deterrence theories maintain that successful threats must be sufficient and credible. Most of these theories, nevertheless, fail to specify adequate criteria for assessing credibility. They encourage tautology; commitments that are challenged are judged *ex post facto* not to have been credible. Thomas Schelling is one of the few theorists to hypothesize about the requirements of credibility. He also has a lot to say about the consequences of the failure to maintain a reputation for resolve. The propositions that Hopf tests all derive from Schelling, and their poor fit with empirical evidence from the cold war—and other conflicts—calls them into serious question.

Hopf is not content to drive a well aimed stake through the heart of Schelling's conceptualization of deterrence, but insists, with less justice, that he is testing deterrence theory. The core of deterrence theory consists of assertions that leaders undertake a rational cost-calculus before acting, that their calculus can be manipulated from the outside, and that threats are an efficacious means of shifting that calculus to make proscribed behavior unattractive. Hopf does not address this core. In taking on Schelling, he is testing a series of auxiliary propositions about the nature of credible threats and the consequences of successful versus unsuccessful defense of commitments. Deterrence theorists could—and should—acknowledge that Schelling is wrong and that alternative formulations of credibility need to be developed and tested, as indeed some already have.

Deterrence theorists could also find fault with Hopf's case selection and coding. Schelling the theorist predicted all kinds of negative consequences from the failure to defend commitments. Schelling the cold warrior regarded almost every challenge to the status quo as a communist-inspired challenge to the United States. Hopf also falls into this trap. In all thirty-eight cases, he defines the Soviet Union as the challenger and the United States as the defender. In Vietnam and Nicaragua, to mention just two egregious examples, the United States might properly be considered the challenger, and there is little reason to consider either conflict a deterrence encounter. The overthrow of the shah of Iran in 1979 is coded as a Soviet victory and an American defeat, even though the Soviet Union never threatened or attacked Iran and the shah fell as the result of an internal revolution. His overthrow was a setback for the United States but was not a deterrence failure. Hopf nevertheless describes it as a "crucial case" for deterrence. Deterrence theory, he asserts, would predict that as a result of the shah's fall, the United States would lose its credibility to protect its interests in other parts of the world. To test a theory of commitments, a researcher would have to use cases in which commitments were made. As currently constituted, Hopf's data set and coding cannot be considered a fair test of Schelling, let alone of deterrence theory.

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Dove va la Repubblica 1992–1994: Una transizione incompiuta *by Giorgio Napolitano. Milan, Rizzoli, 1994. 208 pp. 24,000 lire*; **Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic** *edited by Carol Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 266 pp. Paper, $34.95*; **The Transformation of Italian Communism** *by Leonard Weinberg. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1995. 147 pp. $29.95.*

These three books address momentous events and transformations that many believe have placed Italian democracy in a parlous state. There are some grounds for this worry. Overzea-

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lous magistrates, through their probes into corruption, have succeeded in beheading a superannuated political class. Hundreds of new office holders, without any previous political experience, have taken its place. A once hegemonic Christian Democratic party, the fulcrum of postwar Italian political stability, has shrunk to two small, ineffectual Catholic parties. The Socialist party, whose excessive misdoings triggered the "Clean Hands" or "Kick-back City" investigations, has simply vanished from the political scene.

The Italian Communist party, relatively untouched by the taint of scandal, has renamed itself and split into two parties. The PCI's belated, agonized change of name and symbol is recounted in the volume by Weinberg. But events have moved so fast since then that the author's description of the change already appears somewhat stale and musty. This is a pity, because Weinberg also fails to bring off his attempt to show in any rigorous way what weight in these changes might be ascribed to international factors.

No one would claim that the end of the cold war and a bipolar world, the disintegration of the USSR, and similar events went unnoticed in Italy. But the author's use of something called linkage theory adds little beyond overdressed verbiage to the description. The moral is simple: the field of international relations has little to offer that will make comparative politics more robust.

Not only have many of Italy's Old Guard been forced from center stage, old parties have been replaced by even greater numbers of new ones. Party identities have disappeared, ideologies have been cast every which way, and new ad hoc coalitions have brought together the strangest and most unlikely of bedfellows. Silvio Berlusconi's four-month electoral blitz that made him prime minister is only the most astonishing of these changes.

The volume edited by Mershon and Pasquino provides valuable detail and insights regarding these transformations. Corbetta and Parisi, and then Katz, expertly explicate recent changes in Italian electoral laws. Given what happened at the polls in 1994, one can only marvel at the ability of the Italians—citizens and leaders alike—to adopt reforms that then bring about perverse effects.

Douglas Wertman and Martin Rhodes treat, respectively, the last days of the DC as a party and the hurried effort of Achille Occhetto to reinvent an Italian left of which he hoped to become the puppet master. Massimo D'Alema, who replaced Occhetto as the head of the PDS, is following the same strategy, but with equally scarce prospects of success. More than in the past, the left today defines very little that looks precise or coherent.

The government of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi is rightly given high marks by Pasquino and Vassallo. However, the earlier vitally important role played by Giuliano Amato in placing Italy into a "virtuous circle" of macroeconomic management is almost entirely ignored. Only in a later chapter by Richard Locke does one find some indication of Amato's tough-minded adjustments in Italy's fantastic pension system and his abolition of the famous "scala mobile" that governed wage increases.

A chapter on the role of the mafia in the Italian South (by della Porta and Vannucci) is disquieting on at least two scores. First, the authors fail to note that the structure of the nexus between mafia and politics and business depicted here is really *not* peculiar to the Mezzogiorno. Rather and alas, it tends to be ubiquitous to contemporary industrial societies. Second, the authors seem to me to be highly uncritical in the way they use as "evidence" the often outlandish accusations or claims made by the so-called repented mafiosi. One needs to place Italy's morbid interest in this topic in better, more objective context.

The matter of proof should be of growing concern to Italians who have witnessed, and indeed applauded behavior on the part of magistrates that is politically motivated, irresponsible, excessive, and in violation of individual rights. Their methods are often inquisitorial.

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They have abused their enormous powers of preventive detention and of incarceration without bail. In an unspoken conspiracy with the press, they have created the misapprehension at home and abroad that the mere arrival of a notice of investigation implies that the recipient of such a letter is guilty of corruption. Whatever good these magistrates may have achieved must be weighed against the contribution they have made to the erosion of Italy's vital democratic institutions.

Among the authors of these three books, only Giorgio Napolitano addresses this important aspect of Italy's current malaise and transformation. Even he, however, who is not oblivious to the propensity of the magistrates to retaliate against their critics, treats this matter with great circumspection. But it is clear that Napolitano, who saw a good deal of these developments from his lofty position as Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, is deeply concerned about this institutional involution.

Because it is written essentially as a memoir, the Napolitano volume provides additional sharp insights into many of the issues discussed in the Mershon-Pasquino volume. Above all, however, Napolitano provides us with a powerful and eloquently articulated argument about the danger of confusing the baby with the bath water. Yes, political parties should be reformed, but it is essential to remember that democracy cannot do without parties. Yes, the corrupt must leave public office, and institutions like the legislature must function more effectively than in the past. But democracy without a legislature accorded widespread legitimacy is in serious trouble. His messages are clear. It's a pity that this little book is not available in English translation.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After *by Robert H. Johnson. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994. 324 pp. $39.95.*

The purpose of this book is to explain the tendency of U.S. policy makers to exaggerate the nature of international threats during the cold war and the persistence of this tendency into the post-cold war era. The author's explanation rests on the interaction of psychological, domestic political, and systemic variables. The psychological sources of threat exaggeration arise from the basic human needs for order and control. The perceived loss of control brought about by unforeseen changes in the global environment, along with the potential or actual subversion of policy maker's ordering principles, produce high levels of basic fear, which lead to an exaggerated sense of threat. Models and theories to guide actions (for example, deterrence theory), and ultimately concrete actions are attempts to restore a sense of order and control and thus a greater feeling of predictability over future events.

The author identifies three major "periods of peril" in which significant changes in the international system lead to very high levels of uncertainty and fear concerning the Soviet threat: 1949–1951, 1957–1962, 1975–1981. Johnson then examines and critiques U.S. conceptions of threat during these periods in the three principal arenas of U.S.–Soviet confrontation: Europe, nuclear weapons, and the Third World. Given the domestic political system of checks and balances and the susceptibility of the American public to moralistic appeals, leaders learned at the outset of the cold war that the most effective way to mobilize public

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and congressional support for policies was to portray the Soviet threat in dramatic, Manichean terms. Thus, the dispersion of power within America's political system and its unique political and social attitudes served to intensify basic fear in the context of changing U.S.–Soviet competition.

In his critique of U.S. policy, Johnson offers a novel type of revisionist history, one that focuses on psychological rather than economic or sociological influences. He neither blames the cold war on the United States nor rejects the necessity for containment. Rather, he argues, distorted and exaggerated views of the Soviet threat exacerbated the conflict, and led America to pay much higher economic, political, and social costs than were warranted. Overall, Johnson's arguments regarding the exaggeration of threats are thoughtful, and he demonstrates an impressive awareness of a wide range of material. In particular, the book includes an exceptional analysis of cold war nuclear policy. More importantly, perhaps, the book's final chapter provides a thought-provoking evaluation of the new threats to order and control facing America in the post-cold war world and warns us of a tendency likely to shape our views in the future.

The book, however, is not without its weaknesses. To begin, like most psychological variables, the concept of basic fear does not easily lend itself to systematic, empirical testing. As a result, the author is forced to rely exclusively on anecdotal evidence and selectively chosen quotes to show a causal connection between his independent variable and exaggerations of Soviet threats. Also, one is left wondering whether there are worthwhile reasons for making the distinction between policy makers' concerns for order and control in an uncertain global environment and the goal of security in an anarchical international system posited by neorealist theory. (Indeed, much of Johnson's analysis seems wholly consistent with neorealist analysis.) If there are, it would have been useful to explore these distinctions and explain how the author's conception adds to our theoretical understanding.

These weaknesses aside, Johnson has drawn on his considerable experience in policy circles, as well as his long study of the subject, to write a careful and compelling book. He provides an interesting explanation both for America's tendency to exaggerate the Soviet threat during the cold war and how this tendency is affecting our views of emerging dangers in the post-cold war world.

KENNETH E. GILMORE
Rutgers University

Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability *by Paul C. Light. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995. 217 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $11.95.*

With this important book, Paul Light has begun to fill a great gap in the public administration literature. Practitioners have long lamented the federal government's ever expanding levels of hierarchy. Light attempts the first empirical investigation of federal "thickening" in search of its extent, causes, and consequences.

Thickening is difficult to study since no official statistics exist. Light builds a data set showing growth in positions ranging from department secretary (executive level I) to adminis-

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trator (level V) since 1935. From 1960 to 1992, level I to V officials rose in number from 451 to 2,393. While department secretaries increased from ten to only fourteen, deputy secretaries, under secretaries, deputy under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and deputy assistant secretaries flourished. In 1960 each assistant secretary accounted for just 1.4 "title riding" adjuncts; by 1992 there were 5.8. Though Light's main focus is on high level thickening, he finds comparable thickening in the middle levels of government. In short, "presidents have grown increasingly distant from the front lines of government" (p. 8).

Intellectual support for thickening dates back to the 1930s, when classic organization theorists argued that the cognitive limitations of leaders mandated narrow spans of control and thus tall hierarchies. The Brownlow Committee and the Hoover Commissions backed increased presidential staff support. Distrusting career bureaucrats, Dwight Eisenhower and later Republican presidents increased levels of hierarchy to coordinate and control the executive branch, assuming that "more leaders equals more leadership" (p. 30). Yet "Democrats out-layer the Republicans at the administrator level, where most policy gets delivered" (p. 118).

Presidents are not the only culprits. Lacking money for new programs, Congress creates new under secretaries to signal concern about issues and appease interest groups. In search of accountability, Congress created or enlarged general counsels, inspectors general, and chief financial officers. Political appointees and career bureaucrats themselves seek new layers for prestige, autonomy, resources, or to copy other departments. Bureaucracies may also thicken in response to the more complex structures of the modern Congress and White House. New positions are cheap to create. Once created, they nearly always endure. New layers in Washington make reporting demands on regional and field offices, encouraging *their* thickening. Middle level thickening also reflects a changing mix of federal jobs. Finally, pay compression forces bureaucracies to create new layers for backdoor pay raises.

While its immediate monetary costs are low, Light argues that thickening threatens organization capability and accountability, distorts the information reaching leaders, and makes it more difficult to recruit/keep capable officials. Light criticizes Vice President Al Gore's proposals for standard "height and weight" limits across departments, in part since departments vary and we lack the information to set and enforce such limits. Instead, Light supports calls for a national reform commission and for increased presidential reorganization authority. Enhancing the watchdog roles of the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office could discourage high level thickening. Compensation reform and a stronger Office of Personnel Management could control middle level thickening. Perhaps most important, Washington needs a new orthodoxy of thinning, ending micromanagement and empowering lower levels.

Thickening Government is not without flaws. Light should recognize that thickening for presidential control was unnecessary before the New Deal. Previous presidents could control the civil service, and government was smaller and less controversial. Light should make more of findings that layers of appointees concentrate in politically sensitive areas and that on most issues few layers come into play. Finally, Light might do more to tie his desire for a new orthodoxy of thinning to current calls for reinventing government. But these are minor quibbles about an important book opening a new path for research.

ROBERT MARANTO
Lafayette College

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Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science *by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994. 239 pp. $25.00.*

If the measure of an important book is the number of highly attended roundtables devoted to it at major political science meetings and the number of review essays and symposia in professional journals, this is indeed an important book. If the measure of an important book is its staying power, this is a footnote in a lengthy and continuing debate. Nonetheless, it is a book that both advocates and opponents of rational choice theory should read. These are intelligent scholars offering a thoughtful critique of a paradigm that has become increasingly dominant in American political science.

Green and Shapiro set out to demonstrate that, first, rational choice has failed to explain empirical realities and, second, that it cannot succeed. Their case for the first claim rests on the evidence—as they read it—of how poorly rational choice theorists account for voter turnout, legislative behavior, electoral competition, and the extent to which individuals overcome the free-rider problem. Their second claim rests on their argument about the underlying methodological "pathologies" that transcend what they label "pedestrian methodological defects" (p. 33). After describing rational choice theory as they understand it, they systematically review the relevant literature, particularly in American politics. They conclude with their responses to a wide range of possible objections they foresee (or have already experienced) to their perspective.

There is much of interest and even some truth in the claim that rational choice has yet to satisfactorily demonstrate its empirical power. However, this is hardly news. Others have offered similar criticisms of rational choice accounts in various empirical domains; indeed, Green and Shapiro cite many of these critiques. Rational choice scholars themselves are aware of the extent to which they have emphasized the development of theory more than its empirical application. This was one of the central themes in the volume Karen Cook and I edited on *The Limits of Rationality*.

Has rational choice fared as poorly as Green and Shapiro contend? I, for one, do not think so. First, it raises important questions that were previously unexamined. For example, why do not all individuals who have an intense interest in an outcome contribute to its achievement? Admittedly, rational choice scholars do a better job of explaining why there is so much nonvoting and free-riding than they do in accounting for those who do vote or participate. This admission leads to the second reason for my skepticism of Green and Shapiro: no one has yet come up with a better alternative theory that explains more of the variance. This is a point Dennis Chong drives home forcefully in his essay in *Critical Review*. Third, by focusing exclusively on American politics, they can safely ignore the important contributions, both theoretical and empirical, in economic history and comparative politics.

The second claim of methodological pathologies is really their major one. If Green and Shapiro are right, then rational choice can never realize its explanatory aims. The claim turns, however, on, first, a matter of taste and, second, a controversial interpretation of the social scientific enterprise (on this point, see, especially, James Johnson's review in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*). They clearly prefer middle-range theories to universalist ones. They seem to prefer survey research to experimental research. Equally importantly, they take nearly every falsified hypothesis and nearly every attempt to improve the theory as symptomatic of poor social science rather than as just the opposite. The fact that rational choice practitioners now claim a role for information, norms, and institutions represents better

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theorizing. As it develops, rational choice theory represents a transformation of neoclassical economics. Gary Becker is increasingly distant from the mean.

The Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory contributes to an important contemporary debate by systematically presenting a case against rational choice theory. Flawed as this book is by its occasional inaccuracies and all too common self-contradictions, it nonetheless has a powerful message: Rational choice scholars still have a long way to go to demonstrate the empirical power of their theory. Equally important, however, is the hidden and unconscious message of this book: The critics of rational choice have even further to go in devising a satisfying alternative.

MARGARET LEVI
University of Washington

The Suburban Racial Dilemma: Housing and Neighborhoods *by W. Dennis Keating. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1994. 274 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $22.95.*

Racial barriers to housing have helped shape the American metropolis. Discrimination has limited housing options for African Americans and concentrated most subsidized housing in the inner city. White resistance to integrated neighborhoods has exacerbated racial separation within cities and among suburbs. The pervasive influence of race on settlement patterns underlies school segregation in metropolitan areas, shapes the political constituencies of cities and suburbs, and isolates inner-city blacks from economic growth in the largely white suburbs.

W. Dennis Keating provides a thorough, thoughtful, and carefully researched study of the interplay of race and housing. His primary concern is suburbia, but he casts a wide net that encompasses cities as well as suburbs, federal and state in addition to local policies and programs, and both public and private activities. Keating combines a general review of race and housing in the suburbs with a detailed examination of the Cleveland metropolitan area, an urban region noteworthy both for its rank on scales of residential segregation and for efforts to promote integrated housing in the suburbs. The case studies examine a variety of suburban experiences with open housing, including two communities that adopted and sustained integrative housing policies, one that underwent rapid racial transition, another in the midst of racial transition, and a fifth that has resisted efforts to increase its racial diversity.

Keating is advocate as well as analyst; he sees open communities as essential to dispelling racial stereotypes and improving race relations. Lowering the racial barriers in the suburbs requires, he argues, affirmative housing policies that encompass metropolitan areas rather than individual local jurisdictions. "Only at the metropolitan level can there be the possibility of forcing or persuading all suburbs, rather than a few, to eliminate barriers to a more open housing market and society" (p. 5). His examples of successful suburban efforts to sustain racial diversity, in Cleveland as well as other metropolitan areas, are offered in the hope that they will inspire action by federal officials, state governments, judges, and suburban leaders.

Advocacy, however, does not compromise the analysis. Keating understands the myriad obstacles to lowering racial barriers in the suburbs. Race has persisted as a critical factor in housing despite advances in civil rights, less overt racial discrimination, and changing white attitudes towards racially-mixed housing and neighborhoods. Open housing has a limited political constituency and few political champions. Federal, state, and metropolitan efforts

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to open the suburbs have been limited in scope and duration, poorly funded, and have rarely delivered benefits to blacks. Moreover, as Keating underscores in his detailed analysis of the Cleveland area, open housing is a complicated undertaking, requiring a wide range of activities, persistent efforts over time, numerous government and public agencies, and private realtors and financial institutions. Making the task even more difficult politically is Keating's conclusion that race-conscious rather than race-neutral policies are essential to promote housing integration in metropolitan areas. In the absence of such policies, as he illustrates in his case studies, open housing leads to black rather than integrated suburbs.

Keating has no illusions about the immediate prospects of the kinds of changes he urges, but he argues that society's stakes in reducing racial divisions are too high to continue to ignore the segregated metropolis. Perhaps, but there is every reason to believe that the changes Keating desires are even less likely today than when he completed the book a year or two ago. Public officials at every level of government in 1995 are in full flight from the kind of race-conscious policies advocated here, a retreat that commands considerable political support. What is to be learned from this book is why racial change is so difficult in the United States, and this lesson is not a happy one for Keating's vision of an integrated society.

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON
Princeton University

Reforming the Health Care Market: An Interpretive Economic History *by David F. Drake. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1994. 224 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $16.95.*

David Drake traces the history of the development of the U.S. medical care market since the turn of the century. His purpose is to determine the historical causes of the current distortions in the market in order to develop health care reform proposals that solve the current problems of increasing costs and incomplete insurance coverage.

Drake divides the century into four periods. During 1900 to 1940, the market for medical care services was established. With the introduction of scientific medicine and the upgrading of physician training, the quality of medical care increased dramatically. The hospital industry expanded and physicians began to use the hospital as their "workshop." In the latter part of this period, the Blue Cross model of prepaid hospital insurance was established.

During the next twenty-five years, health insurance became an important fringe benefit of employment. At the same time, the federal government pumped money into hospital construction and medical research, further encouraging the growth of the hospital industry and physician specialization. This set the stage for a period of enormous growth in the medical care industry.

With the 1965 passage of Medicare and Medicaid, poor Americans experienced some significant gains in health status, but expenditures on medical care exploded. Medicare and Medicid continued the tradition established by the health insurance industry of "first-dollar" health insurance coverage and free choice of providers, making the consumer immune to the costs of medical care and encouraging providers to supply services with essentially no budget constraints. With the influx of this new money, the medical care industry continued to grow and to become increasingly more specialized and technologically sophisticated. Federal and state policy makers attempted to restrain cost increases through a variety of mechanisms, largely regulatory approaches, to no avail.

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According to Drake, the final phase in the development of the medical care market began around 1980, when the over-supply of providers had grown so large that various components of the industry began to compete for revenues. Coupled with technological advances that allowed for the growth of outpatient surgery, this competition led to a dimunition in the size of the hospital industry. Despite the new competition, most consumers continued to make decisions about purchasing medical care without regard to total costs, because their health insurance covered most of the expense. Health insurers and the government began efforts to control escalating costs through more aggressive purchasing practices, but with limited success. Except for hospitals, the medical care industry continues to expand.

Drake's analysis suggests that the principal cause of market failure in the United States is the structure of health insurance, which insulates consumers from the true price of the medical care they consume. The result of that failure is an industry that is larger than it would probably otherwise be and that is overinvested in science and technology.

In his last chapter, Drake turns his analysis to health care reform proposals. While his examination of President Clinton's 1993 health reform proposal lacks much relevance today, he presents his own alternative formulation of a reform proposal. His proposal would restructure health insurance so that consumers would choose last-dollar insurance that covers large, unpredictible expenditures rather than the current first-dollar type of coverage that covers even small and predictible expenses. In his proposal, out-of-pocket expenses would be limited to a percentage of income, and government financing would be available for those who could not afford coverage. Drake demonstrates that most Americans would benefit from such a proposal.

This book is packed with good information and sound analysis. While health care reform is unfortunately no longer receiving the attention it did last year, this book is well worth reading.

ANNE LENHARD REISINGER
Columbia University

Sharing the Burden: Strategies for Public and Private Long-Term Care Insurance *by Joshua M. Wiener, Laurel Hixon Illston, and Raymond J. Hanley. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1994. 290 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $14.95.*

Although it is a wonderfully clear, lucid, informative book, unfortunately it was out of date as soon as it was published. Wiener and associates begin their excellent book, *Sharing the Burden*, on long-term care for the elderly with this now dated opening line: "The United States is now engaged in a historic debate over how, not if, our health care system should be overhauled." Their recommendations, spelled out in Chapter 10, are by their own description "more far-reaching" than the proposals put forth by President Bill Clinton.

How fickle we are: The Wiener-Illston-Hanley study came out just as the Clintons' health care debate was fading. One marvels at how much social policy has shifted since this book was published. However, the book is by no means the only such solid policy study overtaken by events in 1995. This is not a reason for getting stirred up about the perishability of public policy studies. The current shift is historic. In more ordinary times, one would not expect a competent policy study like this one to be so quickly overtaken by events.

The book deserves the most careful study both by those who agree and disagree with its conclusions. Wiener and his associates skillfully use the data from the Brookings-Lewin ICF

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Long-Term Care Financing model to show the grim facts: people are getting older and frailer, such that the demand for long-term care for the elderly (the group Wiener concentrates on) is rising and will continue to do so. "The overall number of elderly will grow from about 33 million in 1993 to 49 million in 2018, with the population aged 75 and older increasing from 14 million to 20 million. The total number of elderly using nursing homes is projected to increase from 2.2 million in 1993 to 3.6 million in 2018. Similarly, the number of home care users is projected to increase from 5.2 million to 7.4 million over the same period" (p. 8).

In 1986, there were 16,033 nursing homes with 1.6 million beds, more than in acute-care hospitals. Half of the bills for this care are publicly-paid—62 percent were paid by Medicaid in 1993. The Wiener study also shows that the predominant provider of long-term care is not government but the family. "Only about 22 percent of the disabled elderly were in nursing homes in 1987." Still, the authors argue—and their point of view is explicit—that reform is needed, and public programs and expenditures to share the burden for long-term care should increase.

As indicated in the opening sentence of this review, the Wiener study is rich and intellectually strong and should be widely read and used. Along with the earlier work by Alice Rivlin and Joshua Wiener, it has a special place in the health policy literature as the seminal research on a subject that often gets left on the cutting room floor of health policy making—long-term care. There is no way we can avoid the inexorable truth of an aging population and miraculous modern medicine that, like it or not, will keep the issue of care for the elderly on the front burner. We are fortunate to have this Brookings research by Rivlin, Wiener, and others as a knowledge base for understanding this policy terrain.

RICHARD P. NATHAN
State University of New York at Albany

International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic *by Lorraine M. Elliott. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994. 336 pp. $65.00.*

Antarctica is an ice-clad continent of superlatives. It is the highest, coldest, windiest, driest, harshest, most desolate, and least accessible place on earth. Yet, the frozen desert of the polar south remains the most pristine region of the planet and plays an integral part in the global ecosystem. Consequently, conserving the Antarctic environment assumes genuine planetary importance, far beyond the cries of merely being a green shibboleth.

This volume undertakes to examine the record of environmental protection in the frozen south, principally as constructed under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the subsequent arrangement of agreements negotiated for environmental protection there (collectively known as the Antarctic Treaty System). The study focuses on the political evolution of the Antarctic Minerals Convention of 1988, its demise, and the resultant rise of an environmental ethic among those states most active in Antarctic affairs. No less important is the author's attempt to explain how norms and values of decision making on international environmental issues are derived from the realm of political economy and military/security issues. Such a case study for the Antarctic is especially appropriate, and Elliott's volume furnishes an articulate and most welcome contribution toward that end.

The framework for analysis is set in international relations regime theory, as applied to the Antarctic Treaty System. Importantly, the convergence of national interests among

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participant states allows the Antarctic regime to take on a dynamic of its own. Elliott makes this clear in her assessment of the 1988 Antarctic Minerals Convention. The institutional operation of the proposed minerals regime, its balance of powers and responsibilities, and the political-economic implications of its promulgation are aptly delineated. Impressive also is the author's effort to assess the role of nongovernmental organizations as informed actors with influence upon the Antarctic decision-making process.

Particularly interesting is the discussion concerning the evolution of the so-called Beeby draft texts of the Antarctic Minerals Convention. New insights explain how and why various critical provisions in the drafts were modified and evolved into the text.

Significant, too, is the analysis of how and why the minerals convention collapsed, in particular the roles of France and Australia in precipitating that event, the interstate tensions that resulted with other governments (especially the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand), and the denouement leading to the negotiation of a more comprehensive environmental protection agreement in the form of the Madrid Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.

One is struck, however, with the author's curious omission of discussing the movement led by Malaysia during the 1980s in the United Nations to have the Treaty System replaced by a common heritage of mankind regime as support for the waning New International Economic Order. Also, one cannot help but wonder just how genuinely altruistic Australia's environmental motives were in sinking the minerals agreement. The thrust of Elliott's rationale suggests that various environmental concerns had profound impacts upon the Hawke government, shifting its policy position away from a minerals regime in favor of advocating an Antarctic wilderness region. That may be so. Still, the issue of Australia's territorial sovereignty in Antarctica and its securing guaranteed royalty payments from minerals operations there retains a nagging common sense of *realpolitik*. While Elliott does mention the sovereignty issue in passing, such an explanation would seem to warrant more serious scrutiny as a factor contributing to Australia's defection from the minerals agreement.

Appended to the volume is an exceptionally useful bibliography, albeit only a few sources since 1991 are included. Fifty pages of appendices include the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Environmental Protocol and its five annexes.

It is admittedly risky to draw general conclusions from a single case study, especially one concerning the geopolitics of a region as unique as Antarctica. Even so, *International Environmental Politics* succeeds in presenting a cogent, insightful, and well balanced assessment of the Antarctic politico-environmental condition. It will, therefore, prove very worthwhile reading for students of regime theory and the politics of international cooperation, as well as for those interested in environmental law and policy.

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER
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The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government
by Joseph M. Bessette. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994. 289 pp. $32.50.

In this fascinating and thoughtful book, Joseph Bessette takes a critical look at the health and well-being of the modern American state. He evaluates processes of policy formation through the lens of what he calls deliberation—that is, a form of collaborative reasoning

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enabling political decision makers to reach consensus as a result of constructive argumentation and persuasion about their common ends or goals. Bessette ranks deliberative democracy as normatively superior to other political action models, such as rational self-interest maximizers or the aggregation of public opinion preferences, because deliberation holds the empirical promise of producing both a better polity and better policies.

In Bessette's analysis, the institution embodying deliberative democracy is Congress, and he turns to an examination of how it operates in order "to clarify the forces that promote or inhibit the collective reasoning about common goals so necessary to the continued success of American democracy" (p. 5). He assesses how pressures from the executive branch and public opinion can subvert deliberative processes in Congress, with particular attention to a few issue areas such as taxation.

Many readers will enjoy this book immensely, but others should be forewarned that there are serious omissions that block sustained development of the author's thesis. Curiously, one such problem occurs with the concept of deliberation, which Bessette utilizes without ever connecting it to the most basic of all tenets of the American social contract heritage—consent, a principle that epitomizes the idea of people joining together in agreement. Although the author does speak of agreement, consent is absent from the index. He thereby misses the opportunity to link deliberative democracy as a process with its contractarian and constitutional origins.

Equally bleak is the author's institutional treatment of Congress, which omits a sustained discussion of how its representational structure links different levels of the polity together in a federal state. Instead of seeing how Congress nationalizes grassroot constituency preferences, he instead views public opinion merely as a potential resource that can be mobilized by presidents who seek to go "over the heads of their representatives" in Congress (p. 192). By so doing, he obscures the idea of Congress as a site of policy nationalization in which presidents aid that process, not so much by "compel[ing] Congress through public opinion" to act according to the dictates of the White House (p. 204) as by solving the problem endemic to Congress, which is how to transform local interests into national ones. Woodrow Wilson's failure to win support for the Treaty of Versailles, for example, does not so much illustrate the folly of trying to circumvent Congress by a direct appeal to the public as it does the folly of trying to manufacture constituency preferences rather than channel them to the national level.

A final word of caution must be added about Bessette's understanding of what constitutes public opinion, declared by him to be "little more than 'impressions formed on the spur of the moment' rather than the result of 'conscious reasoning'," a view he adopts from James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth*, published in 1909 (p. 214). With all due respect to Bryce, social psychologists have done a bit of work since his time, discovering that opinions are founded upon complex normative, affective, and cognitive attitudinal structures. Far from fleeting, it is these structures that give coherence to everyday life, including one's political orientations, as major schools of electoral studies have shown. Bessette's book would have been more enriched had he only been careful, rather than cavalier, when scrutinizing key connections between public attitudes and political deliberation.

With these reservations aside, however, Bessette crafted his book with an obvious concern for the efficacy of the democratic state, and his many rich insights will be of lasting value to the large community sharing his interests.

EILEEN L. MCDONAGH
Northeastern University

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Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy *edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 146 pp. Cloth, $38.50; paper, $12.95.*

Prior to the breakup of the former Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union, nationalism was regarded negatively as a Third World phenomenon. In contrast to liberal democracies of the West, which were viewed as good, civilized, progressive, and rational, nationalisms and ethnic conflicts of the Third World were considered a problem of the backward nations. Decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East at the end of World War II, as expressed in ideas of national liberation and self-determination, was treated as violent expressions of anticolonialism and anti-imperialism. Thus nationalism and ethnic conflict of the Third World were seen as incompatible with and in direct opposition to democracy.

The end of the cold war and the fall of European communism have changed this oversimplistic view of nationalism. In fact, the redrawing of boundaries of European nation-states and the revival of ethnic nationalisms in societies as varied as France, Germany, Israel, South Africa, India, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have reopened questions over a century-old. Are nation–states viable? How can we reconcile antagonistic group interests within the modern democratic state? Can we reconcile ethnic differences with nationalism and democracy?

As suggested in the title, *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* presents a provocative set of essays about the dilemma of the modern nation–state. The editors, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, have collected nine essays that previously appeared in the *Journal of Democracy*, which present a lively debate of these questions. For Diamond and Plattner, it is the value of democracy that can control the continuing ethnic tensions and violence and the "worst impulses" of nationalism. Thus, they raise these questions as urgent problems and challenges facing the global community.

The first part of the volume begins with an insightful essay about the relationship between nationalism and democracy. Ghia Nodia argues that nationalism is not a one-sided, regressive idea. Instead, it is impossible for nationalism to exist without the idea of democracy and vice versa. In Nodia's view, the two are joined as a sort of "complicated marriage, unable to live without each other, but coexisting in an almost permanent state of tension," (p. 28). In disagreement with Nodia, Francis Fukuyama argues that "tolerant" nationalism can coexist with liberal democracy, but this is only possible in "homogeneous" countries where the dominant culture is "secure" and "less ethnic." (Japan, France, the United States, and Australia are the homogeneous nations Fukuyama has in mind.) On the other hand, supporting Nodia's vindication of nationalism in the context of modernity, Shlomo Avineri rightly notes that the typical view of nationalism as provincial and retrograde is largely a product of "the cultural imperialism of Great Nations" (p. 36). The English, the French, and the Russians, Avineri argues, have unthinkingly and mistakenly regarded their own cultures as the very hallmark of advanced civilization. By so doing, Avineri notes, they have consistently overlooked the strength of nationalist aspirations of smaller nations/peoples, particularly of the East.

The second part of the volume presents selective analyses of the present ethnic conflicts. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. analyzes the success of federalism in India to thwart ethnic conflicts. Rotimi T. Suberu points out that in the case of Nigeria, federalism as a system failed to contain and disperse ethnic conflict. Unlike Hardgrave, who sees the potential value of federalism, Suberu argues that in Nigeria only decentralized self-governance at state and local levels could encourage the practice of genuine democracy and authentic federalism. Donald L. Horowitz focuses on "severely divided societies" which are, in his view, particularly serious

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threats to democratic polities. In Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, Horowitz finds that the rigid and permanent nature of ethnic cleavages threatens democracy. Similarly, Hugh Donald Forbes discusses "deep ethnic divisions" among nationalisms of the Quebecois, Anglo-Canadians, and indigenous Canadians. Shlomo Avineri and Ghia Nodia criticize this kind of uncritical view of ethnic differences and ethnic-national conflict. Indeed, as in the case of former Yugoslavia and South Africa, ethnic difference is not the cause of ethnic violence. Effects of social and economic marginalization of minority groups and unequal distribution of resources are crucial factors that facilitate group conflicts.

Finally, three short but passionate essays in particular pulled my attention. Janusc Bugajski's analysis of varieties of ethnic politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe emphasizes the importance of creating constitutional and civil rights provisions for minority groups. On Serbia's violent conflicts with Croatia and Bosnia, V. P. Gagnon, Jr. offers a fresh perspective that ethnic violence is caused neither by "the spontaneous eruption of *ancient ethnic hatreds*," (p. 97) nor by the cultural and historical conflict between the nationalities that are hostile to democratization. Gagnon argues instead that behind the bellicose Serbian nationalism lies purposeful and rational strategy carried out by Serbian leaders (namely, Slobodan Milosevic), who have skillfully manipulated images of a threat and feelings of ethnic hatred to the Serbian people. Similarly, Vesna Pesic's passionate essay cautions us to consider Serbian violence as a janus-faced nationalism: that is, the engineering of national feelings and fears by old communist elites to reproduce the undemocratic, totalitarian structures in a pursuit of ethnic homogeneity.

HYUN SOOK KIM
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Legislative Leadership in the American States *by Malcolm E. Jewell and Marcia Lynn Whicker. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1994. 232 pp. $39.50.*

Your peers put you in charge, sometimes after a spirited contest. Once chosen you're the boss—likely to be able to name committee members and chairs, control staff, direct the flow of business, assign office space and perks, and do lots of favors, building personal loyalty. You seek added job security in the 1990s by recruiting candidates and providing them campaign money and expertise, by helping friendly incumbents get reelected, and by making it harder for those less friendly. But every time the legislature reorganizes the members can take you out, and experience shows that sometimes they will.

You need to serve many masters all at once: the state, the legislative institution, your caucus, the party outside the legislature, and, of course, your own home district, to name just a few. Those you must lead are diverse in their geographic origins, demographic characteristics, ideology, and points of view. Members' personal hopes, fears and ambitions, and the demands of their constituencies pull them in conflicting directions. Moreover, much of what you do must be done under continuous public scrutiny and evaluation; instant commentary alters the environment for your decisions as you make them. And always the loyal opposition is very purposefully making it as hard as possible for you to do your job, because that's their job.

That's legislative leadership: challenging and daunting, exhilarating and frustrating, powerful and vulnerable.

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This volume is the first to systematically consider the goals and methods of legislative leadership in the states, with an eye toward determining which leaders are most effective and why. It is based upon ninety-two interviews with current and former house presiding officers and majority and minority party leaders and deputy leaders from twenty-two well geographically-distributed states with legislatures of varying degrees of professionalism. Especially interested in women as leaders, the authors overrepresent these among their interviewees. (Deputy leaders were apparently included to augment the interview base; there are more women than men among respondents in this category.) Jewell and Whicker also relied on surveys of political science experts in the politics of individual states.

This book's core chapters are devoted to developing measures to facilitate further systematic comparison of four aspects of legislative leadership in the states: the institutional context, variety in leadership positions and roles, the tools and techniques of leadership, and personal leadership types. For the first three, the authors identify elements of additive, weighted quantitative indexes, marshal interviews and other data to further define and detail these, and then use each index to assign scores in ten states for which they have the most information. These processes involve considerable professional judgment and, as the authors acknowledge and hope, this work will surely be refined as it is used. One small example of an area for possible refinement on which the authors seem unclear is whether small or big partisan majorities empower legislative leaders. William Riker's writing on coalition theory may be helpful here.

For their examination of personal leadership types, Jewell and Whicker explore two dimensions—style of leadership and goals of leadership. Since each dimension has three categories, together they produce a ninefold typology, three of which are identified as dominant and three as recessive. When the model is applied to a subset of interviewees, male legislative leaders are found to have a proclivity for a "command" style and "power" goals, while women are inclined toward a "consensus" style and "process" goals. An interesting question is whether these differences arise out of predispositions linked to gender or whether they are demanded of leaders of different genders in the legislative environment.

Until now, scholarly understanding of American legislative leadership relied upon four sources: intensive study of the U.S. Congress, comparison of formal powers and structures in the states available from the *Book of the States*, relatively narrowly focused detailed comparative studies of specific powers or practices, and scholarship and reportage focused on individual states. Methodological and substantive limits notwithstanding, the ambitious scope of this book and the comparative framework it offers make it an important contribution that extends our understanding of American legislative leadership.

GERALD BENJAMIN
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Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution *by Thomas G. Paterson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 352 pp. $27.50.*

Thomas Paterson eloquently details the change of events in the 1950s that led the United States and Cuba, the closest of neighbors, to part bitter company. Based on newly declassified documents and interviews as well as secondary source materials, Paterson describes the inability of the U.S. government to develop a coherent and effective policy both to maintain

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the corrupt and autocratic Fulgencio Batista in power and to foster a democratic alternative to Fidel Castro.

Paterson reveals how Washington, fixated on the issue of communism, failed to comprehend the extent and nature of dissatisfaction with Batista. Its very support of Batista unwittingly served to strengthen Castro's political base by stirring up nationalistic sentiments among a population hostile to U.S. political meddling since its independence from Spain. Paterson shows, moreover, that the U.S. fixation on Castro's prerevolutionary communist ties was misplaced. The author puts to rest any possible lingering belief that Castro was always a communist and committed to a Marxist view of the world before taking power. Even the veteran foreign service officer appointed U.S. ambassador to Cuba shortly after Castro's triumph acknowledged that Castro's Soviet alliance solidified only after the United States tried to overthrow the bearded leader.

Paterson, in addition, dispels the view that the U.S. "state" or "system" is internally cohesive in the foreign policy domain. He highlights differences within and among the U.S. Havana embassy, the military, the CIA, the State Department, the White House, and the House and Senate. Agencies operated somewhat at cross-purposes, and individuals squabbled. These differences contributed to uncoordinated decision making. Batista's fall and Castro's rise to power were from Washington's vantage point further muddled by President Dwight Eisenhower's tendency to delegate authority to lower echelons. The inattentive president failed to grapple with the Cuban problem until just before Batista's flight. Ironically, the then U.S. Ambassador Earl Smith, who should have understood Cuban political developments best, since he was on the scene, proves to have ranked among the least informed.

While Paterson's book explicitly contributes to a better understanding of why such an hegemonic power as the United States failed to get its way, even in a small dependent economy, it implicitly contributes to an understanding of why Washington may be no less likely to make Cuba "safe for democracy" in a post-Castro era than in the 1950s. For one, he highlights how important exile activity is to island political developments. Groups within the exile community, important in the 1950s to Castro's rise to power, now are much more moneyed, more organized, and more skilled at influencing U.S. foreign policy than four decades ago. The exile community has come to be dominated by a leadership demonstrating little respect for political pluralism. Second, the conditions for installing a meaningful democratic regime have declined since the 1950s, even as capitalism, under the banner of socialism, returns to Cuba. There no longer are any political parties other than the Communist party or autonomous organizations on which to build democracy.

But perhaps the greatest tragedy is not the difficulty of creating political democracy out of the ashes of Cuba's sunken economy but the difficulty of preserving and advancing Castro's genuine social accomplishments (not detailed in the book): Cuba's impressive health care and educational advances, women's social and economic gains, and improvements in race relations. The United States should try to help preserve the good of the revolution and not settle for a seeming political victory that excludes what democracy should entail, namely widespread economic, social, and political rights and opportunities.

SUSAN ECKSTEIN
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Collective Security beyond the Cold War *edited by George W. Downs. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994. 275 pp. $42.50.*

In their ideal form, collective security systems are universal, all-against-any-aggressor systems that bind all states to automatically take up arms against any aggressor that emerges

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from their midst. Both proponents and opponents of collective security tend to focus on its ideal form, spawning simplistic and tendentious debates. Liberal proponents emphasize the potential of collective security to temper anarchy and lessen the probability and consequences of war. Alternatively, realist opponents hold collective security to absolute standards and argue that it can never be made to work. For proponents, the more collective security can approximate the ideal form, the more hope and insurance it provides. For opponents, the ideal form makes a fatter target.

Downs's volume sets out to add nuance to debates about collective security. To do this, Downs relaxes the definition of collective security and, instead of asking whether or not collective security could ever be universal or stop great power wars, Downs asks if any form of collective security can solve any security problems, under what conditions, and at what cost. Downs defines collective security as including any inward-focusing security institution that attempts to regulate the behavior of its members. This definition allows consideration of a wider set of institutional forms including concerts of great powers and regional collective security systems. The looser definition still differentiates collective security systems from traditional alliances; the latter are oriented externally against known adversaries. In this light, collective security systems span time and space from the Concert of Europe to the Economic Community of West African States. Further, collective security systems are fertile laboratories for theorists because they share characteristics with alliances, public goods, and international institutions.

The chapters in this book reflect this wide substantive and theoretical range. One of the authors is an historian and the others come from a variety of international relations subfields and methodological specialties ranging from international political economy and security studies to game theory and formal modeling. They cover a number of subjects including the Middle East after the cold war, the former Soviet Union, the Concert of Europe, and alternatives to NATO.

Many of the chapters succeed in adding nuance and depth to existing scholarship on collective security. Downs and Keisuke Iida rebut six prominent arguments against collective security. For example, critics often argue that free-riders cripple collective security systems or that a hegemon makes collective security impossible, because other states can't effectively balance against it. Drawing lessons from analyses of alliances, regimes, and oligopolies, Downs and Iida point out that hegemony also has benefits: the provision of side-payments, punishment of defectors, leadership—all things that reduce the corrosive effects of free riders, differential perceptions of threat, and uneven distribution of benefits. Charles Kupchan uses international institution theory to make a case for collective security. Charles Lipson surveys debates about the length and effectiveness of the Concert of Europe, concluding that it lessened conflicts because it helped states communicate. Stephen Walt explains why collective security systems have trouble confronting revolutionary change—an analysis also applicable to internal conflicts. Charles Glaser assesses five possible future security arrangements for Europe and argues that NATO will continue to best serve Western interests.

This book is a must read for scholars interested in collective security and offers useful insights for other international relations scholars as well. Its greatest success is in redefining—through definition and example—what it means to study collective security. In so doing, Downs recasts collective security debates and opens up the subject to a broad array of scholars with different area, historical, methodological, and theoretical backgrounds.

DAN LINDLEY
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Seasoned Judgments: The American Constitution, Rights, and History *by Leonard W. Levy. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers. 444 pp. $39.95.*

A prolific author and editor who has spent much of his life teaching at Brandeis University and Claremont Graduate School, Levy presents a wide range of writings on American constitutional history that he has previously published in his *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution*, a number of his books, and several law reviews. Levy divides his essays into groups that deal respectively with rights, with constitutional history, and with the Marshall Court. As in his other works, Levy writes with flair and occasional hyperbole. The law review pieces contain copious scholarly references, and for the most part the shorter, more readable essays merely list a number of secondary sources for readers to consult.

Those who have followed Levy's extensive writings will not be surprised to find that he returns again and again to discussions of the Bill of Rights and especially to the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. It may be ironic, but again, knowledgeable readers will not be surprised that while arguing that theories of constitutional interpretation predicated on the original intent of the Framers or ratifiers of the Constitution are inadequate, Levy continually examines English common law precedents, understandings, and practices in the early national period, and the original debates over the meaning of key constitutional clauses.

Although Levy's views are generally liberal, and he frequently targets conservatives like Robert Bork, Levy's judgments can sometimes surprise. Thus, in an essay on "Property as a Human Right," Levy argues that the Supreme Court's rational basis test does not adequately protect property rights. In an essay on "Incorporation and the Wall," he wisely suggests that the exercise of "common sense" (p. 136) would deflect the law from dealing with trifles and that challenges to every act of cooperation between the state and religion are sometimes ridiculous.

With age, Levy has reassessed some of his earlier judgments, especially regarding the First and Fifth Amendments. Still, he is rarely charitable, and he sometimes resorts to *ad hominem* attacks when he crosses swords with those who disagree with him. In this reviewer's judgment, his book would be better if he had omitted a few of the longer pieces – for example, his fourth essay "On the Origins of the Free Press Clause," where his arguments with authors whose own essays are not on exhibit for comparison can be difficult to follow. Although it is informative, Levy's essay on "Lemuel Shaw: America's Greatest Magistrate" also seems a bit out of place in a volume that otherwise focuses on the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court.

Readers are likely to come away from this book with a deep respect for Levy's versatility of interests and his depth of scholarship, but the book itself is somewhat schizophrenic. The longer essays, as well as a brilliant shorter piece entitled "Textualism," point to the ambiguities of the U.S. Constitution. In accord with the book's title, they suggest that a true understanding of the document requires the kind of seasoned judgments that few without Levy's own love for and familiarity with history are likely to be able to make. By contrast, the shorter essays suggest that many constitutional issues and cases are simple and can be explained with ease.

Ultimately, Levy's essays reflect the ambiguity implicit in a Constitution that is at once a public charter and the foundation of massive legal and scholarly edifices. The essays should also open windows onto and stimulate further interest in Levy's own prodigious scholarship.

JOHN R. VILE
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We the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy *by Jeffrey Abramson. New York, Basic Books, 1994. 308 pp. $25.00.*

Abramson's objective is to show us two models of the jury and the transition that is taking place in its role as we move from the jury as a deliberative body to a representative one. This change takes away from the jury its noble role as the premier body to translate democratic ideals into everyday practice and makes it just another group whose task is to represent constituents, where discussion and thought leading to collective wisdom are secondary as they strive for "the vote."

Abramson examines six primary elements of the jury process in historic and political detail. In the first section we see the transition of the jury from being locally informed of the activities of the defendant, including the incident itself, to today's fear of anybody with knowledge of the incident. Abramson's description makes fascinating reading, but does it illustrate the move to lessen deliberation by removing more knowledgeable persons? Research indicates that pretrial publicity does produce biases, despite a person's statement to the contrary. He misses this body of social science research.

His second element is the issue of jury nullification. Letting the jury decide the law, as well as the facts, is a powerful and precious right that jurors may not know or are instructed to avoid. In practice we have seen it in the trials of William Penn, John Peter Zenger, John Delorean, Marion Barry, and many others. Abramson claims this privilege of civil disobedience should be explicitly known to the jury as a requisite to full deliberation. He gives us an engrossing chapter filled with easily identified examples but does little to get us from the deliberation to the representation models.

The movement toward more representative juries through broader source lists, the removal of exemptions from service, and the limits upon use of peremptory challenges is then examined. Has this striving for a representative jury consciously placed jurors in a role as representative of a constituent group and, therefore, in an uncompromising position, contrary to the deliberation role? The move to representativeness is further explored in a discussion of scientific jury selection. The author joins many others who feel jury consultants are questionably effective and raise the issue of eliminating peremptory challenges.

In the discussion of the unanimous verdict, we see the anchor of the author's deliberative mode—everyone is important to the deliberation. He examines the mandate for unanimity in noncapital felony cases, which is required in all but two states (Oregon and Louisiana). This crucial requirement makes each person on the jury of equal importance and gives a minority veto. Abramson senses a movement for nonunanimous verdicts, which is overstated, but which may increase and become a ballot initiative in California if the O. J. Simpson jury cannot reach a verdict.

The last topic of the book examines race and the death penalty. Unfortunately, the topic of the death penalty itself is so controversial that it becomes devisive in terms of the competing models. To excuse those jurors opposed to the death penalty is to deny representativeness; but can one expect a complete deliberation with unalterable views that denies the deliberation model? Perhaps the models are not mutually exclusive and therein lies a greater value for the book. Perhaps we should consider reconciling the best of both models. Abramson's journey from the deliberative to the representative jury is a trip cut short, but filled with enlightenment and many wonderful sights along the way.

G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN
National Center for State Courts

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Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency: Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration *by Robert Maranto. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 182 pp. $52.95.*

This book explores the relations between career and noncareer public officials in the U.S. federal government. In a departure from the traditional reliance on single-case studies for examining questions of public administration, the author analyzes this important subject by using theoretical, historical, and empirical arguments. Though his research approach and data are insufficient to provide conclusive answers to all of his questions, he succeeds in disabusing us of several narrowly based views that have become part of the conventional wisdom surrounding career-noncareer interactions, especially during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.

The central argument of the study is that goal congruence regarding an agency's mission is the most important factor in explaining how well careerists and their political bosses cooperate at that agency. Agencies with missions that are supported by the current presidential administration tend to experience significantly better relations between careerists and appointee than agencies with missions that are opposed by the president. The Reagan administration may have taken steps to constrain and subvert the activities of agencies with liberal social welfare and regulatory missions, as several case studies have shown; however, the administration simultaneously acted to enhance the performance and autonomy of conservative defense agencies whose missions the president fully supported.

After a brief introduction, Maranto reviews the history of bureaucrat-politico relations and reform in the U.S. from the Revolutionary War through the Reagan administration. Based on this deft and informative sweep of history, Maranto concludes that the battle for political control over the bureaucracy, far from being an invention of the Nixon and Reagan administrations, has raged in virtually every administration since George Washington's.

Chapter 5 provides aggregate empirical tests for several hypotheses gleaned from the literature on career-noncareer relations within the federal bureaucracy. It is the most ambitious and novel section of the book, and could stand quite well on its own. The data used in the analysis are survey responses from 513 high-level career officials and 118 appointees in 15 different federal agencies with missions that were categorized as Defense, Social Welfare, Regulatory, or that ubiquitous category, "Other." The survey responses indicate that career-noncareer relations during the Reagan administration were excellent in Defense agencies, varied among the Social Welfare and Other agencies, and were significantly strained in the Regulatory agencies. Based on a refined analysis, Maranto concludes that leadership changes improved relations over time in several Regulatory and Other agencies. Interestingly, relations tended to improve about as much in the year before the leadership change as in the years during and after the change.

The main drawback of the study is that certain characteristics of the research design and data limit the scope and conclusiveness of the empirical results. Seventy percent of the agencies that were petitioned to participate in the study refused, and 51 percent of the employees surveyed chose not to respond. Selection bias could undermine some of the results, since unity of purpose (and keeping complaints to oneself) might be valued to a greater extent in military than in nonmilitary organizations. Moreover, fourteen of the fifteen responses of appointees in Social Welfare agencies were from one anomalous agency—Housing and Urban Development. To his credit, Maranto acknowledges most of the weaknesses in his data.

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This is a fine book—a solid contribution to our understanding of career-appointee relations within the bureaucracy. Noteworthy are the historical overview, the empirical analyses of Chapters 5 and 8, and the general effort of the author to move beyond single-case studies to a systematic examination of public administration questions. Many scholars of the executive branch should benefit from his analysis.

PATRICK J. WOLF
Columbia University

Understanding the Nature of Poverty in Urban America *by James Jennings. Westport, CT, Westport, 1994. 209 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $17.95.*

This text is an introduction to the major issues about poverty in the United States. The book originated in 1991 when, under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Boston Foundation's Persistent Poverty Project, a diverse group of local organizations working to combat poverty asked the author to summarize the main debates in the field. This volume contains the results of that research.

Jennings begins by identifying eight significant poverty-related issues. The issues are well chosen and include subjects such as the measurement of poverty, national policy toward the poor, the demographic characteristics of poor people, the question of the "underclass," and a comparison of poverty in the United States with that of other countries. The author then devotes one chapter to each of these debates.

In the chapter on national policy, for example, the author examines the policies toward the poor of every presidential administration from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. Although the reviews are necessarily brief, they do capture the essence of each administration's policy. Kennedy emphasized services. Nixon began block grants and enacted some important social reforms. If Roosevelt, the author points out, tried in a limited way to fix the system, Reagan sought to fix the poor. While it is unlikely that someone who is knowledgeable about these administrations would learn anything new from such sketches, the analysis is in each instance a clear, concise, and fair-minded introduction to the subject.

The author leans toward the structural view of poverty. He is dubious about interpretations of poverty as an individual, local, or minority problem, and critical of those who suggest that the poor are poor because they are lazy or immoral. He is also sensitive to the uses of poverty, to the ways in which its existence provides economic benefits and an ideological scapegoat for those who are not poor. From this perspective, it is only natural for him to argue that unless other interpretations gain credence, not much progress will be made against either the myths or the facts of poverty.

For the most part, the ideas in this book are derivative. The book is written as a literature review, rather than as an original work of scholarship. Yet the review of the literature is skillfully done, and someone who was looking for a point of entry to this literature would do well to start here.

JOEL BLAU
State University of New York at Stony Brook

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Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements *by Lawrence E. Susskind. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 193 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $24.95.*

Lawrence Susskind argues persuasively that current models of global environmental negotiation are critically flawed and in need of revitalization. He provides a useful application of negotiation theory to global environmental treaty making. In evaluating case studies of international environmental agreements, Susskind develops a strategic approach to global environmental degradation.

Susskind's concern is with how global environmental negotiations might be structured more effectively to address both internal and external pressures on negotiating committees. The book evaluates case studies of fifteen environmental agreements, exploring specific elements inherent in global environmental negotiations—representation, the tension between advocacy and science, issue linkages, monitoring, and enforcement. These categories provide logical frameworks through which Susskind draws beneficial lessons.

Environmental Diplomacy provides a useful integration of the negotiation literature into the global environmental arena. For students of environmental politics the text provides an excellent introduction into the strategic negotiation literature. For those well versed in international relations, the text provides a critical introduction into emerging global environmentalism. As the tide of bipolarism recedes, global environmental degradation may replace military security as the dominant international challenge. Susskind's observations, therefore, deserve attention.

Susskind's main contribution is in his three-stage process for revitalizing global environmental treaty making. After developing a schematic explaining why global environmental negotiations have largely failed, Susskind provides a strategy that differs markedly from existing models. Drawing largely on the principles of the Salzburg Initiative—ten areas of general agreement that grew out of the Salzburg Seminars in 1990 and 1991—Susskind sketches a three-stage strategy for productive negotiation while accommodating the internal and external pressures on national negotiating committees.

The three-stage process utilizes the existing United Nations-based framework of environmental treaty making. Each stage of Susskind's model contains a prescribed time frame, but does not assume or require that parties move on to the next stage. Rather, each progressive stage makes it more likely that parties will choose to move on to later stages. This recognizes the basic foundation of all successful negotiations: at the very least, get parties talking to one another.

Stage I negotiations focus on defining the scope of the threat and articulating key principles. The outcomes of Stage I include a report of scientific findings, a statement of principles, and a signed general agreement requiring no ratification. Stage II negotiations are directed at agreement on general commitments, financial arrangements, and reporting and monitoring processes. The outcome of Stage II negotiations includes a signed convention and multiple protocols, all of which must be ratified by at least 50 percent of the parties who begin Stage II. Stage III negotiations revolve around reviewing, evaluating, and possibly tightening Stage II protocols.

At first glance, Susskind's analysis may appear somewhat simplistic. Global environmental negotiations are clearly very difficult processes, and simply dividing up negotiations and imposing a time frame doesn't solve that difficulty. Still, Susskind's approach may maximize the chances that parties with very different interests may begin negotiating, albeit hesitantly. Parties to environmental negotiations possess very different industrial and economic pro-

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cesses, fuel resources, and technologies. Different parties, therefore, favor different types of environmental controls. Susskind recognizes that. Thus, to get these parties to the table (Stage 1) it is necessary to create a "safe" (that is, noncommittal) environment. While, the Susskind approach is not problem free, Susskind is correct in arguing that we have no choice but to move forward. Any framework that is incrementally better than the existing should be embraced.

Overall, the book is valuable. It is well written and thoughtful. And, perhaps in the best tradition of political science, Susskind engages a big picture problem with detail, but without being distracted by minutiae. Anyone interested in environmental politics, negotiation processes, or international relations would enjoy the book.

MATTHEW ALAN CAHN
California State University, Northridge

War and Peace in Ireland: Britain and the IRA in the New World Order *by Mark Ryan. London, Pluto Press, 1994. 173 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $15.95.*

Thus far in Northern Ireland, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) cease-fire declared in August 1994 has held. The British and Irish governments continue to conduct "talks about talks" with nationalist parties in the North in hope of devising a formula to entice a fragmented and distrustful loyalist community to the negotiating table. The Unionist parties angrily contend that the Provos have gained the upper hand—an impression reinforced by the formal welcome in America for Gerry Adams. Nonetheless, the author argues that the peace process may prove a "cruel deception" because of the danger that a depleted Republican movement will be maneuvered into a peace deal that will only "restructure relationships of conflict without removing the underlying injustices" (p. viii). Ryan points out persisting segregative practices, job discrimination, and wide wage differentials between loyalists and nationalists. The bargaining dilemma in Ulster remains the same as ever: how to deliver necessary concessions to nationalists without inciting loyalists to violent reaction.

Ryan contends that both the armed and the constitutional Irish nationalist organizations have been substantially weakened by external events such as the Soviet collapse, the cut-off of Libyan arms, recent settlements in the Middle East and South Africa, and a widespread revulsion at the nationalist slaughter in former Yugoslavia. He portrays the IRA and its mainly Catholic working class supporters as worn down by the long grim grind of twenty-five years of fighting the British military and loyalist death squads. After their initial electoral successes during the H-block hunger strike in the early 1980s, the Provos made no new gains among Northern nationalists nor any inroads in the Irish Republic. The future only offered the prospect of many more years of lethal stalemate. In these dire circumstances Ryan believes that the Republicans are likely to capitulate to schemes of ineffective reforms that, moreover, keep Ulster British. After all, immediate unification and troop withdrawal are not on the agenda. However, it may be much more accurate to say that *all* parties—except perhaps the Unionists—have been worn down by the struggle and accordingly all have scaled down their objectives.

Ryan consistently underplays IRA savvy and overplays British resolve. The 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement is treated as a tribute to clever British politicking, when there are credible accounts available attesting that Margaret Thatcher resorted to the agreement only under

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severe pressure from U.S. politicians for a political initiative. The IRA recognized long ago that no military victory was possible; British authorities took rather longer to admit that repressive measures only created more IRA recruits. It would be extremely foolish to ignore the massive damage inflicted, especially in London, by IRA bombs. Like it or not, IRA representatives are at the bargaining table because they fought their way there.

The new global situation cuts both ways: the end of the cold war enabled President Bill Clinton to overrule an invariably pro-British State Department regarding contact with the Provisionals. U.S. involvement has been an utterly essential ingredient in launching the peace process. Ryan himself points out that Tories today are inclined to seek short-term gains (rather than cling to the Ulster link), and, therefore, to venture "into uncharted waters where almost anything can happen" (p. 161). Exactly. No one can rule out a deal that in retrospect will turn out to have been a stepping stone to some sort of Irish unity. Despite my quibbles, this is a stimulating and occasionally insightful little book.

JOHN KURT JACOBSEN
University of Chicago

United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change *by Peter J. Schraeder. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1994. 347 pp. Cloth $59.95; paper, $27.95.*

Peter Schraeder's new analysis of American foreign policy toward Africa is a welcome addition to the literature on American relations with countries south of the Sahara and to the more general study of American foreign policy. The book's primary appeal is its extensive investigation of how bureaucratic politics affect U.S. policy toward Africa and under what conditions policy is not made as business as usual.

The core of the book is three extraordinary comprehensive case studies of American foreign policy toward Zaire, Ethiopia–Somalia, and South Africa. Relying on archival research, a thorough review of the scholarly literature, and interviews, Schraeder is able to paint a detailed picture of how the different bureaucracies that comprise the American foreign policy apparatus—the State Department, the Office of the President, and the defense, intelligence, and aid communities—clash and cooperate to make policy in regard to contentious issues. Experts will find that Schraeder has taken care to get all the details right, while those with more general interests will find that the details never overwhelm the story. As a result, the book will be of interest to both Africanists and those who study American foreign policy. It is well written and could easily be used in the classroom.

A critical issue for Schraeder concerns discontinuities in the bureaucratic politics of American foreign policy. He makes the sensible, although hardly novel contention that only during crises are presidents, Congress, or important lobbying groups able to change the course chartered by compromises among bureaucrats. Each of the chapters clearly demonstrates why a crisis disrupted the making of foreign policy and what had to happen before authority once again reverted back to the State Department and the other agencies.

The last chapter on U.S. foreign policy after the cold war is short and something of a disappointment. Most of Schraeder's examples are drawn from diplomacy when the cold war affected many of the views of policy makers. Therefore, he does not have much leverage on post-cold war issues. In particular, the course of diplomacy promoting economic and

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political reform is hard to extrapolate from the diplomatic record towards Zaire, Ethiopia–Somalia, and South Africa.

JEFFREY HERBST
Princeton University

Gay and Lesbian Politics: Sexuality and the Emergence of a New Ethic *by Mark Blasius. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1994. 225 pp. Cloth, $39.99; paper, $18.99.*

The subtitle to this important book better describes Blasius's intent: to link the effects of a politicized sexuality to the emergence of a new ethos. Blasius emphasizes the uniqueness of gay experience, and in doing so he grounds an argument for gay rights not on privacy but on the right to establish and construct one's own sexual and personal associations with others—what he calls relational rights.

Because he emphasizes the uniqueness of gay experience, Blasius starts with sex. In assuming responsibility to administer life and regulate individuals within its economic, social, and political systems, the modern state (and society) effects its values across two axes: statistically defined groups (populations) and individuals, or more specifically the bodies of individuals. Both are venues of intervention to effect social administration and are manifestations of power in modernity, what Michel Foucault termed biopower. The contribution of lesbian and gay experience to the understanding of the dynamic of biopower is to problematize some of its groundings. The accumulated experience of sexual praxis among lesbians and gay men comes into dissonance with the coordinating themes of social regulation, particularly but not exclusively in matters sexual. Sexuality, being so intimate, avails an internal arena of political combat and thus, literally, is the nexus for lesbians and gay men between the private and the public. The praxis of sexuality leads to the politicization of the self, since the self itself is the ultimate object of social regulation via sexuality. Though he relies heavily on Foucault throughout, Blasius stands in a long tradition from the prefects of medieval monasticism to Sigmund Freud in joining the development of the self [soul?] to the disciplining of sex.

As sexuality has become a venue of internalized social administration, coming out—the revealing of sexual practice in public and the understanding of its social characteristic—becomes crucial. In coming out, the individual engages in a dialogue not only with her or himself, but also with social meanings imbedded in the institutions, symbols, and language sets surrounding them in regard to sexuality. One aspect of Blasius's argument is that where coming out is seen by many as an end point of ego development, for him it is just a beginning of a social discourse and personal agency. The public statement of political identity becomes a responsibility and a right to participate in creating a community of identity and care.

This is the ethos that Blasius explains: a stylized life not exhausted by style, a life expanding on and critiquing the boundaries of socially presented sexual relationships, but one which also freely takes on the social responsibility to participate in building the institutions of an emerging community. In part, it is an aspect of Burkean responsibility of citizenry (or even older, those of Athenian citizenry) and partly an empirical observation that lesbian and gay identity draws a large portion of its meaning from the gay community. Blasius completes his argument with a call for the accumulation and codification of gay (lesbian) knowledge and wisdom that comes from the experience of becoming gay as a life long project. This

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knowledge becomes the basis for critiquing truth claims offered solely on the basis of heterosexual homodoxy.

In terms of day-to-day political discourse, Blasius's most important contribution is his fresh approach to the developing argument for gay rights as a right of association. By emphasizing relational rights, he jumps back to an initial base of the privacy principle in *Griswold v Connecticut*, in which the right to privacy (in this case for the right of a married couple to obtain contraceptive devices) was based on an intimacy that allows the partners to create and construct their own relationship(s) through their own agency. State regulation of contraceptive devices was held an unsustainable intrusion into this intimacy and thus a privacy protection was afforded. Similarly, Blasius is arguing on behalf of gay men and lesbians, not only for the legal right to have sex in private but to create each other intimately and ultimately to be a whole person in public.

One unfortunate aspect of the book is that the logic of its argument requires the casual reader to come to terms with the terminology of post-structural theory before getting to the more usable arguments or relational rights. In addressing the profession, Blasius may lose some readers in the lesbian and gay community. On the other hand, every serious scholar of gender, sexuality, and politics will need to deal with this significant contribution to the discussion.

ROBERT W. BAILEY
Rutgers University—Camden

More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World *by Peter W. Rodman. New York, Scribners, 1994. 654 pp. $35.00.*

Peter Rodman's account of Soviet-American competition for influence and dominance in the Third World undertakes to tell the story in the grand manner, both in length and with a moral concern. Further, it attempts to combine the long view, generalizing insights of the historian dealing with some seventy years of decolonization's impact on international relations with the actual experience of a participant in the decision-making processes from 1969 to 1990.

The book begins by setting down what Woodrow Wilson and V.I. Lenin had to say on the colonial question and continues with a compact chronological discussion of American and Soviet policies before World War II. Starting with the U.S. engagement in Vietnam, it offers increasingly detailed analysis of superpower behavior in various Third World crises—Angola, Afghanistan, the Gulf, and Central America. The Reagan Doctrine and its impact on Soviet policies and behavior is the centerpiece in the second part of the book and is presented as singularly successful in turning around the American disengagement precipitated by the debacle in Vietnam.

Despite conscientious research, there is not much new or challenging, either about the sources for the communists' commitment to the colonial question or about actual Soviet policies in the colonial and postcolonial areas. This is a conventional recounting of fairly well known facts or developments through the prism of ascribing to Lenin and his successors narrow and calculated self-interest. The same could logically be said about the discussion of American principles and practice. Despite the author's claim of having avoided simplistic moralizing and his effort to balance the relative weight of moral convictions and strategic

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needs, he invariably identifies American decisions as based on a sense of "responsibility for the international order." In these days of deconstruction, general cynicism, and comparative studies of superpower behavior, it is a quaint throwback to be reminded of the moral or universal concerns that guide American policies. In this scheme of things, the Iran-contra affair is treated as a bastard child of the Reagan Doctrine, a miscarriage or an unfortunate deviation, not the unsurprising outcome of a hubris wherein the "noble" aim justified any and all means.

The latter parts of the book, dealing with policies in which Rodman participated either directly or indirectly, will undoubtedly offer readers some rewarding insights into personalities, decision-making processes, and actual policies. After all, the author was uniquely placed—first as an assistant to Henry Kissinger in the Nixon and Ford administrations and then during the Reagan years—to recount and use various bits of insider information and personal experience.

What distinguishes the book, however, is not the new information about American policies in various Third World conflicts and their resolution, but rather the unabashed apologia for the Reagan Doctrine. This committed the United States to provide covert military support to the guerrillas waging wars against Soviet-backed governments in the Third World. In the Rodman scenario, the Doctrine not merely reversed America's post-Vietnam paralysis and tipped the scales in the competiton with the Soviet Union. It was the principal cause for the collapse of communism in the USSR as well.

To readers less certain about the unfailing righteousness of America's course or the benefits of its victory, the grand design of the book leaves many equally important issues either unaddressed or unanswered, such as the price of victory or the future of the Third World after victory in the cold war. It is inadequate to state, as Rodman does in his introduction, that what was at stake in American competition with the Soviets over the Third World was to "restore" to the emergent countries the possibility "to develop on their own right." That unctious certainty displays surprising indifference to the price Third World nations had to pay in the great power rivalry that was to a large extent driven by narrow and selfish national self-interests.

ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER
Columbia University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America *by Paul Avrich. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 574 pp. $75.00.*

Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era *by Jerome Huyler. Lawrence, Kansas University Press, 1995. 394 pp. $40.00.*

National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981–1991 *by Christopher Simpson. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 1031 pp. $119.95.*

New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and Communities *edited by Amitai Etzioni. Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1995. 320 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.50.*

The Political Dictionary of Modern Middle East *by Agnes Korbani. Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1994. 262 pp. Cloth, $48.50; paper, $34.50.*

The United Nations and El Salvador, 1990–1995, with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Blue Book Series, Volume IV *by the United Nations. New York, United Nations Publications, 1995. 611 pp. $29.95.*

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

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

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

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